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Young v. United Parcel Service 
12-1226 
 
Ruling Below: Peggy Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 707 F.3d 437, (4th Cir. 2013), cert 
granted, 134 S.Ct. 2898 (2014). 
 
Employee brought action against her employer, alleging that she was the victim of pregnancy 
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (PDA). The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted 
employer's motion for summary judgment, and employee appealed. 
 
Question Presented: Whether, and in what circumstances, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e(k), requires an employer that provides work accommodations to non-pregnant 
employees with work limitations to provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who 
are “similar in their ability or inability to work.” 
 
 
Peggy YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 v.  
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellee, 
and 
United Parcel Service of America, Inc.; UPS Heal Program; Aetna Life Insurance 
company; Aetna Disability and Absence Management, Defendants. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
 
Decided on January 9, 2013 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
 
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge: 
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), which 
amended the definition of discrimination on 
the basis of sex in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) to provide 
that it included discrimination in 
employment “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions.” Invoking both the PDA and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (the 
“ADA”), Peggy Young (“Young”) appeals 
the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for her employer, United Postal 
Service, Inc. (“UPS”). For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm. 
I. 
A. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we recite the facts in the light most 
favorable to Young as the non-moving 
party. Three UPS policies lie at the core of 
this dispute. First, UPS defined among the 
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essential functions for all drivers the ability 
to “[l]ift, lower, push, pull, leverage and 
manipulate ... packages weighing up to 70 
pounds,” and to “[a]ssist in moving 
packages weighing up to 150 pounds.” 
Second, the applicable Collective 
Bargaining Agreement (the “CBA”) 
provides temporary alternate work 
(“TAW”) to employees “unable to perform 
their normal work assignments due to an on-
the-job injury.” To comply with this CBA 
provision, UPS offers light duty work to 
those employees injured while on the job or 
suffering from a permanent impairment 
cognizable under the ADA. Under UPS 
policy and the CBA, a pregnant employee 
can continue working as long as she can 
perform the essential functions of her job, 
but is ineligible for light duty work for any 
limitations arising solely as result of her 
pregnancy. 
Finally, a CBA provision requires UPS to 
give an “inside job” to drivers who have lost 
their certification by the Department of 
Transportation (the “DOT”) because of a 
failed medical exam, a lost driver's license, 
or involvement in a motor vehicle accident 
as long as the driver is capable of 
performing such a job. Because an inside job 
often involves heavy lifting, it is typically 
not considered light duty work. 
Against this backdrop, we turn to the facts 
before us. We begin with a general 
statement of facts, providing additional 
information as necessary to the analysis. 
Young started working for UPS in 1999, and 
began driving a delivery truck in 2002. By 
2006 and throughout the relevant period, 
Young held a position as a part-time, early 
morning driver, also known as an “air 
driver,” apparently in reference to her 
responsibility to pick up and deliver 
packages that had arrived by air carrier the 
previous night. Young worked out of a UPS 
facility in Landover, Maryland known as the 
“D.C. Building.” Each morning after 
clocking in at the D.C. Building and 
inspecting her delivery van, Young and 
other air drivers would meet a shuttle from 
the airport bearing letters and packages 
scheduled for immediate delivery. Air 
drivers were then responsible for loading 
their vans and making deliveries. Young 
typically finished her work responsibilities 
by 9:45 or 10 in the morning, and then 
proceeded to her second job at a flower 
delivery company. 
In July 2006, following two unsuccessful 
rounds of in vitro fertilization, Young 
requested a leave of absence to try a third 
round. The UPS occupational health 
manager, Carolyn Martin, granted Young's 
request. When Young became pregnant, she 
sought to extend her leave. At some point in 
September 2006, she left with her supervisor 
a note from Dr. Thaddeus Mamlenski 
indicating that she should not lift more than 
twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of 
her pregnancy and not more than ten pounds 
thereafter. Young soon followed up with a 
phone call to Martin saying that she was not 
yet ready to return to work. 
During that September 2006 call, Martin 
informed Young that UPS policy would not 
permit her to continue working as long as 
she had the twenty-pound lifting restriction. 
Young maintains that she sought to explain 
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to Martin that her job rarely required her to 
lift over twenty pounds, that other UPS 
employees had in any case agreed to assist 
her, and that she was willing to do either 
light duty work or her regular job. Young 
characterized the seventy-pound lifting 
requirement as illusory because she rarely 
had to transport large packages, and when 
she did, she could use a hand truck or 
request assistance from other UPS 
employees. 
On October 11, 2006, Young had a check-up 
with midwife Cynthia Shawl. At the 
conclusion of her check-up, Shawl drafted 
and signed a short note on National Naval 
Medical Center letterhead stating “Peggy 
Sue Young is currently pregnant and due to 
deliver on or about May 2, 2007. Due to her 
pregnancy it is recommended that she not 
lift more than 20 pounds.” (the “Shawl 
note”). The Shawl note also indicated Shawl 
was available to provide further information 
or answer questions, and listed contact 
information for her. Although Shawl did not 
typically draft such notes, she did so in this 
instance because Young had told her she 
needed “a letter for work stating her 
restrictions.” 
At some point after her appointment with 
Shawl, Young contacted her supervisor at 
the D.C. Building and requested to return to 
work. When Young informed her supervisor 
of the note recommending she not lift more 
than twenty pounds, her supervisor referred 
Young to Martin. After speaking with 
Young, Martin concluded that, based on 
UPS policy, Young was unable to perform 
the essential functions of her job and was 
ineligible for light duty assignment. It is 
undisputed that Martin made this 
determination alone. 
Young and Martin spoke by phone at the 
end of October 2006. In the course of 
discussing Young's lifting limitation and 
eligibility for work, Martin explained to 
Young that (1) UPS offered light duty for 
those with on-the-job injuries, those 
accommodated under the ADA, and those 
who had lost DOT certification, but not for 
pregnancy; (2) Young did not qualify for 
short-term disability benefits because she 
had presented no note stating she could not 
work at all; (3) Young had exhausted her 
leave under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act (the “FMLA”); and (4) UPS policy did 
not permit Young to continue working as an 
air driver with her twenty-pound lifting 
restriction. Although Martin “empathize[d] 
with [Young's] situation and would have 
loved to help her,” Martin believed she was 
required to treat Young the same as she 
would any other UPS employee who had a 
lifting restriction that did not result from an 
on-the-job injury or illness and who could 
not perform his or her regular job. 
According to Martin, she would have 
allowed Young to return to work if Young 
could provide a medical certification 
removing her lifting restriction and stating 
she could perform the essential functions of 
her job. 
The parties do not dispute that Martin based 
her decision to disallow Young from 
returning to work solely on the basis of the 
lifting limitations imposed by Mamlenski 
and Shawl. Martin did not believe Young 
had any other restrictions, and asserts that 
had she considered Young disabled within 
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the meaning of the ADA, she would have 
encouraged Young to apply for an 
accommodation in accordance with UPS's 
ADA policy. Although Young takes issue 
with Martin's failure to contact Shawl and 
seek more information regarding the 
recommended lifting restriction, Young does 
not controvert Martin's assertion. 
Still seeking to return to work, Young 
approached Myron Williams, the Capital 
Division Manager in the D.C. Building, in 
November 2006. According to Young, when 
she explained her desire to return to work, 
Williams told her she was “too much of a 
liability” while pregnant and that she “could 
not come back into the [D.C.] [B]uilding 
until [she] was no longer pregnant.” 
By November 2006, Young's FMLA leave 
had expired. She then went on an extended 
leave of absence, receiving no pay and 
eventually losing her medical coverage by 
the end of the year. During this extended 
leave, someone—the record does not 
disclose who—at UPS ascribed Young's 
absence to “disability” by placing the code 
for disability on her attendance chart. A UPS 
employee explained at his deposition that 
the disability code does not necessarily 
mean that the employee is on approved 
disability leave; it in some cases means only 
that an employee is “not working because of 
an off the job situation.” 
Young gave birth on April 29, 2007, and 
returned to work for UPS at some point 
thereafter. 
B. 
Young filed a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (the 
“EEOC”) on July 23, 2007, and later 
amended it. She alleged discrimination on 
the basis of race,
 
sex, and pregnancy. After 
the EEOC issued Young a right to sue letter 
in September 2008, she filed suit in October 
2008. In an amended complaint filed the 
same month, Young sought damages for sex 
and race discrimination under Title VII and 
for disability discrimination under the ADA. 
When Young sought to amend her complaint 
a third time in June 2009 to add a distinct 
disparate impact claim, the district court 
denied her motion. 
Following over eighteen months of 
discovery, UPS moved for summary 
judgment in July 2010. In addition to 
responding in opposition to UPS's summary 
judgment motion, Young also sought to 
compel additional discovery, asked for a 
continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and moved to 
dismiss voluntarily her race discrimination 
claim. In an opinion issued in February 
2011, the district court granted summary 
judgment for UPS and denied Young's 
motions for additional discovery, a 
continuance, and a dismissal of her race 
discrimination claim.
 
On Young's ADA 
claim, the district court reasoned that UPS 
had not discriminated against Young either 
by asking for a doctor's note, which it was 
permitted to do under the circumstances, or 
by deciding not to accommodate her. 
Applying the Title VII burden shifting 
analysis under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green to Young's PDA claim, the district 
court concluded Young had not shown direct 
evidence of discrimination; failed to 
establish a prima facie case of sex 
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discrimination because she could identify no 
similarly situated comparator who received 
more favorable treatment than she did; and 
in any case could not show that UPS's non-
discriminatory rationale for its decision was 
pretextual. 
The district court denied Young's motion for 
reconsideration in August 2011. This appeal 
followed. 
II. 
Young challenges the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on her ADA and PDA 
claims. First, she claims that UPS 
impermissibly regarded her as disabled 
under the ADA. Second, Young contends 
that UPS discriminated against her on the 
basis of pregnancy in violation of the 
PDA. In considering these arguments, we 
review the district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, and construe all the 
documentary evidence and inferences 
available therefrom in the light most 
favorable to Young. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if UPS establishes “that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” 
Thus, a genuine issue of material fact, and 
not simply “the mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties,” 
is required to defeat UPS's motion. We turn 
first to Young's ADA claim. 
A. 
The ADA prohibits discrimination against 
“a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability.” To establish disability 
discrimination, Young must demonstrate 
that (1) she had a disability as defined in the 
ADA; (2) she was a “qualified individual,” 
which entails being able to perform the 
essential functions of her job; and (3) UPS 
took an adverse action against her on 
account of her disability. Young's claim fails 
because she cannot establish the first of 
these elements. 
The ADA provides three avenues for 
establishing the existence of a disability: 
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; (B) a record of 
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment.” Young does 
not press the argument that her pregnancy 
alone establishes disability. Rather, she 
contends that UPS regarded her pregnancy-
related work limitations as such. 
A “regarded as” disabled claim “includes the 
circumstance when the employer 
‘mistakenly believes that an actual, non-
limiting impairment substantially limits one 
or more major life activities.’ ” Thus, the 
employer “must believe ... that [an 
individual] has a substantially limiting 
impairment when, in fact, the impairment is 
not so limiting.” Major life activities are 
“those activities that are of central 
importance to daily life,” such as walking, 
seeing, and hearing. Finally, where an 
employee relies on a “regarded as” disabled 
theory, we focus “on the reactions and 
perceptions of the employer's 
decisionmakers....” 
Young identifies three actions on Carolyn 
Martin's part as evidence that UPS regarded 
her as disabled: soliciting from Young a 
doctor's opinion that she was no longer 
under any lifting limitations; preventing 
Young from working based only on the 
Shawl note without independently 
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evaluating Young's ability to work or 
contacting Shawl for more information; and 
improperly relying on a mistaken belief 
about Young's capacity for work. We briefly 
consider each. 
The argument that Martin improperly 
solicited the doctor's opinion is unclear. The 
record reflects no evidence that Young 
provided such an opinion to anyone. The 
only doctor's notes in the record are those 
from Dr. Mamlenski and midwife Cynthia 
Shawl, suggesting Young lift no more than 
twenty pounds. Thus, to the extent Young 
either claims Martin improperly solicited the 
Shawl note or takes issue with Martin's 
request that Young provide medical 
certification that she was no longer under 
the lifting restrictions indicated in the notes 
from Mamlenski and Shawl, we agree with 
the district court's view that “[b]ecause UPS 
possessed objective facts suggesting Young 
might have lost the ability to perform central 
job functions, it had a legitimate reason to 
seek some verification that Young had 
recovered her ability to perform those 
duties.” 
Young's second contention—that UPS had a 
duty to seek additional information from her 
healthcare providers and independently 
evaluate her ability to work—is similarly 
unavailing. In Young's view, UPS should 
have engaged in an interactive process to 
determine whether Young was capable of 
performing her job. Although the ADA does 
advise an employer to initiate “an informal, 
interactive process” when determining 
whether an individual with a disability needs 
an accommodation, no such counsel applies 
to the determination of whether an employee 
is disabled in the first instance. Young 
presents no rationale, compelling or 
otherwise, for concluding that an employer 
acts inappropriately in relying on the 
employee's own objective medical evidence.  
Finally, Young fails to marshal evidence 
creating a genuine issue of material fact on 
the question of whether Martin had a 
mistaken belief regarding Young's capacity 
for work. Young offers no evidence 
indicating Martin believed Young's 
pregnancy substantially limited one or more 
of her major life activities. The most the 
record establishes is that Martin believed 
Young to be pregnant and under a temporary 
lifting restriction on account of her 
pregnancy, based on the evidence Young 
herself provided. Given the relatively 
manageable weight restriction—twenty 
pounds—and the short duration of the 
restriction, there is no evidence that Young's 
pregnancy or her attendant lifting limitation 
constituted a disability within the meaning 
of the ADA. Because Young points to no 
more than the objective fact of her 
pregnancy, and offers no evidence tending 
to show that Martin subjectively believed 
Young to be disabled, Young cannot adduce 
evidence to raise a factual issue on her 
“regarded as” claim. 
B. 
We turn next to the heart of Young's appeal, 
that UPS violated the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act. Although not free from 
ambiguity, Young's core contention appears 
to be that the UPS policy limiting light duty 
work to some employees—those injured on-
the-job, disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA, or who have lost their DOT 
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certification—but not to pregnant workers 
like Young violates the PDA's command to 
treat pregnant employees the same “as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their 
ability or inability to work.” In a similar 
vein, the ACLU amicus brief argues that the 
PDA requires employers like UPS to 
provide pregnant workers like Young light 
duty work so long as it does so for any other 
workers similar in their ability or inability to 
work even though it concededly does not do 
so for all nonpregnant employees. 
We analyze a PDA claim as a sex 
discrimination claim under Title VII. 
Applying the usual Title VII analytical 
construct for sex discrimination claims, we 
first consider whether Young has shown any 
direct evidence of discrimination. In the 
absence of that, we apply the familiar 
burden shifting framework articulated 
in McDonnell Douglas and subsequent 
cases. As Young's counsel clarified at oral 
argument, Young challenges the UPS policy 
as both direct evidence of discrimination and 
under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Accordingly, we assess the policy in both 
contexts. 
1. 
In asserting direct evidence of 
discrimination, Young points to both the 
UPS policy and to disparaging comments 
from Myron Williams as indicative of UPS's 
general corporate animus against pregnant 
employees. Evidence is direct if it “both 
reflect[s] directly the alleged discriminatory 
attitude and ... bear[s] directly on the 
contested employment decision.” Thus, 
evidence is direct if it establishes 
discriminatory motive with no need for an 
inference or a presumption. We first 
consider the challenge to the UPS policy. 
a. 
Young contends that the UPS policy that 
does not provide light duty work to pregnant 
workers but does for certain other 
employees constitutes direct evidence of 
discrimination. It is certainly true that an 
explicit policy excluding pregnant workers 
would violate antidiscrimination law. But no 
such policy exists here. By limiting 
accommodations to those employees injured 
on the job, disabled as defined under the 
ADA, and stripped of their DOT 
certification, UPS has crafted a pregnancy-
blind policy, and Young does not contend 
otherwise. Such a policy is at least facially a 
“neutral and legitimate business practice,” 
and not evidence of UPS's discriminatory 
animus toward pregnant workers.  
Young and the ACLU argue, however, that 
UPS's policy of accommodating certain 
employees but not pregnant workers who are 
otherwise allegedly similar in their ability or 
inability to work nonetheless runs afoul of 
the PDA. In particular, the ACLU contends 
that the PDA explicitly alters the traditional 
sex discrimination analysis under Title VII 
by restricting the basis upon which 
employers may compare pregnant workers 
with nonpregnant workers. At its core, this 
argument posits that the PDA creates a 
cause of action distinct from that of § 703(a)
 
by compelling employers to grant pregnant 
employees a “most favored nation” status 
with others based on their ability to work, 
regardless of whether such status was 
available to the universe—male and 
female—of nonpregnant employees. 
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Considering the history and structure of the 
PDA and the consequences of interpreting it 
in this way, we cannot agree. 
Passed in 1978 to overrule the Supreme 
Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. 
Gilbert, the PDA added pregnancy-related 
discrimination to Title VII's general 
prohibition on sex discrimination. Congress 
placed the entirety of the PDA into the 
“Definitions” section of Title VII: 
The terms “because of sex” or “on the 
basis of sex” include, but are not limited 
to, because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions shall be 
treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of 
benefits under fringe benefit programs, 
as other persons not so affected but 
similar in their ability or inability to 
work.... 
As the Supreme Court subsequently 
recognized, the PDA “makes clear that it is 
discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related 
conditions less favorably than other medical 
conditions.” 
In addition to including pregnancy-related 
conditions within the definition of sex 
discrimination in its first clause, the PDA's 
second clause provides that “women 
affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the 
same for all employment-related purposes ... 
as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work.” 
Standing alone, the second clause's plain 
language is unambiguous. But the second 
clause does not stand alone; it follows the 
first clause. Confusion arises when trying to 
reconcile language in the first clause 
suggesting the PDA simply expands the 
category of sex discrimination (without 
otherwise altering Title VII), and language 
in the second clause suggesting the statute 
requires different—perhaps even 
preferential—treatment for pregnant 
workers. 
Although the second clause can be read 
broadly, we conclude that its placement in 
the definitional section of Title VII, and 
grounding within the confines of sex 
discrimination under § 703, make clear that 
it does not create a distinct and independent 
cause of action. We further note the 
anomalous consequences a contrary position 
would cause: pregnancy would be treated 
more favorably than any other basis, 
including non-pregnancy-related sex 
discrimination, covered by Title VII. 
Most courts to have considered the potential 
incongruence between the PDA's first and 
second clauses have concluded similarly. 
These courts reason that to find otherwise 
would be to transform an antidiscrimination 
statute into a requirement to provide 
accommodation to pregnant employees, 
perhaps even at the expense of other, 
nonpregnant employees. 
Interpreting the PDA in the manner Young 
and the ACLU urge would require 
employers to provide, for example, 
accommodation or light duty work to a 
pregnant worker whose restrictions arise 
from her (off-the-job) pregnancy while 
denying any such accommodation to an 
employee unable to lift as a result of an off-
the-job injury or illness. Under this 
interpretation, a pregnant worker who, like 
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Young, was placed under a lifting restriction 
by her healthcare provider and could not 
work could claim that the PDA requires that 
she receive whatever accommodation or 
benefits are accorded to an individual 
accommodated under the ADA, because the 
pregnant worker and the other individual are 
similar in their ability or inability to work—
i.e., they both cannot work. By contrast, a 
temporary lifting restriction placed on an 
employee who injured his back while 
picking up his infant child or on an 
employee whose lifting limitation arose 
from her off-the-job work as a volunteer 
firefighter would be ineligible for any 
accommodation. Such an interpretation does 
not accord with Congress's intent in enacting 
the PDA, and would thus imbue the PDA 
with a preferential treatment mandate that 
Congress neither intended nor enacted. 
We are unpersuaded that Ensley–Gaines, on 
which Young and the ACLU as amicus rely, 
effects the watershed change they ascribe to 
it. Although the court in Ensley–Gaines 
stated the second clause “explicitly alters the 
analysis to be applied in pregnancy 
discrimination cases,” it analyzed the 
plaintiff's challenge to the United States 
Postal Service's policy—a policy akin to the 
one challenged here—not as direct evidence 
of sex discrimination, but as circumstantial 
evidence under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. Moreover, given the 
troubling consequences just outlined of 
interpreting the PDA in this broad manner, it 
is unsurprising that no other circuit has 
followed Ensley–Gaines. We are similarly 
compelled to disagree with its analysis. 
We therefore adhere to the majority view 
that where a policy treats pregnant workers 
and nonpregnant workers alike, the 
employer has complied with the PDA. The 
UPS policy at issue is not direct evidence of 
pregnancy-based sex discrimination. 
b. 
We next consider whether Myron Williams's 
comments demonstrate “corporate animus” 
on the part of UPS tantamount to direct 
evidence of discrimination.
 
Young focused 
below on Williams's comments alone, but 
now contends those comments amount to 
evidence of UPS's “corporate animus.” The 
district court rejected her previous argument 
on the ground that Williams wielded no 
decisionmaking power over Young. Young's 
argument on appeal that Williams's 
comments manifest UPS's corporate animus 
towards pregnant workers finds no support 
in the record; Williams's statements stand 
alone as the only explicit evidence of a 
pregnancy-related comment, derogatory or 
otherwise. Moreover, Young's reliance on 
Merritt and Staub v. Proctor Hosp., is 
inapposite as those cases involved non-
decisionmaker colleagues whose pervasive 
animus for the plaintiff influenced the 
ultimate decisionmaker. No such evidence 
exists here: Williams neither possessed the 
authority to make determinations about 
Young's employment nor sought to 
influence Martin, who did. 
2. 
Because Young presents no direct evidence 
of pregnancy discrimination, we next 
consider whether she offers evidence 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case 
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under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
Under this framework, Young must establish 
a prima facie case of sex discrimination on 
her pregnancy claim by showing “(1) 
membership in a protected class; (2) 
satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse 
employment action; and (4) that similarly-
situated employees outside the protected 
class received more favorable treatment.” 
Again, the focus of her challenge is the UPS 
policy. 
Young fell within the protected class, raised 
at least a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding her job performance, and suffered 
an adverse employment action when she 
could not continue working. Thus, the 
dispute here centers on the final element of 
the prima facie case: whether similarly-
situated employees outside the protected 
class received more favorable treatment than 
Young, or more broadly, whether UPS's 
decision to prevent Young from either 
receiving an accommodation or returning to 
work occurred “under circumstance[s] 
giving rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.” In particular, Young and 
UPS sharply disagree about who constitutes 
an appropriate “comparator” in this context. 
At bottom Young seeks to compare herself 
to employees accommodated under the 
ADA, drivers who have lost their DOT 
certification for medical reasons, and 
employees injured on the job. As we have 
already noted, however, these 
accommodations were created by a neutral, 
pregnancy-blind policy—a policy she can 
attack indirectly no more successfully than 
she could directly. 
Moreover, we conclude that a pregnant 
worker subject to a temporary lifting 
restriction is not similar in her “ability or 
inability to work” to an employee disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA or an 
employee either prevented from operating a 
vehicle as a result of losing her DOT 
certification or injured on the job. Young is 
dissimilar to an employee disabled under the 
ADA for the same reason she herself was 
not disabled: her lifting limitation was 
temporary and not a significant restriction 
on her ability to perform major life 
activities. She is unlike employees 
guaranteed an inside job or light duty under 
the CBA provision
 
for drivers who have lost 
DOT certification for at least two reasons. 
First, no legal obstacle stands between her 
and her work. A driver who has lost his or 
her DOT certification is legally disabled 
from operating a vehicle; Young's physical 
impairment only restricted her ability to lift. 
Second, as the district court observed, “those 
with DOT certification maintained the 
ability to perform any number of demanding 
physical tasks, while Young labored under 
an apparent inability to perform tasks 
involving lifting.” Finally, Young is not 
similar to employees injured on the job 
because, quite simply, her inability to work 
does not arise from an on-the-job injury. The 
CBA provision requiring UPS to 
accommodate those employees injured while 
carrying out job duties for the company but 
not while pursuing other activities 
reasonably places a heightened obligation on 
UPS to accommodate the former group. The 
PDA does not render this distinction 
unlawful. 
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We are also unpersuaded that Martin's 
decision occurred under circumstances 
“giving rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.” According to Young, these 
circumstances consist of (1) Martin's 
solicitation of a doctor's note from Young 
identifying her restrictions; (2) Martin's 
statement that UPS policy did not provide 
light duty for pregnant workers; and (3) 
Williams's comments about Young as a 
liability while pregnant. However, with the 
exception of Williams's comments, which 
played no role in Martin's decision, these 
facts fail to demonstrate the specific animus 
Young ascribes to them. Even assuming 
Martin solicited a note from Young, there is 
no indication that this was not done with all 
employees returning from leave, or that 
Martin did so because Young was pregnant. 
And Martin's statement about UPS's policy 
providing light duty in three instances—but 
not for pregnancy—is simply one of fact. 
One may characterize the UPS policy as 
insufficiently charitable, but a lack of 
charity does not amount to discriminatory 
animus directed at a protected class of 
employees. 
Accordingly, we conclude that Young 
cannot establish that similarly situated 
employees received more favorable 
treatment than she did, and therefore cannot 
establish the fourth element of the prima 
facie case for pregnancy discrimination. 
While not unsympathetic to Young's 
circumstances, we are nevertheless 
concerned about the problematic potential of 
creating rights not grounded in the text and 
structure of Title VII as a whole. 
III. 
We therefore affirm the decision of the 
district court. 
AFFIRMED. 
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“Up Next for the Supreme Court: Pregnant Workers’ Rights” 
The Washington Post 
Nia-Malika Henderson 
July 3, 2014 
With its decision in the Hobby Lobby case, 
the Supreme Court ignited a contentious 
conversation about religious freedom and 
reproductive rights, ensuring that women’s 
health issues will once again dominate 
political jockeying in an election 
year.  Well, next year could provide the 
same sort of fodder, as the court has agreed 
to hear a case involving a woman who says 
that her employers discriminated against her 
because she was pregnant. 
At issue in the case, Peggy Young v. United 
Parcel Service, is whether the company 
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA) in its treatment of Young, a delivery 
driver who said she was required to go on 
unpaid maternity leave, rather than get a 
position that was less strenuous as her 
doctors advised. 
Lower courts have ruled in UPS’s favor, 
with the company arguing that its policies 
are “pregnancy-neutral,” and governed by a 
collective bargaining agreement that Young 
didn’t qualify for. 
The court’s decision to take the case comes 
as President Obama is calling on Congress 
to act on the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, 
(PWFA) and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission has filed federal 
lawsuits recently against companies, 
alleging that women were fired after their 
pregnancy was revealed in violation of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which 
doesn’t expressly mandate that employees 
make accommodations for pregnant women. 
It also comes as lawmakers in New York are 
calling on the state legislature to pass a 
bill that expands on protections for pregnant 
women workers. 
A lawyer for Young said that the case is 
particularly important for women in low-
wage jobs. 
“These cases often arise with nurses and 
nurses assistants and women who have jobs 
with a physical component. It’s a barrier to 
work for women who become pregnant in 
those sorts of jobs,” said Samuel Bagenstos, 
a lawyer on the case. “What the PDA says is 
that employees have to provide workers who 
are pregnant the same accommodations that 
they would provide any other worker.” 
Susan Rosenberg, UPS’s public relations 
director said in an e-mailed statement: 
“UPS is committed to a fair workplace and 
has consistent and robust policies to prevent 
discrimination and adhere to our legal 
obligations,” said Susan Rosenberg, UPS’s 
public relations director.  “We look forward 
to the Court’s review of the merits of this 
case.“ 
The is the company’s key 
argument according to an opposition brief: 
The collective bargaining agreement 
neither requires nor authorizes UPS to 
disrupt the seniority system by giving 
temporary, alternative positions to 
employees unable to perform their 
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normal work assignments due to off-
the-job injuries or conditions (unless the 
resulting limitation amounts to a 
cognizable disability under the ADA). 
For example, a driver whose health care 
provider imposed a lifting limitation 
due to a back injury sustained off the 
job, and which was not an ADA-
cognizable disability….would not be 
eligible for an accommodation. Under 
its collectively bargained policy, UPS 
treats a lifting restriction resulting from 
pregnancy in exactly the same way. 
The U.S. solicitor general, Donald B. 
Verrilli Jr., filed a brief arguing that the 
court should pass on the case because the 
EEOC is currently considering guidance that 
would clarify issues related to pregnancy, 
the PDA and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). 
A spokesman for the EEOC said that the 
agency doesn’t have anything to announce 
right now. 
The proposed Pregnant Workers Fairness 
Act (PWFA) seeks similar clarification, but 
it has little chance of making its way out of 
the Senate. 
Employers would have to create “reasonable 
workplace accommodations for workers 
whose ability to perform the functions of a 
job are limited by pregnancy, childbirth, or a 
related medical condition,” according to the 
text of the 12-page bill. 
“The key to the Pregnant Workers Fairness 
Act is the phrase ‘reasonable 
accommodations.’ The bill uses the same 
tried and trusted standard as the bipartisan 
Americans with Disabilities Act to provide 
basic protections for these vulnerable 
women,” Sen. Robert P. Casey Jr. (D-Pa.), 
the bill’s sponsor, wrote in an e-mail to She 
The People. “Some employers across the 
country are stepping up but it should be 
common sense to enshrine this basic 
principle into law.” 
Deborah Widiss, an associate law professor 
at Indiana University, said she was “a little 
surprised,” that the court took the case, 
given that the EEOC is likely to issue 
guidelines, but the court as well as Congress 
are reacting to “the reality that some 
pregnant women need accommodations at 
work and there is no explicit law that 
requires that.” 
“Look at the Hobby Lobby case and some of 
the issues here as well.  It is about the reality 
that women work and they get pregnant,” 
Widiss said.  “These are important issues 
and it would be good to have clarity.” 
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“Justices Could Clarify Pregnancy Accommodation in UPS Suit” 
Law 360 
Scott Flaherty 
July 1, 2014 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to 
review a former UPS Inc. driver’s 
pregnancy discrimination suit, a case that 
gives the justices a chance to clarify 
employers’ obligations to accommodate 
pregnant workers and may impact Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
guidance on the issue. 
One day after the justices issued their final 
rulings for the 2013-2014 term, the Supreme 
Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari 
filed by former UPS delivery driver Peggy 
Young, who claimed the company had 
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
by refusing to put her on light duty while 
she was pregnant. Young’s petition asked 
the high court to review a Fourth Circuit 
decision that found the PDA did not require 
employers to provide more favorable 
treatment to pregnant workers as compared 
to other, “similarly situated,” employees. 
By taking up the case, the Supreme Court 
agreed to consider whether an employer that 
provides accommodations to nonpregnant 
workers based on disabilities or other work 
limitations is also required to accommodate 
pregnant workers who are “similar in their 
ability or inability to work.” The case, 
according to employment attorneys, gives 
the justices a chance to offer employers 
some clarification on what they’re required 
to do under the PDA. 
“They want to seek to clarify what an 
employer’s obligations are,” said Joseph 
Greenwald & Laake PA principal Jay 
Holland, referring to the Supreme Court’s 
decision to hear the Young case. 
But just how much certainty the court’s 
ultimate decision will give employers 
remains to be seen, attorneys say. 
The U.S. solicitor general had argued in an 
amicus brief that the Supreme Court should 
not take up the case because the EEOC is 
considering new guidance to clarify its 
stance on the PDA and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act. So attorneys say 
employers’ obligations to pregnant workers 
may depend on the interaction between the 
Supreme Court’s ruling and any future 
EEOC guidance on the PDA. 
If, for instance, the EEOC issues guidance 
before the Supreme Court has ruled in the 
Young case, it may contradict whatever the 
justices decide, muddying the waters for 
employers, according to Carrie Hoffman, a 
labor and employment partner with Gardere 
Wynne Sewell LLP. 
“There is potential that this future ruling will 
conflict with the EEOC’s guidance, when 
published, on these issues,” said Hoffman. 
“This will further complicate how 
employers deal with the pregnancy and 
accommodation issues.” 
The Supreme Court may ultimately find that 
the PDA does, in fact, require employers 
that offer accommodations to employees 
with certain work-related limitations to 
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provide some form of accommodation for 
pregnant employees as well. But if that 
happens, the justices may set their own 
standard for the types of accommodations 
employers will be required to offer, or they 
may leave it up to the EEOC to fill in the 
details. 
Either way, there’s a chance that employers’ 
obligations under the PDA will end up 
differing from the interactive process and 
reasonable accommodations called for under 
the ADA says Tracy Billows, a labor and 
employment partner with Seyfarth Shaw 
LLP. 
“This will be very interesting for employers 
because it could create a whole new 
obligation, separate and apart from the 
[obligations under] the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,” Billows said. 
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court 
finds against Young and rules that 
employers have no obligation to provide 
accommodations to pregnant employees, 
attorneys say that would likely limit the 
impact of any EEOC guidance on the issue. 
“The Supreme Court is controlling,” said 
Billows. “Its decision could render the 
EEOC guidance null and void.” 
But Phillip Voluck, managing partner with 
Kaufman Dolowich Voluck, says it’s more 
likely that the Supreme Court would, at least 
in some respects, side with the argument that 
pregnant workers should be afforded 
accommodations. That sort of finding, he 
says, would be consistent with a broader 
trend in the courts toward expanding 
accommodations for protected classes of 
employees. 
“It would be hard to imagine that the 
Supreme Court would find totally in favor of 
UPS, based upon how the law has developed 
in this area,” Voluck said. 
With the trend growing toward greater 
accommodations in mind, Voluck added that 
he would advise employers against waiting 
to see what the Supreme Court decides in 
Young. 
“The decision could be a ways off,” he said. 
“Employers should be proactive.” 
Holland offered similar advice. 
“Employers would have to be careful to 
heed, first, the guidance of the courts in their 
jurisdiction, but certainly not be blind or 
ignore the EEOC’s guidance,” said Holland. 
“It’s always safer to take a broader view of 
your obligations as an employer.” 
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the 
Young case comes after the Fourth Circuit 
in January 2013 backed a lower court ruling 
in favor of UPS. Young brought claims 
under both the PDA and the ADA, but her 
high court petition focused on the PDA. 
Young, who ended up taking unpaid leave 
because of restrictions on how much weight 
she could lift during her pregnancy, claims 
that UPS should have provided her the same 
accommodations that were offered to 
nonpregnant employees with similar 
limitations. 
UPS, on the other hand, has maintained that 
it offered accommodations to workers 
injured on the job, those who qualified for 
ADA accommodations and those who lost 
their U.S. Department of Transportation 
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certification, but that Young did not fall into 
any of those categories. 
The case is Young v. United Parcel Service 
Inc., case number 12-1226, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
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“Protections for Pregnant Workers Expand Before Key Supreme Court Case” 
Businessweek 
Josh Eidelson 
July 15, 2014 
 
Refusing to accommodate new mothers’ 
lactation after a pregnancy, refusing 
bathroom breaks during a pregnancy, or 
punishing workers for planning a future 
pregnancy are now all forms of illegal 
discrimination under federal rules. 
New guidelines from the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, the first on 
pregnancy since 1983, passed by a party-line 
3-to-2 vote on Monday. The Democratic 
majority found that conditions related to 
pregnancy can qualify as legally protected 
disabilities under federal law, that it’s 
usually illegal to keep women out of certain 
jobs because the working conditions could 
be bad for a pregnancy, and that health-care 
costs tied to a pregnancy need to be treated 
like other costs under company insurance 
plans. 
Under President Obama, the EEOC has 
issued other bold instructions. A 2012 
ruling, for instance, made discrimination 
against transgender workers a form of illegal 
sex discrimination. “The EEOC is spending 
a lot of time now prosecuting pregnancy 
discrimination,” says employer-side attorney 
Michael Cohen. 
But the EEOC’s guidelines lack the legal 
force of an act of Congress or a Supreme 
Court ruling. Backed by the president, 
Democrats have introduced a congressional 
bill requiring employers to accommodate 
pregnant workers, but there’s no reason to 
think it will reach Obama’s desk this 
session. And the Supreme Court agreed this 
month to hear a case, Peggy Young v. United 
Parcel Service, which threatens to undo 
some of the EEOC’s pregnancy work. 
Young, a former delivery driver, argues that 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
required UPS (UPS) to provide her with 
doctor-recommended light duty just as it 
accommodates workers with other medical 
conditions. UPS contends it’s within its 
rights to restrict accommodations to people 
who are injured at work, have lost their 
drivers’ certification, or have a disability 
recognized by the Americans With 
Disabilities Act. A UPS 
spokeswoman says the company will review 
the new EEOC instructions and that the new 
rules may not impact the Supreme Court 
case. 
Samuel Bagenstos, the University of 
Michigan Law School professor 
who’s representing Young, says he sees the 
EEOC vote as vindication of “the position 
we’ve taken all along—that the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, by its terms, requires 
employers to give pregnant workers the 
same accommodations they give to other 
valued employees.” 
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“A Pregnant Worker’s Day in Court” 
ACLU 
Ariela Migdal 
October, 26, 2012 
A federal appeals court yesterday heard 
arguments in the case of Peggy Young v. 
UPS. Peggy Young was a package delivery 
driver for UPS when she became pregnant 
and asked UPS for a light duty assignment, 
so that she could continue to work while 
pregnant, even though her doctor had 
recommended she not lift more than 20 
pounds. Although UPS admits it routinely 
grants alternative work assignments, 
including light duty, to other workers – 
including workers who are injured on the 
job, workers eligible for accommodations 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
and workers who lose their driver’s license - 
it refuses to grant those same minor 
adjustments to pregnant workers like Young. 
UPS’s policy forces pregnant workers off 
the job and leaves them without health 
benefits when they give birth. This is exactly 
the result that Congress intended to avoid 
when it enacted the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act in 1978, a point the 
ACLU and ACLU of Maryland emphasized 
in a friend-of-the-court brief we filed on 
behalf of more than 10 women’s rights 
groups. Before the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act was enacted, companies 
routinely excluded pregnant workers from 
benefits that they gave to other employees, 
including health insurance coverage. The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act fixed this 
problem by mandating that when employers 
give a benefit to other workers who are 
similar to a pregnant worker in their ability 
or inability to work, employers must give 
that same benefit to the pregnant worker. 
The problem is that employers, and some 
courts, including the district court in this 
case, have subverted the law by letting 
employers come up with “pregnancy blind” 
reasons for excluding pregnant workers. 
UPS argues that it has nothing against 
pregnant workers; it’s just that they don’t fit 
into any of its “neutral” categories of people 
entitled to accommodations. 
In court yesterday, Young’s lawyer 
emphasized to the judges that UPS’s policy 
violates both the letter and the spirit of the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. UPS offers 
accommodations to just about everyone 
under the sun who needs one, while 
pregnant workers like Peggy Young get left 
out. It’s time to end the exclusion of 
pregnant workers, once and for all. 
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Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama 
13-895 
 
Ruling Below: Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. The State of Alabama, 989 F.Supp.2d 
1227 (M.D. Ala. 2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 2695 (2014). 
 
Black political caucus, political party, office holders, and county commissioners 
of Alabama brought separate actions against state of Alabama and various state officials, 
challenging redistricting plans for Alabama's Senate and House of Representatives. Actions were 
consolidated and bench trial was held. 
 
Question Presented: Whether Alabama's legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally 
classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain 
supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-
black districts. 
 
 
ALABAMA LEGISLATIVE BLACK CAUCUS, et al., Plaintiffs, 
 v.  
The State of ALABAMA, et al., Defendants. 
 
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division 
 
Decided on December 20, 2013 
 
[Excerpt, some footnotes and citations omitted] 
 
PRYOR, Circuit Judge: 
The Constitution of Alabama of 1901 
requires the Alabama Legislature to 
redistrict itself following each decennial 
census of the United States, but for a half 
century—from 1911 to 1961—the 
Legislature failed to fulfill that duty. Then 
the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that this abdication could be tolerated 
no longer, and it affirmed the judgment of 
this Court that the Alabama Legislature had 
to be apportioned after each census based on 
the principle of one person, one vote. The 
Supreme Court explained, “[T]he basic 
principle of representative government 
remains, and must remain, unchanged—the 
weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to 
depend on where he lives. Population is, of 
necessity, the starting point for consideration 
and the controlling criterion for judgment 
in legislative apportionment controversies.” 
After the decision in Reynolds v. Sims, the 
Legislature struggled to redistrict itself and 
to satisfy the requirements of the federal 
Constitution. When the Alabama Legislature 
failed to perform its duty to redistrict itself 
after the 1970 Census, this Court adopted 
new district lines to protect the rights of the 
voters under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
the 1980s, the Legislature successfully 
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redistricted itself only after it twice failed to 
obtain administrative preclearance of its first 
redistricting plans, under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and this Court 
then ordered Alabama to hold a special 
election using the new districts. In the 
1990s, the Legislature again failed to 
redistrict itself, and new districts were 
adopted instead by the Alabama judiciary.  
After the 2000 and 2010 Censuses, the 
Legislature finally fulfilled its responsibility 
to redistrict itself without any federal or 
judicial interference. Both times, the Senate 
adopted a redistricting plan for itself, and the 
House adopted a plan for itself. Each 
chamber then, in turn, passed the plan 
adopted by the other chamber. And each 
time, the governor signed the redistricting 
acts, and the state attorney general then 
obtained administrative preclearance of the 
acts as required by the Voting Rights Act. 
As the Legislature complied with Reynolds 
v. Sims and the Voting Rights 
Act, black voters enjoyed increasing success 
in electing their preferred candidates for 
the Alabama Legislature. In 1970, voters 
elected to the House of Representatives Fred 
Gray and Thomas Reed, the first 
two black legislators since Reconstruction. 
After the 1980 Census, voters elected 
17 black candidates to the House and 
three black candidates to the Senate. After 
the 1990 Census, voters elected 
27 black candidates to the House and 
8 black candidates to the Senate. After the 
2000 Census, the Legislature adopted a 
redistricting plan that maintained 27 
majority-black House districts and 8 
majority-black Senate districts. Because 
most of the majority-black districts were 
substantially underpopulated, the Legislature 
redrew the districts by shifting more black 
voters into the majority-black districts to 
maintain the same relative percentages 
of black voters in those districts. 
Legislative redistricting regularly provokes 
partisan controversies. In the 1990s, 
Republicans filed lawsuits to challenge the 
districts adopted by the Alabama judiciary 
and favored by the Democrats, but those 
lawsuits failed. After the 2000 Census, the 
Democrat-controlled Legislature adopted 
districts that favored its partisan 
interests. Republicans again challenged the 
districts in litigation, but their lawsuits 
failed. 
When Republicans challenged the district 
lines adopted after the 2000 Census, they 
targeted the systematic under-population of 
the majority-black districts, but State 
officials and Democratic leaders 
successfully defended the population 
deviations as “the product of the Democratic 
Legislators' partisan political objective to 
design Senate and House plans that would 
preserve their respective Democratic 
majorities.” State officials and Democratic 
leaders presented “abundant evidence ... that 
black voters and Democratic voters 
in Alabama are highly correlated.” After the 
Republicans' complaint of racial 
gerrymandering failed, they filed another 
complaint that challenged the population 
deviations as an unlawful partisan 
gerrymander, but that complaint failed 
because it was barred by res judicata. In a 
filing in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the Democratic leadership of the 
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Legislature openly touted the districts 
adopted in 2001 as a lawful partisan 
gerrymander that enabled black legislators 
to serve in positions of unprecedented 
leadership. 
The partisan gerrymander that protected 
Democratic control of the Legislature 
collapsed in 2010 when Republicans gained 
supermajority control of both houses of the 
Legislature, which then adopted new 
redistricting acts based on the 2010 Census. 
The Republican-controlled Legislature 
adopted district lines with smaller deviations 
in population equality, which upended the 
partisan gerrymander adopted by the 
Democrat-controlled Legislature after the 
2000 Census. Not surprisingly, that result 
did not sit well with the Democratic leaders 
who filed these complaints. As a result, we 
must be careful not to take one side in a 
partisan battle masquerading as a legal 
controversy; our task is to evaluate whether 
the new redistricting Acts violate the 
Constitution or federal law. 
In these consolidated actions, Alabama has 
now come full circle. In the first civil action, 
several plaintiffs complain that the purpose 
and effect of the new districts is to dilute 
and isolate the strength of black voters, in 
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. In the second civil action, 
several other plaintiffs complain that the 
purpose and effect of the new districts is to 
dilute the opportunities for minority voters 
to participate in the political process and that 
the new districts are products of racial 
gerrymandering. The plaintiffs in these 
actions, in contrast with the plaintiffs 
in Reynolds, complain that the Legislature 
redistricted itself based on too little 
deviation in population equality and paid too 
little attention to considerations of where 
voters live based on the jurisdictional lines 
of counties and other subdivisions. They 
also complain that the Legislature diluted 
the voting strength of black voters by 
moving them into underpopulated majority-
black districts, even though the Democratic 
majority of the Legislature employed the 
same technique ten years earlier to maintain 
the same relative percentages of black voters 
in those districts. 
For the reasons explained in this 
memorandum opinion and order, we reject 
these complaints. We DISMISS the claims 
of racial gerrymandering filed by the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs because 
they lack standing to maintain those claims; 
in the alternative, we GRANT judgment in 
favor of the State defendants on the claims 
of racial gerrymandering filed by the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs. 
We DISMISS as not justiciable the claim of 
vote dilution based on the local House 
delegation in Jefferson County; in the 
alternative, we GRANT judgment in favor 
of the State defendants on the claim of vote 
dilution based on the local House delegation 
in Jefferson County. We GRANT judgment 
in favor of the State defendants on the 
remaining claims in both actions. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Procedural History 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs filed a 
complaint against the State and Beth 
Chapman, in her official capacity as the 
Secretary of State of Alabama. The 
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complaint asserted three counts: violation of 
the guarantee of one person, one vote under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; dilution and 
isolation of the strength of black votes in 
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the Fifteenth Amendment; and partisan 
gerrymandering in violation of the First 
Amendment. The Black Caucus plaintiffs 
moved for partial summary judgment and 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief 
on count one of their complaint. 
The State defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, to stay the 
action until the Attorney General 
of Alabama, Luther Strange, obtained either 
administrative or judicial preclearance of the 
new districts under section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act… The State defendants filed an 
answer to the complaint and a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings with respect to all 
three counts. 
After a hearing on the latter motions, the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs filed a 
complaint against the State; Robert Bentley, 
in his official capacity as the Governor of 
Alabama; and Chapman, in her official 
capacity as the Secretary of State 
of Alabama. The Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs asserted three counts: violation 
of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; racial 
gerrymandering in violation of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and 
violations of constitutional and statutory 
rights under the Voting Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
After the Democratic Conference action was 
assigned to this three-judge court, we 
determined that both the Black Caucus 
action and the Democratic Conference 
action involve common questions of law and 
fact and consolidated them... 
On December 26, 2012, we denied the first 
motion for a partial summary judgment filed 
by the Black Caucus plaintiffs with respect 
to count one, granted the motion of the State 
defendants for a judgment on the pleadings 
as to count one, denied the motion of the 
State defendants for a judgment on the 
pleadings as to count two, and dismissed 
without prejudice count three of the 
complaint of the Black Caucus plaintiffs. 
We granted the Black Caucus plaintiffs 
leave to amend their complaint “to allege 
more facts and constitutional grounds to 
support [their] claim of political 
gerrymandering and to identify a judicial 
standard by which we can adjudicate the 
claim.” 
On March 13, 2013, Senator Gerald Dial 
and Representative Jim McClendon filed an 
unopposed motion to intervene as 
defendants. Senator Dial and Representative 
McClendon are the Chairpersons of the 
Permanent Legislative Committee on 
Reapportionment of the State of Alabama. 
The Court granted the motion to intervene. 
After the Black Caucus plaintiffs timely 
filed an amended complaint with a new 
count three entitled “Partisan 
Gerrymandering” and a second motion for a 
partial summary judgment on that claim, we 
again denied their motion… We explained 
that the claim of partisan gerrymandering 
filed by the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to 
identify a judicial standard by which we 
could adjudicate the claim and that, under 
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any standard of adjudication, 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to explain 
how they are entitled to a judgment in their 
favor as a matter of law. We also explained 
that the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to 
establish the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
The State defendants then moved for a 
partial summary judgment on count three, 
and the Black Caucus plaintiffs filed a 
motion to reconsider our denial of their 
second motion for a partial summary 
judgment and a motion for a permanent 
injunction. At a hearing on the pending 
motions, the Black Caucus plaintiffs 
announced, for the first time, that count 
three encompassed two claims: an as-
applied challenge for partisan 
gerrymandering in violation of the First 
Amendment and a facial challenge to the 
districts based on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We 
granted in part the motion for a partial 
summary judgment and entered judgment in 
favor of the State defendants on the claim of 
partisan gerrymandering and dismissed the 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We also 
explained, in the alternative, that the claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause failed on 
the merits. We denied the motion for 
reconsideration and denied as moot the 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
The State defendants filed motions for 
summary judgments against the remaining 
claims filed by the Black Caucus plaintiffs 
and the Democratic Conference plaintiffs, 
and we denied those motions. We concluded 
that the State defendants had failed to 
explain the absence of genuine issues of 
material fact or how they were entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
On August 8, 9, 12, and 13, 2013, we 
conducted a consolidated bench trial at 
which the plaintiffs presented arguments and 
evidence about two distinct kinds of claims. 
First, the plaintiffs argued that the State 
defendants had diluted the black vote 
in Alabama in violation of section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. Second, the plaintiffs 
argued that the State defendants had 
engaged in intentional discrimination in 
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments when they drew the new 
districts. During the trial, we substituted Jim 
Bennett for Beth Chapman as a defendant, in 
Bennett's official capacity as the new 
Secretary of State of Alabama. Demetrius 
Newton died after the trial. 
The State defendants responded that the 
redistricting plans violate neither section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act nor the 
Constitution. They argued that the plaintiffs 
could not prove vote dilution because it is 
not possible to draw another compact, 
majority-black district, and that the 
Legislature acted with lawful motives, not 
with any unconstitutional racially 
discriminatory purpose. The State 
defendants argued that the Legislature 
adopted an overall deviation in population of 
2 percent to comply with the requirement of 
one person, one vote, under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. They also argued that the 
Legislature preserved the majority-
black districts with roughly the same 
percentage of black voters to comply with 
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the nonretrogression principle of section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act so as to obtain 
preclearance from the Attorney General of 
the United States. 
Although the Black Caucus plaintiffs and 
the Democratic Conference plaintiffs both 
asserted claims under section 2, they framed 
their claims differently. The Black Caucus 
plaintiffs argued that the State defendants 
diluted black voting strength across the State 
by packing majority-black districts and 
ignoring traditional districting criteria, 
including the preservation of county lines. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs also asserted 
claims of local vote dilution in Madison 
County based on the changes to Senate 
District 7 and in Jefferson County based on 
the changes to the balance of members of 
the local delegation. The Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs asserted claims of only 
local vote dilution. They argued that the 
plans failed to create a majority-black House 
district in Jefferson County and in 
Montgomery County and a minority 
opportunity Senate district in Madison 
County. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs and Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs also made different 
arguments in support of their claims of 
intentional discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argued that the 
Legislature discriminated on the basis of 
race when it drew the districts to preserve 
the existing percentages of blacks in the 
majority-black districts and that this 
discrimination could not survive strict 
scrutiny after the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs 
argued that the Legislature subordinated 
traditional redistricting criteria to racial 
criteria when it drew the majority-
black districts; that the impact of the 
redistricting plans falls more heavily on 
minority voters; that the Republican-
controlled Legislature had a desire to cement 
its supermajority status by inadequately 
representing minorities in the redistricting 
plans; and that the plans were drafted by a 
Republican consultant without input 
from black legislators, were not provided to 
the public until May, and were adopted in a 
special session of the Legislature. 
B. Findings of Fact 
We divide our findings of fact in five parts. 
In the first part, we describe the 2010 
Census data and the information that it 
conveyed about the population of the State 
of Alabama. In the second part, we describe 
the 2001 districting plans and the effects of 
the population shifts on those plans. In the 
third part, we describe the redistricting 
process that followed the 2010 Census. In 
the fourth and fifth parts, we discuss the 
evidence presented at trial; we first consider 
the evidence presented by the plaintiffs and 
then consider the evidence presented by the 
State defendants. 
1. The 2010 Census Data for the State 
of Alabama 
Between 2000 and 2010, the overall 
population of Alabama grew by 7.48 
percent. Although the absolute number of 
the white non-Hispanic population 
increased, the percentage of the population 
composed of white non-Hispanic residents 
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decreased by 3.3 percent. The absolute 
numbers of the black and Native American 
populations increased, but the percentages of 
the population composed of black residents 
and Native American residents remained 
relatively constant. Only the absolute 
number of the Hispanic population and the 
percentage of the population composed of 
Hispanic residents increased between 2000 
and 2010. The 2010 Census reported 
that Alabama had 4,779,736 residents, 
including 3,204,402 white non-Hispanic 
persons (67 percent), 
1,244,437 black persons (26 percent), 
25,907 Native American persons (0.5 
percent), and 185,602 Hispanic or Latino 
persons (3.9 percent). In 2000, Alabama had 
4,447,100 residents, including 3,125,819 
white non-Hispanic persons (70.3 percent), 
1,155,930 black persons (26 percent), 
22,430 Native American persons (0.5 
percent), and 75,830 Hispanic persons (1.7 
percent). The Court calculated the above 
percentages using the population statistics of 
the U.S. Census Bureau that the plaintiffs 
provided. When available, the Court elected 
to use the population data for each race that 
was identified as that racial group alone. 
Alabama comprises 67 counties, and three 
of the most populous counties are Jefferson 
County, Madison County, and Montgomery 
County. According to the 2010 Census, 
Jefferson County had a total population of 
658,466; a white population of 349,166; and 
a black population of 276,525. Between 
2000 and 2010, the total population of 
Jefferson County decreased by 3,581; the 
white population decreased by 35,473; and 
the black population increased by 15,917. In 
2010, Madison County had a total 
population of 334,811; a white population of 
228,280; and a black population of 80,376. 
Between 2000 and 2010, the total population 
of Madison County increased by 58,111; the 
white population increased by 28,879; and 
the black population increased by 17,351. In 
2010, Montgomery County had a total 
population of 229,363; a white population of 
90,656; and a black population of 125,477. 
Between 2000 and 2010, the total population 
of Montgomery County increased by 5,853; 
the white population decreased by 18,524; 
and the black population increased by 
16,894. 
The next general election will take place on 
November 4, 2014. The Senate has 35 
members elected by single-member voting 
districts. The House of Representatives has 
105 members also elected by single-member 
voting districts. Based on the 2010 Census 
data, the ideal Senate district would have a 
total population of 136,564, and the ideal 
House district would have a total population 
of 45,521. 
2. The 2001 Districting Plans 
In this subsection, we review two aspects of 
the 2001 districting plans that are relevant to 
this litigation. We explain that the districts 
established in 2001 were severely 
malapportioned in the light of the population 
data from the 2010 Census, and we describe 
the systematic underpopulation of the 
majority-black districts in the 2001 plans. 
The new data from the 2010 Census 
revealed severe malapportionment of the 
House districts established in 2001 for use in 
the 2002 election. The population in 80 of 
the 105 districts for the Alabama House of 
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Representatives deviated from the ideal 
population by more than 5 percent. Of those 
malapportioned districts, 22 deviated above 
or below the ideal population by more than 
20 percent. The most malapportioned district 
was District 41, a majority-white district in 
Shelby County, which was overpopulated by 
60.76 percent. Two other majority-white 
districts that included portions of Shelby 
County—Districts 43 and 50—were 
overpopulated by 23.14 percent and 21.65 
percent respectively. District 50 also reached 
into St. Clair County. All three of these 
districts in Shelby and St. Clair Counties 
were in the Birmingham metropolitan area. 
Two majority-white districts in Baldwin 
County near Mobile—Districts 94 and 95—
were overpopulated by 31.29 percent and 
35.41 percent respectively. And Districts 6 
and 25, majority-white districts in Madison 
and Limestone Counties near Huntsville, 
were overpopulated by 26.70 percent and 
42.68 percent respectively. 
The malapportionment was especially severe 
in the majority-black House districts that the 
Democrat-controlled Legislature had drawn 
as part of their successful partisan 
gerrymander in 2001. After the 2010 
Census, all of the 27 majority-black districts 
in the House were underpopulated, and 25 
were underpopulated by more than 5 
percent, the maximum deviation used under 
the 2001 plans. Nine of the majority-black 
districts were underpopulated by more than 
20 percent. 
The new census data also revealed the 
malapportionment of the Senate districts. 
The population in 24 of the 35 districts for 
the Alabama Senate deviated from the ideal 
population by more than 5 percent. Of those 
malapportioned districts, four of the districts 
deviated from the ideal population by more 
than 20 percent. Like the House districts, the 
most malapportioned districts included 
portions of Shelby County, Limestone 
County, and Madison County. The most 
malapportioned district was District 2, a 
majority-white district in Limestone and 
Madison Counties, which was 
overpopulated by 31.12 percent. Districts 14 
and 15, majority-white districts that included 
portions of Shelby County, were 
overpopulated by 23.51 percent and 17.50 
percent respectively. District 17, a majority-
white district that included portions of St. 
Clair, Jefferson, and Blount Counties, was 
overpopulated by 15.09 percent. 
As with the House districts, the 
malapportionment was especially severe in 
the majority-black Senate districts drawn by 
the Democrat-controlled Legislature as part 
of their successful partisan gerrymander in 
2001. All of the eight majority-
black districts were underpopulated. Seven 
of the eight majority-black districts were 
underpopulated by more than 10 percent, 
and two of those districts were 
underpopulated by more than 20 percent. 
Many of these malapportioned districts were 
located within the “Black Belt,” a south-
central region of the State named for 
its black soil. A large black population 
resides there because of a history of 
agriculture and slavery. 
The underpopulation of the majority-
black House and Senate districts reflected 
the systematic underpopulation of those 
districts in previous rounds of redistricting 
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over the last twenty years. In the 1993 
Reed–Buskey plans, which Democratic 
legislators proposed and a state court 
approved, 25 of the 27 majority-
black districts in the House of 
Representatives were underpopulated, and 
19 of those 25 were underpopulated by more 
than 4 percent. All eight of the majority-
black districts for the Senate were 
underpopulated, and six of them were 
underpopulated by more than 4 percent. In 
the 2001 plans, adopted by the then-
Democratic Legislature, 22 of the 27 
majority-black House districts were 
underpopulated, and 10 of those districts 
were underpopulated by greater than 4 
percent. Six of the eight majority-black 
Senate districts were underpopulated, and 
four of those districts were underpopulated 
by greater than 4 percent.  
In 2001, the Democrat-controlled 
Legislature repopulated the majority-
black districts by shifting thousands 
of black people into those districts to 
maintain the same relative percentages of 
the black population in those districts. The 
following table illustrates how the 
Legislature repopulated the majority-
black House districts by adding thousands of 
black people to 26 of those districts. 
[See page 212] 
In total, the Democrat-controlled Legislature 
moved 62,376 black people into the 
majority-black House districts to maintain 
the same relative percentages 
of black population in those districts. In 
2001, 62,376 black people constituted 5.4 
percent of the total black population 
in Alabama. 
The following table illustrates that the 
Legislature repopulated the majority-
black Senate districts by adding thousands 
of black people to all but one of those 
districts. 
[See page 213] 
In total, the Democrat-controlled Legislature 
moved 55,294 black people into the 
majority-black Senate districts to maintain 
the same relative percentages 
of black population in those districts. In 
2001, 55,294 black people constituted 4.8 
percent of the total black population 
in Alabama. 
The Democratic leaders of the previous 
Legislature were never shy about their 
partisan strategy in redistricting. After the 
adoption of the 2001 districts, the 
Democratic leaders filed, as amici curiae, a 
brief in the Supreme Court of the United 
States that described the districts as an 
example of a successful partisan 
gerrymander. The brief explained that, 
during the redistricting process after the 
2000 Census, “the Democratic leadership 
pursued a biracial strategy aimed at 
safeguarding its governing majorities in both 
houses of the Legislature.” The brief 
bragged that the partisan strategy succeeded: 
“The 2002 general election returned 
Democratic candidates to 71% of the Senate 
seats and 60% of the House seats, with 52% 
of the statewide vote supporting Democrats 
in Senate races and 51% supporting 
Democrats in House races.” But this partisan 
gerrymander, during a period of realignment 
when Republicans won presidential and 
other statewide elections with increasing 
frequency, rested on a shaky foundation that 
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collapsed in 2010 when Republicans won 
supermajorities in both houses of the 
Legislature. 
3. The Redistricting Process After the 
2010 Census 
After the 2010 Census, 
the Alabama Legislature began the process 
of redistricting itself. We describe that 
process from its inception to the adoption of 
the final plans by the Legislature. In so 
doing, we describe the work of the 
permanent legislative committee on 
reapportionment, the guidelines adopted by 
the committee, and the consultant hired by 
the committee to draw the new district lines. 
a. The Permanent Legislative Committee 
on Reapportionment 
The Alabama Code provides for a 
Permanent Legislative Committee on 
Reapportionment to address the problems of 
malapportionment that may arise after each 
new census. When the Legislature is not 
actively involved with the reapportionment 
process, the Committee comprises six 
members, three from each house of the 
Legislature. During the reapportionment 
process, Alabama law requires that the 
Committee expand to 22 members. Those 22 
members must include “[o]ne member of the 
House of Representatives from each 
congressional district, four members of the 
House of Representatives at-large ... 
appointed by the Speaker of the House and 
one member of the Senate from each 
congressional district, four members of the 
Senate at-large ... appointed by the 
Lieutenant Governor.” Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon co-chair the 
Committee. All of the Republicans on the 
Committee are white. Representative Ford is 
the only white Democrat on the Committee; 
all of the other Democrats on the Committee 
are black.  
The Committee is primarily charged with 
the creation of each new reapportionment 
plan for the State. The Committee is 
required to “make a continuous study of the 
reapportionment problems in Alabama”; 
“make reports of its investigations, 
findings[,] and recommendations to the 
Legislature at any time, during any regular 
or special session of the Legislature, as it 
may deem necessary”; and “engage in such 
activities as it deems necessary for the 
preparation and formulation of a 
reapportionment plan” for 
the Alabama Legislature and the 
congressional districts of the State… 
b. Guidelines Adopted by the Committee 
To guide its work, the current Committee 
established written guidelines for drawing 
the new district lines for members of 
Congress, the State Board of Education, and 
the Legislature. In these guidelines, the 
Committee changed the allowable overall 
deviation in population for the State Board 
of Education and the Legislature from 10 
percent, which had been used in the 1993 
and 2001 plans, to 2 percent. The guidelines 
also provided that the districts be drawn in 
accordance with the Voting Rights Act, be 
contiguous and reasonably compact, be 
composed of as few counties as practicable, 
avoid contests between incumbent members 
whenever possible, and respect communities 
of interest. The guidelines acknowledged 
that not all of the redistricting goals could be 
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accomplished and provided that, in cases of 
conflict, priority would be given to the 
requirement of one person, one vote and to 
the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
believed that the Legislature was obligated, 
under the Voting Rights Act, to preserve the 
existing number of majority-black districts. 
And Senator Dial personally promised the 
other members of the Senate that he would 
try to make sure that none of the incumbents 
would have to run against each other in the 
new plan. 
The Committee adopted the guideline of an 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent 
to comply with the requirement of one 
person, one vote under the Fourteenth 
Amendment after a recent decision of 
another district court sitting in the Eleventh 
Circuit that cast doubt on the presumptive 
constitutionality of a deviation of 10 
percent. In Larios v. Cox, the district court 
concluded that a redistricting plan in 
Georgia, which had used an overall 
deviation in population of 10 percent, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because the “population deviations in the 
Georgia House and Senate were not driven 
by any traditional redistricting criteria such 
as compactness, contiguity, and preserving 
county lines,” but were the result of a 
“concerted effort to allow rural and inner-
city Atlanta regions of the state to hold on to 
their legislative influence (at the expense of 
suburban Atlanta), even as the rate of 
population growth in those areas was 
substantially lower.” The district court also 
cast doubt on the notion that an overall 
deviation of 10 percent could always serve 
as a “safe harbor” for a state, especially in 
the light of developing technology that made 
it possible to achieve substantially greater 
population equality.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed that decision. 
Many states across the country adopted an 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent 
or less for the redistricting of their state 
legislatures after the 2010 Census. Florida 
used an overall deviation of 2 percent in its 
State Senate districts and an overall 
deviation of 4 percent in its State House 
districts. Georgia used an overall deviation 
of 2 percent in both houses of its 
legislature… 
c. Public Hearings 
At the beginning of the reapportionment 
process, the Committee conducted public 
hearings at 21 locations 
throughout Alabama. The Committee used 
the schedule of public hearings that had 
taken place during the last round of 
reapportionment in 2001 as the template for 
its schedule of public hearings and made 
changes to the locations based only on 
specific requests from members of the 
Committee. Senator Dial and Representative 
McClendon attended all of the hearings. The 
other members of the Committee attended 
some of the hearings, and other members of 
the Legislature occasionally spoke at the 
hearings. The first 21 meetings were held 
before the Committee had completed any 
draft plans. Members of the public who 
attended these hearings asked the 
Legislators to keep counties whole to the 
extent possible, preserve communities of 
interest, and allow voters to keep the 
representatives and senators with whom they 
were already familiar. At the public hearing 
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in Dallas County, Senator Hank Sanders 
(D), a black senator who represents a 
majority-black district, asked Senator Dial to 
use 62 percent as a minimum for the 
majority-black districts because often the 
population statistics for a district do not 
reflect the actual voters in that district. At 
the public hearing in Clarke County, 
Representative Thomas Jackson (D), 
a black representative of a majority-
black district, asked that his district be 62 to 
65 percent black. 
d. Randy Hinaman Hired as Consultant To 
Draw the Redistricting Plans 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
worked with Randy Hinaman to draw the 
new districts for the Legislature. Hinaman is 
a political consultant with experience 
working in Alabama. He drew the 
congressional districts in Alabama after the 
2010 Census; worked with Democratic 
leaders after the 2000 Census to draw the 
congressional districts adopted by the 
Legislature and precleared by the 
Department of Justice; and drew 
congressional districts that were adopted by 
another three-judge district court in 1992 
and affirmed by the Supreme Court. He also 
served as the campaign manager and then as 
chief of staff for Alabama Congressman 
Sonny Callahan during the 1980s. In 2011, 
Hinaman contracted with Citizens for Fair 
Representation, a nonprofit organization, to 
coordinate with the Republican leadership of 
the Legislature to redraw the district lines 
for the Legislature after the 2010 Census.  
Hinaman used a computer program known 
as Maptitude to draw the plans. Maptitude 
allows the user to draw districts based on the 
data from the census. The program also 
allows the user to load additional data into 
the program to assist with the drawing of the 
districts. Hinaman collected political data 
from the Republican National Committee 
for every election in Alabama between 2002 
and 2010 and imported that data into 
Maptitude. Hinaman also collected and 
imported information about the residences 
of incumbents from the Reapportionment 
Office. 
On September 22, 2011, Hinaman met with 
Speaker of the House Mike Hubbard, 
President Pro Tempore Del Marsh, Senator 
Dial, Representative McClendon, attorney 
Dorman Walker, and staff to agree upon 
goals and establish a timeline for the 
drawing of the new districts. The 
participants understood that, under the 
Voting Rights Act, the new districts could 
not reduce the total number of majority-
black districts for each house and that the 
new majority-black districts should reflect 
as closely as possible the percentage 
of black voters in the existing majority-black 
districts as of the 2010 Census. Hinaman 
suggested that he should begin with the 
majority-black districts when he drew the 
map, and all of the participants agreed. The 
legislators also asked Hinaman to avoid the 
placement of two incumbent members of the 
Legislature in a single new district. And the 
participants agreed that Hinaman should try 
to maintain the characteristics of the 
preexisting districts to the extent possible. 
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon, 
and Hinaman understood “retrogression” 
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to 
mean the reduction in the number of 
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majority-black districts or a significant 
reduction in the percentage of blacks in the 
new districts as compared to the 2001 
districts with the 2010 data. Section 5 
requires that a covered jurisdiction obtain 
preclearance of a new voting “standard, 
practice, or procedure” by either the 
Attorney General of the United States or the 
United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia to ensure that the change “does 
not have the purpose and will not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race or color.” “Whether 
a voting procedure change should be 
precleared depends on whether the change 
would lead to a retrogression in the position 
of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 
When the Attorney General evaluates 
whether a new redistricting plan has a 
“retrogressive” effect, the Attorney General 
compares the old districts in the light of 
updated census data with the new plans. 
Hinaman worked alone on the new districts 
during the fall of 2011. He began with the 
majority-black districts. Although during 
this phase Hinaman did not personally speak 
with the black members of the Legislature 
who represented those districts, he 
incorporated proposals that he received from 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
after they met with the representatives from 
those districts. After he drafted the majority-
black districts, Hinaman started in the 
southern corners of the State and worked 
toward the center of the map. He provided 
an initial plan to Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon around February 
2012. 
During the spring of 2012 while the 
Legislature was in regular session, Hinaman 
continued to work on the district plans and 
incorporate feedback from the legislators. 
Hinaman traveled to Alabama to meet in 
person with many of the Republican 
legislators. Although he did not meet with 
Democratic legislators, he incorporated 
suggestions that Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon received from 
Democratic legislators. Senator Dial gave 
Hinaman proposed maps for the three 
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson 
County that Senator Rodger Smitherman 
(D), a black legislator from Jefferson 
County, had provided him. Senator Dial 
instructed Hinaman to incorporate those 
maps into the Senate plan to the extent 
possible because they represented the wishes 
of the three senators from those districts. 
Hinaman drew the majority-black districts in 
Jefferson County to be substantially the 
same as the maps provided to him by 
Senator Dial. Representative McClendon 
gave Hinaman proposed maps for the 
drawing of Montgomery County that 
McClendon had been given by 
Representative Thad McClammy (D), 
a black legislator from that county. Notably, 
the McClammy map proposed the move of 
House District 73 from Montgomery 
County. It was a consensus map among 
the black Democratic representatives of 
Montgomery County. House District 73 is 
represented by Joe Hubbard, a white 
freshman Democrat. Representative 
McClendon told Hinaman to adopt as many 
of Representative McClammy's ideas as 
possible, and Hinaman followed that 
instruction. 
131 
 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
unveiled the plans to the Committee on May 
9, 2012. The plan for the House of 
Representatives increased the total number 
of majority-black districts from 27 to 28 
based on total population figures. The new 
majority-black district was District 85, 
which had previously been a plurality-
black district. District 85 is located in 
southeast Alabama in Henry and Houston 
Counties. Because of the severe 
malapportionment of most of the majority-
black districts, the new plans had to 
incorporate significant changes to those 
districts. 
e. The Six Districts Challenged by 
Plaintiffs 
Primarily at issue in this matter are six 
decisions made by Hinaman, in consultation 
with members of the Legislature. In the map 
for the House of Representatives, Hinaman 
moved one majority-white district, House 
District 73, out of Montgomery County, and 
moved one majority-black district, House 
District 53, out of Jefferson County. In the 
map for the Senate, Hinaman reworked the 
boundaries of Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, and 
26. 
i. House District 73 
Hinaman moved House District 73, a 
majority-white House district, from 
Montgomery County to Shelby and Bibb 
Counties to avoid retrogression of the 
majority-black House districts in 
Montgomery County. The 2001 plan divided 
Montgomery County into six House 
districts—Districts 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, and 
78—three of which were majority-white and 
three of which were majority-black. The 
new plan divided Montgomery County into 
seven House districts—Districts 69, 74, 75, 
76, 77, 78, and 90—four of which are 
majority-black districts, and three of which 
are majority-white districts. Although House 
District 73 was a majority-white district 
under the 2001 plan, its black population 
had grown since 2000, and Hinaman was 
able to use that population to repopulate the 
majority-black districts in Montgomery 
County without retrogression. Hinaman 
placed the new District 73 in Shelby County, 
one of the fastest growing areas of the State. 
Although Hinaman had begun working on 
this idea in early 2012, he refined the 
concept after he received a map from 
Representative McClammy that also used 
the former District 73 to repopulate the 
majority-black districts.  
ii. House District 53 
Hinaman also moved House District 53, a 
majority-black district, from Jefferson 
County to the Huntsville area in Madison 
County because of the substantial 
underpopulation of the majority-
black districts in Jefferson County. Under 
the 2001 plan, Jefferson County had nine 
majority-black House districts and nine 
majority-white House districts. Although 
the black population in Jefferson County 
increased between 2000 and 2010, that 
change was not reflected in the majority-
black districts in the County. Instead, all of 
the majority-black districts in Jefferson 
County were significantly 
underpopulated. Because of that 
underpopulation, Hinaman could not comply 
with the guideline for population deviation 
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adopted by the Committee and maintain nine 
majority-black House districts within 
Jefferson County without significantly 
reducing the percentage of black voters in 
each district. To preserve the total number of 
majority-black districts and avoid a problem 
of retrogression under section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, Hinaman moved District 
53 to Madison County and used the 
population that had previously been located 
within District 53 to repopulate the other 
majority-black districts in Jefferson County. 
Under the new plan, the same number of 
House districts include a portion of Jefferson 
County, but ten of those districts are 
majority-white and eight of those districts 
are majority-black. Although the racial 
balance of the districts has changed, the 
partisan balance of incumbents has not: nine 
of the House districts have Republican 
incumbents as residents, and nine of the 
House districts have Democratic incumbents 
as residents. But the majority-white district 
with a Democratic incumbent might elect a 
Republican, which would likely shift the 
partisan balance to 10 Republicans and 8 
Democrats. Jefferson County is 53.62 
percent white and 42.47 percent black. 
iii. Senate District 7 
Hinaman reduced the population of Senate 
District 7 to accommodate the 
overpopulation of it and its neighboring 
districts. District 7, a majority-white district 
in Madison County with a substantial 
minority population, was overpopulated by 
9.04 percent. To the west, District 7 shared a 
border with District 2, which was 
overpopulated by 31.12 percent. To the 
south, District 7 shared a border with 
Districts 3 and 9, which were overpopulated 
by 10.69 percent and 5.85 percent 
respectively. To the east, District 7 shared a 
border with District 8, which was 
overpopulated by 4.07 percent. To the north, 
District 7 shared a border with Tennessee. 
Under the new map, Hinaman took some 
residents of Limestone and Madison 
Counties from District 2 and moved them 
into District 1. Hinaman removed a total of 
10,994 people from District 7, and 10,151 of 
those people were black. He moved most of 
that population into Senate District 1, which 
was represented by Senator Tammy Irons 
(D). 
iv. Senate District 11 
Hinaman significantly altered the shape of 
Senate District 11, a majority-white district 
formerly located in Calhoun, Talladega, 
Coosa, and Elmore Counties, because of 
changes to nearby districts. Hinaman 
testified that the changes made to District 11 
were the result of “a combination of how the 
rest of those districts were moved around.” 
Under the 2001 plan, Senate District 30 was 
a bizarre district drawn in the shape of an 
Elmo projector, with Butler, Crenshaw, and 
Pike Counties forming a sturdy base for the 
district, and a portion of Lowndes County 
forming a thin neck to its head in Autauga 
County. Under the new plan, District 30 is a 
more compact district that includes all of 
Autauga and Coosa Counties and portions of 
Chilton and Elmore Counties. Because 
District 30 now encompasses all of Coosa 
County, the district shares a border with the 
new District 11, which includes portions of 
St. Clair, Shelby, and Talladega 
Counties. The former District 11 was 62.59 
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percent white and 33.95 percent black. The 
new District 11 is 81.66 percent white and 
14.96 percent black. The incumbent senator 
from District 11, Jerry Fielding, switched 
from the Democratic Party to the Republican 
Party after the Legislature approved the new 
districts. 
v. Senate District 22 
Although Senate District 22 in 
southwest Alabama was not malapportioned 
in 2010, Hinaman redrew its borders to 
accommodate shifts in population from 
neighboring districts that were significantly 
malapportioned. In 2010, three of the Senate 
districts in Mobile County—Districts 33, 34, 
and 35—were underpopulated by a total of 
15,656 people. Senate District 32, which 
was located in Baldwin County on the 
eastern shore of Mobile Bay, was 
overpopulated by 19,055. Baldwin County is 
bordered on the east by Florida, the south by 
the Gulf of Mexico, and the west by Mobile 
Bay and Mobile County. Mobile County is 
bordered on the west by Mississippi, the 
south by the Gulf of Mexico, and the east by 
Mobile Bay and Baldwin County. Senate 
District 22, which included portions of 
Washington, Clarke, Choctaw, Escambia, 
Monroe, and Conecuh Counties, bordered 
District 34 on the north, and extended down 
into a strip of land in Mobile and Baldwin 
Counties between Districts 33 and 34 on the 
west and District 32 on the east. Senate 
Districts 23 and 24 bordered Senate District 
22 on the north and both were majority-
black districts with significant 
underpopulation. Hinaman considered 
moving District 35 across Mobile Bay to 
gain some of the overpopulation from 
Baldwin County, but Senator Trip Pittman 
(R) of District 32 objected to that proposal. 
Hinaman decided instead to repopulate 
District 35 by taking population from 
District 34; to transfer population from a 
portion of District 22 in Mobile County to 
District 34; to move northern portions of 
District 32 in Baldwin County into District 
22; and to repopulate Districts 23 and 24 
with some of the portions of District 22. As 
a result, District 22 crossed into all of the 
same counties as in the 2001 plan, but the 
District included smaller portions of Mobile, 
Choctaw, and Washington Counties. The 
new map divided the MOWA Band of 
Choctaw Indians, a small Native American 
tribe not recognized by the federal 
government, between District 22 and 
District 34. 
vi. Senate District 26 
Hinaman substantially decreased the land 
size of Senate District 26, a majority-black 
district in Montgomery County. Under the 
2001 plan, Senate District 26 included the 
majority of Montgomery County, following 
the county lines. In 2010, the total 
population of District 26 was 
underpopulated by 11.64 percent and was 
22.03 percent white and 72.75 percent black. 
To comply with the guideline of an overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent, 
Hinaman moved some of the densely 
populated precincts in the City of 
Montgomery into Senate District 26. Under 
the 2001 plan, Senate District 25 was 
located primarily in Elmore County to the 
northeast of Senate District 26. To maintain 
contiguous districts and as a result of 
moving other districts, Hinaman created a 
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land bridge through Montgomery County to 
connect District 25 with Crenshaw County 
to the south. This land bridge removed a 
large geographic portion of District 26, 
although it did not significantly reduce the 
population of the district. Under Act 603, 
the new redistricting plan for the Senate, 
Senate District 26 maintains much of its 
former shape by following the county lines 
at the northern borders. The district remains 
underpopulated by .08 percent and the 
percentage of the population that 
is black has increased slightly, from 72.75 
percent to 75.22 percent. 
f. Adoption of the Plans by the Committee 
The Committee adopted these plans on May 
9, 2012, as working drafts, and then 
officially adopted the plans on May 17, 
2012. In both meetings, Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon explained the 
plans, and the Committee discussed them. 
The Committee adopted the McClendon 
House plan as a working draft by a recorded 
vote of 16 yeas and 3 nays and the Dial 
Senate plan by a voice vote. The Committee 
officially adopted the plans one week later 
by the same votes. 
The Committee conducted a twenty-second 
public hearing in Montgomery 
approximately an hour and a half after it 
adopted the plans. At that hearing, several 
legislators objected to particular splits of 
counties and to the decision to split 
Lauderdale and Colbert Counties into two 
different Senate districts because those 
counties form a community of interest 
known as the “Shoals.” Under the 2001 
plan, all of Lauderdale County and most of 
Colbert County had been located within 
District 1. Under the new plan, part of 
Lauderdale County and all of Colbert 
County are now located in District 6, and 
District 1 now includes portions of 
Lauderdale, Limestone, and Madison 
Counties. Representative Merika Coleman 
(D) from Jefferson County objected to what 
she viewed as the “packing and stacking” of 
the black vote. Representative Joe Hubbard 
(D) objected to the districts for Montgomery 
County, which he viewed as disrespectful of 
communities of interests, and to the decision 
to move his district, District 73, to Shelby 
County. Two local officials from Clay 
County objected to its division into two 
districts because the 2001 plan had included 
the county in a single House district. And 
voters from several counties raised 
objections to the lack of sufficient advance 
notice for the hearing and to the splitting of 
certain counties. 
In the final week before the passage of Act 
602 and Act 603, Hinaman met with 
legislators at a computer in the 
Reapportionment Office to make final 
adjustments to the maps. Hinaman met with 
several Democratic members of the 
Legislature during this process. 
Representative McClendon and Hinaman 
were able to accommodate some of the 
representatives, but Representative 
McClendon and Hinaman were not able to 
accommodate requests from Representative 
Merika Coleman and Representative 
Juandalynn Givan, two members from the 
Birmingham area, who wanted to move 
3,700 people from one district to another 
because that change would have violated the 
guideline of an overall deviation of 2 
percent. Senator Dial tried to accommodate 
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a request from Senator Tammy Irons (D) to 
move her law office into her district, but he 
was unable to offer an amendment on the 
Senate floor because another senator, Mark 
Keahey (D), called for a third reading of the 
bill at length and the rules of the Legislature 
require an immediate vote on a bill after it 
has been read three times. 
Throughout the process, Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon had to balance 
the requirements of the committee 
guidelines against the preferences of 
incumbents. And the new districts needed to 
be passed by the Legislature. Senator Dial 
adjusted the Senate plan repeatedly to satisfy 
legislators so that the bill could be passed. 
But many legislators, both Republican and 
Democrat, were dissatisfied with the plans. 
g. The Final Redistricting Plans: Act 602 
and Act 603 
The final versions of the House and Senate 
bills preserved the majority-black districts 
with roughly the same percentages 
of black population as in the 1993 and 2001 
plans. The statistics are consistent with the 
agreement between Hinaman, the 
Republican leadership, and the co-chairs of 
the Committee to preserve the majority-
black districts without retrogression. As the 
following table illustrates, Act 602 increased 
slightly the percentage of 
the black population in 14 of the original 27 
majority-black House districts, decreased 
slightly the percentage of 
the black population in the other 13 
majority-black House districts, and created 
one new majority-black House district in 
total population. 
[See page 214] 
And the following table illustrates that Act 
603 increased the percentage of the black 
population in five of the majority-
black Senate districts and decreased the 
percentage of the black population in the 
other three majority-black Senate districts. 
[See page 215] 
The following table illustrates the 
percentages of total black population 
and black voting-age population for each 
majority-black House district under Act 602 
and the percentage of overall deviation in 
total population from ideal population for 
each majority-black House district. 
[See page 216] 
The following table compares the 
percentages of black voting-age population 
for each majority-black House district using 
the 2010 Census data under Act 602 and 
under the 2001 plan. 
[See page 217] 
The following table compares the 
percentages of black voting-age population 
for each majority-black Senate district using 
the 2010 Census data under Act 603 and 
under the 2001 plan. 
[See page 218] 
Most of the majority-black districts under 
the new plan remain underpopulated, but 
within 1 percent of the ideal population. Of 
the 28 majority-black House districts, 20 
remain underpopulated. Six of the eight 
majority-black Senate districts remain 
underpopulated. 
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Because the Legislature used a tighter 
deviation in population compared to the 
Democrat-controlled Legislature in 2001, 
the number of black people and the 
percentage of the black population moved 
into majority-black districts were higher 
under the Acts than compared to those same 
numbers in 2001. In 2012, the Legislature 
moved 9.8 percent of the 
total black population into the majority-
black House districts and 8.5 percent of the 
total black population into the majority-
black Senate districts. If the Democrat-
controlled Legislature in 2001 had drawn the 
redistricting lines in accordance with an 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent, 
they would have needed to move 6.6 percent 
of the total black population into the 
majority-black House districts and 5.8 
percent of the total black population into the 
majority-black Senate districts. The 
following table illustrates how the 
Legislature repopulated the majority-
black House districts in 2001 and how many 
additional black people would have been 
required had that Legislature complied with 
the guideline of 2 percent deviation used in 
2012. 
[See page 219] 
The following table illustrates how the 
Legislature repopulated the majority-
black districts in the Senate in 2001 and how 
many additional black people would have 
been required had that Legislature complied 
with the guideline of 2 percent deviation 
used in 2012. 
[See page 220] 
Although the Constitution 
of Alabama prohibits the division of a 
county among districts, the final plans split 
some counties to comply with the overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent used to 
satisfy the federal requirement of one 
person, one vote. The final plans split 33 
counties for the Senate districts and 50 
counties for the House districts. The 1993 
plans split 32 counties for Senate districts 
and 36 counties for the House districts, and 
the 2001 plans split 31 counties for the 
Senate districts and 39 counties for the 
House districts. But those earlier plans used 
an overall deviation in population of 10 
percent. 
Other counties were split to further the 
interests of incumbents. For example, 
Representative Alan Harper, who switched 
to the Republican Party in 2012, asked to 
have his district include a portion of Greene 
County in which he owned property. 
Representative Harper stated that he might 
move to that property in the future, and the 
representative whose district had previously 
included that property agreed to a change in 
which 12 people were moved to District 61. 
The rest of Greene County is divided 
between Districts 71 and 72. 
The final plan also kept incumbent conflicts 
to a minimum. No two incumbent Senators 
were in the same district. The House plan 
had only two incumbent conflicts. 
Two black incumbent Democrats, 
Representative Juandalynn Givan and 
Representative Demetrius Newton, lived in 
District 60. Representative Demetrius 
Newton has since died. Another 
black incumbent Democrat, Representative 
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John Knight, and a white incumbent 
Democrat, Representative Joe Hubbard, 
lived in District 77, but Representative 
Hubbard has since moved to District 74. The 
former incumbent conflict was the result of 
the decision to move District 53 to 
Huntsville and use its former population to 
repopulate the majority-black districts in 
Jefferson County, and the latter incumbent 
conflict was the result of the decision to 
move District 73 to Shelby County and use 
its former population to repopulate the 
majority-black districts in Montgomery 
County. 
h. Adoption of the Acts into Law 
The Alabama Legislature considered the 
proposed districts in a special session that 
began on May 17, 2012, and ended on May 
24, 2012. The Legislature made only minor 
changes to the bills during that week. The 
bills proceeded along the 
normal legislative process through 
committees and debate on the floor of each 
house of the Legislature. Democratic 
legislators offered substitute plans in 
committee and on the floors of both houses 
of the Legislature, but none of their plans 
complied with the guideline of an overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent adopted 
by the Committee. Senator Hank Sanders 
(D) introduced HB16 and SB5 as 
alternatives, both of which were drafted with 
an overall deviation of 10 percent. Those 
plans placed several incumbents in the same 
districts, and those plans included 27 
majority-black House districts. All of the 
proposed substitutes were defeated. 
Both houses of the Legislature approved the 
Acts, and the Governor signed them into 
law. The Senate approved its new districts 
by a vote of 20 to 13 along party lines, with 
an Independent, Harri Ann Smith, joining 
the Democrats in the minority. The Senate 
approved the new House districts by a vote 
of 23 to 12 along party lines, with the 
Independent joining the Republicans in the 
majority. The House approved its new 
districts by a vote of 66 to 35, with one 
Democrat, Charles Newton, voting in favor 
of the plan and three Democrats abstaining 
from voting. The House approved the new 
Senate districts by a vote of 61 to 34 along 
party lines, with 4 Republicans and 5 
Democrats abstaining from the vote. 
Governor Bentley signed the Acts into law 
on May 31, 2012. 
4. Evidence Presented by the Plaintiffs at 
Trial 
At trial, the plaintiffs introduced the live 
testimony of 13 lay witnesses and 3 expert 
witnesses. The expert witnesses included 
William S. Cooper, who drew alternative 
maps for the Black Caucus plaintiffs; Allan 
J. Lichtman, who testified about racial 
polarization in Alabama elections; and 
Theodore S. Arrington, who testified that, in 
his opinion, the Acts packed black voters 
into majority-black districts to isolate and 
diminish their political strength. 
a. Testimony of Senator Tammy Irons 
Senator Tammy Irons (D) testified that, in 
her opinion, the only explanation for the 
changes made to her district in Act 603 is an 
intent to “crack” a minority-opportunity 
district in Senate District 7. She explained 
that her old district included all of 
Lauderdale County and part of Colbert 
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County, a community of interest commonly 
known as “the Shoals,” but that her new 
district includes only a portion of 
Lauderdale County, a strip of land in the 
northern portion of Limestone County that 
used to belong to District 2, and a section of 
Madison County heavily populated by 
minorities that used to belong to District 7. 
According to the 2010 Census, Senate 
District 7 had a voting-age population that 
was 62.61 percent white and 30.90 
percent black. Under Act 603, Senate 
District 7 will have a voting-age population 
that is 67.83 percent white and 26.14 percent 
black. According to the 2010 Census, Senate 
District 1 had a voting-age population that 
was 84.93 percent white and 12.20 
percent black. Under Act 603, Senate 
District 1 will have a voting-age population 
that is 85.56 percent white and 10.66 
percent black. 
We do not doubt that Senator Tammy Irons 
testified truthfully about her opinions, but 
we do not credit her conclusions about the 
changes to her district or about the 
Republican Party. The population statistics 
for the districts in the northern portion of the 
State reveal the overpopulation of Senate 
District 7 and all of the districts surrounding 
it. Senator Dial and Hinaman testified 
consistently that the significant 
overpopulation of the northern districts, as 
well as the underpopulation of the majority-
black districts in the Black Belt caused a 
domino effect that required changes to 
Senate District 7.  
b. Testimony of Senator Marc Keahey 
Senator Marc Keahey (D) also testified on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Keahey 
represents District 22, a sprawling district in 
southwest Alabama. He testified that, after 
the landslide elections for the Republicans in 
2010, he was, at 17 months, the second-
longest serving white Democrat in the 
Senate. District 22 was a crossover district 
because its voting-age population in 2010 
was only 27.50 percent black, but the district 
elected a Democrat preferred 
by black voters. Under Act 603, District 22 
has a voting-age population that is 20.70 
percent black. Senator Keahey testified that, 
after he saw the working draft of the new 
districts, he brought several proposed 
amendments to Senator Dial, all of which 
Senator Dial rejected on the ground that the 
changes would result in the retrogression of 
Districts 23 and 24 to the north, majority-
black districts represented by Senator Hank 
Sanders (D) and Senator Bobby Singleton 
(D) respectively. Some of Senator Keahey's 
proposed amendments would have placed all 
of the MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians in 
the same district. He also testified that, when 
he asked for changes to the districts, other 
senators asked him to switch parties, but he 
declined. We credit Senator Keahey's 
testimony. 
c. Testimony of Senator Rodger 
Smitherman 
Senator Rodger Smitherman (D), who 
represents majority-black Senate District 18 
in Birmingham, testified that the new 
districts were unfair to the voters of 
Jefferson County because of the structure of 
the local delegation, which is composed of 
every legislator who represents voters in 
Jefferson County. Under both the 2001 
Senate plan and Act 603, Jefferson County 
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residents vote in eight Senate districts, three 
of which are majority-black districts and 
five of which are majority-white districts. 
But Act 602 changes the House districts in 
Jefferson County because it moves one 
majority-black district to Huntsville and 
moves an additional majority-white district 
into the County. Under the previous House 
plan, residents of Jefferson County had 
voted in nine majority-black districts and 
nine majority-white districts. Under the new 
House plan, residents of Jefferson County 
will vote in eight majority-black districts 
and ten majority-white districts. Because the 
new majority-white district that crosses into 
Jefferson County includes a Democratic 
incumbent as a resident, the partisan balance 
of the districts remains the same. 
Senator Smitherman testified that, in his 
view, the balance of the Jefferson County 
local delegation is unfair to black residents 
of Jefferson County and dilutes their voting 
power. Local delegations act as gatekeepers 
for county legislation in the Legislature, 
which ordinarily will not consider or pass 
local legislation not approved by the local 
delegation. Although black voters in 
Jefferson County are ordinarily successful in 
electing their preferred candidates in county-
wide elections, they are unable to exercise 
the same control over the local delegation 
because of the influence of suburban voters 
on many of its members. As an example, 
Senator Smitherman cited an occupational 
tax supported by the senators elected by the 
majority-black districts within Jefferson 
County, but opposed by the senators elected 
by majority-white districts that extend to 
suburban counties, where many people 
commute to work in Birmingham. Because a 
majority of the local delegation opposed the 
occupational tax, the Legislature did not 
pass it. Senator Smitherman testified that, as 
a result of the failed tax, Jefferson County 
closed Cooper Green Mercy Hospital, a 
charitable hospital for the indigent that 
formerly served many of his constituents. 
Senator Smitherman also testified that the 
failure to pass the occupational tax had 
resulted in a loss of security jobs at the state 
courthouses in Jefferson County. 
Senator Smitherman acknowledged that he 
provided Senator Dial with a map for the 
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson 
County and that Senator Dial adopted the 
substantial majority of that map. 
Smitherman asked Senator Dial to maintain 
a similar racial balance in the district, and 
Senator Dial agreed that he would try to 
accommodate that request, so long as doing 
so would not result in retrogression in other 
districts. As of 2010, Senate District 18 had 
a black voting-age population of 57.31 
percent, and under Act 603, District 18 has 
a black voting-age population of 56.43 
percent.  
We credit most of Senator Smitherman's 
testimony. We credit his testimony about the 
makeup of the local delegation for Jefferson 
County and his testimony that the 
occupational tax failed because of 
opposition from legislators who represent 
suburban counties. And we credit Senator 
Smitherman's testimony that he provided 
Senator Dial a proposed map of the 
majority-black Senate districts in Jefferson 
County and that Senator Dial incorporated a 
majority of that map into the new districts. 
But we cannot credit Senator Smitherman's 
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testimony that Act 603 dilutes the votes of 
the black population of Jefferson County as 
that testimony calls for a legal conclusion 
that we must decide for ourselves. 
d. Testimony of Senator Vivian Davis 
Figures 
Senator Vivian Davis Figures (D), who 
represents District 33, a majority-
black district in Mobile County, testified on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Figures 
served on the Reapportionment Committee 
and testified that, when the Committee met 
to establish guidelines for redistricting, the 
Democratic members of that Committee had 
favored an overall deviation in population of 
10 percent because it allowed for more 
leeway, but the Republican members of the 
Committee favored a lower overall deviation 
in population because of the decision 
in Larios. She testified that she had no input 
in the creation of her district and that she 
never asked for the black voting-age 
population to be increased in her district, but 
that the final plan increased 
the black voting-age population in her 
district from 61.55 percent to 68.10 percent. 
She testified that, although she had not 
examined the boundaries of her district, she 
knew it was packed. 
Senator Figures testified that she felt her 
voice was silenced during the passage of the 
new Senate districts, but she admitted on 
cross-examination that many of the incidents 
she had cited as examples occurred for race-
neutral reasons. For example, she testified 
that she had not seen the final version of the 
bill until the day it was introduced on the 
Senate floor, but she admitted that she had 
seen the first plan of the new Senate districts 
two weeks before the Acts were passed and 
that the only changes made to the second 
plan were minor alterations to put two 
Democratic senators back in their districts 
because Senator Dial and Hinaman had 
inadvertently drawn those senators out of 
their districts in the initial plan. And she 
testified that debate on the Senate plan had 
been cut off, but she also admitted that, 
under the Senate rules, a vote had to be 
immediately taken on the bill when her 
Democratic colleague, Senator Keahey, 
asked for the bill to be read at length a third 
time. She agreed that Senator Keahey's 
request to have the bill read at length for the 
third time, not any action by the 
Republicans, had the effect of cutting off 
debate on the redistricting Acts. 
We credit most of Senator Figures's 
testimony. We credit her testimony that the 
Democratic members of the Committee 
voted in favor of a higher overall deviation 
in population because it would give more 
leeway to meet other priorities and that the 
Republican members favored a lower 
overall deviation in population because 
of Larios. We credit her testimony that she 
did not meet with Hinaman or otherwise 
give input about her district and that she 
never requested an increase in the 
percentage of the black population in her 
district. But we do not credit her testimony 
that her district is packed because that 
testimony amounts to a legal conclusion. 
e. Testimony of Senator Quinton Ross 
Senator Quinton Ross (D) also testified on 
behalf of the plaintiffs. Senator Ross 
represents Senate District 26, a majority-
black district in Montgomery. He testified 
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that he had some limited conversations with 
Senator Dial about the redistricting plans, 
but never sat down with Hinaman to draw 
his district. And he testified that the 
percentage of black population in his district 
is much higher than it was under the 2001 
plan. He testified that Act 603 split several 
precincts in his district, which will have a 
major economic impact on Montgomery 
County because it will require the County to 
hire new personnel for the voting precincts. 
We credit most of Senator Ross's testimony. 
We credit his testimony that he was never 
given the opportunity to work on his district 
with Hinaman, but we rely on the statistics 
introduced into evidence about his districts 
instead of his description of those statistics. 
In 2010, the total population of Senate 
District 26 was 72.75 percent black, and the 
voting-age population was 70.87 
percent black. Under Act 603, the total 
population of Senate District 26 is 75.22 
percent black, and the voting-age population 
is 72.70 percent black.  
f. Testimony of Representative Laura Hall 
Representative Laura Hall (D) also testified 
on behalf of the Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs. Representative Hall represents 
House District 19 in Madison County. In 
2010, the total population of House District 
19 was 70.04 percent black. Under the new 
plans, District 19 gained some rural 
population, and the percentage 
of black population decreased to 61.5 
percent. Representative Hall testified that 
she met with Representative McClendon to 
discuss possible areas in which her district 
could gain additional population because it 
was underpopulated, but she did not sit with 
Hinaman at a computer to consider different 
options.  
Representative Hall also testified about the 
changes to Senate District 7 because she ran 
as the Democratic nominee for that district 
in 2010, but she lost in the general election 
to Senator Paul Sanford (R). Under the 2001 
plan, District 7 included a strip of land in the 
middle of Madison County from 
the Alabama–Tennessee border down the 
center of the County through Huntsville. 
The district included most of urban 
Huntsville. Representative Hall testified that 
the new plan moved a portion of southwest 
Huntsville, which is sometimes called 
“Little Mexico” because it has a “very 
viable” Hispanic community, into Senate 
District 2 and moved a portion of northwest 
Huntsville, which is predominantly black, 
into Senate District 1. Senator Bill 
Holtzclaw (R) represents District 2, and 
Senator Tammy Irons (D) represents District 
1. Representative Hall agreed that the 
“socioeconomic community interests” of 
the black population moved into Senator 
Irons's district is different from 
the black population formerly in Senator 
Irons's district because the black population 
in Huntsville “has a high population of 
engineers [and] scientists” whereas the 
Florence area has “a very hard-working 
union type of community.” 
Representative Hall testified that Act 603 
provides less favorable opportunities for 
minorities in Huntsville than alternative 
plans advanced by the plaintiffs, but she also 
acknowledged that all of the alternative 
plans follow an overall deviation in 
population of 10 percent. Under Act 603, 
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Senate District 7 is overpopulated by just 
under 1 percent and has a total population 
that is 65.56 percent white, 27.34 
percent black, and 2.58 percent other. The 
voting-age population is 67.83 percent white 
and 26.14 percent black. Under an 
alternative plan proposed by Dr. Reed, 
District 7 would be underpopulated by 2.81 
percent, and the proposed district would 
have a total population that is 47.17 
percent black, 43.58 percent white, and 3.69 
percent other. The plaintiffs failed to 
provide the Court with voting-age statistics 
for that plan. The illustrative district 
introduced by the Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs would be underpopulated by 4.96 
percent and would have a total population 
that is 42.02 percent white, 48.36 
percent black, and 7.29 percent Hispanic. 
The illustrative district would have a voting-
age population that is 45.18 percent white, 
46.45 percent black, and 6.51 percent 
Hispanic. Representative Hall testified that 
both the plan proposed by Dr. Reed and the 
Democratic Conference illustrative district 
would allow black and Hispanic voters to 
form a coalition to reach 50 percent, but Act 
603 has a smaller minority population. 
Representative Hall also testified, like 
several of her other Democratic colleagues, 
that she is upset about the ability of the 
Republican supermajority in the Legislature 
to invoke cloture. And she testified that she 
felt that she had been “clotured more during 
this last quadrennium than the entire 20 
years [she had] been in session.” Under the 
new Republican supermajority, 
Representative Hall explained that she views 
it as challenging at best to advocate on 
behalf of her district. She testified that she 
has not been asked to switch parties, but that 
she would not be very happy as a 
Republican.  
We credit most of Representative Hall's 
testimony. We credit her testimony that she 
discussed her district with Representative 
McClendon, but did not sit down with 
Hinaman to discuss potential changes. We 
credit her testimony that some of the 
minorities who previously resided in Senate 
District 7 reside in new districts under Act 
603 and that those minorities will probably 
be less able to elect the candidate of their 
choice under Act 603 than in the illustrative 
districts. And we credit her testimony that 
the Republicans have invoked the rule of 
cloture to end debate by the Democrats.  
g. Testimony of Representative Joe 
Hubbard 
Initially elected in 2010, Representative Joe 
Hubbard (D) testified for the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs. Representative 
Hubbard represents House District 73, 
which Act 602 moved from Montgomery 
County to Shelby County. He testified that, 
after he had voted with Republicans on a 
controversial jobs bill, the Republican 
Speaker of the House, Mike Hubbard, told 
him that if he “played [his] cards right, [he] 
could have a long future in 
the Alabama House of Representatives.” 
Representative Hubbard assumed that the 
Speaker was asking him to switch parties, 
given that the Speaker's chief of staff 
previously had extended that invitation. 
After he rejected that invitation, the 
Committee introduced a new House plan, in 
which District 73 had been moved to Shelby 
County. Representative Hubbard testified 
143 
 
that he tried to get the agreement of the 
other representatives in Montgomery County 
to reconstitute some of the neighborhoods he 
had represented, but that Representative Jay 
Love (R), who has since resigned his 
position, rejected the proposed amendments 
because they would have reduced the 
percentage of the voting-age population in 
District 74 that was white. Representative 
Hubbard has purchased a new home in 
District 74, the majority-white district 
formerly represented by Representative 
Love. We credit this testimony. 
h. Testimony of Dr. Joe Reed 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
introduced the testimony of Dr. Joe Reed, 
who appeared as a representative of 
the Alabama Democratic Conference. He 
testified that the Alabama Democratic 
Conference is an organization of Democrats 
founded in 1960 to advance the political 
influence of blacks in Alabama. The 
organization is involved in voter registration 
and lobbying and, according to Reed, has 
chapters in most of the counties in Alabama. 
In those counties where the Conference does 
not have chapters, the Conference has at 
least a contact. The Conference endorses 
candidates in almost every race for the 
Legislature.  
Reed testified that he has been involved in 
redistricting in Alabama since the 1970s and 
that he became involved to 
elect black candidates. He testified that, for 
a long time, he believed that a district 
needed to be at least 65 percent black to 
allow the black voters to elect the candidate 
of their choice because some blacks either 
are not registered to vote or are ineligible to 
vote. And he testified that he now believes 
that a district should be about 60 
percent black to allow the voters to elect 
their candidate of choice, although in some 
circumstances the percentage may need to 
be closer to 65 percent. 
Reed testified that he drafted an alternative 
plan for the Alabama Legislature, which he 
showed Senator Dial at one of the public 
hearings. He testified that he viewed the 
plan as a “status quo plan.” He testified that 
he tried only to satisfy incumbents and meet 
the requirement of one person, one vote. To 
accomplish the latter objective, he used an 
overall deviation of 10 percent because that 
is the deviation that the Legislature had used 
in the 2001 plan. With this deviation, he was 
able to keep District 73 in Montgomery 
County, but reduce the black population in 
that district. Despite his efforts to satisfy all 
incumbents, his plan caused one incumbent 
conflict in the House. 
He testified that, as compared to his plans, 
the plans adopted by the Legislature were 
bad for both blacks and whites. He 
explained that the adopted plans will cause 
significant problems for boards of registrars 
because of the county and precinct splits, but 
he also acknowledged that the boards of 
registrars had fulfilled their duties when the 
plans adopted in 1993 and 2001 split 
counties and precincts. And he testified that 
the new plans would cause confusion for 
voters for the same reasons, but 
acknowledged that the boards of registrars 
were required by law to send postcards to 
voters about their polling places and that he 
could challenge any failure to do so in court. 
Reed asked the Court to send the issue of 
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redistricting back to the Legislature and tell 
it to apply an overall deviation in population 
of 10 percent. 
We credit most of Reed's testimony. We 
credit Reed's testimony that redistricting is 
an inherently political process and that a 
drafter can draw a plan in many ways. We 
credit Reed's testimony that he formerly 
believed that a larger black population was 
often needed to guarantee black voters the 
opportunity to elect their candidate of choice 
than he now believes is necessary. And we 
credit Reed's testimony about his 
redistricting plan and about the reaction of 
registrars to the precinct splits in the 1993 
and 2001 redistricting plans, but we do not 
credit his testimony that the plans adopted 
by the Legislature are bad for all black and 
white citizens of Alabama. 
i. Testimony of Framon Weaver 
Framon Weaver testified as a Democratic 
Conference plaintiff. Weaver is the Chief of 
the MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians, 
which has approximately 4,000 members in 
the State of Alabama. The State 
of Alabama has recognized the MOWA 
Band of Choctaw Indians, but the federal 
government has not. The Band lives along 
the border between Washington County and 
Mobile County. Weaver testified that the 
Band has worked closely with black groups 
on political campaigns and that the Band has 
predominantly supported Democratic 
candidates. And he testified that, although 
the Band was able to elect its candidate of 
choice in coalition with blacks in the old 
Senate District 22, it will not be able to do 
so under the Acts because the Band is split 
between three different Senate districts—
District 22, 23, and 34—and 
the black population is predominantly in 
District 23. 
We credit most of Weaver's testimony. We 
credit Weaver's testimony that he has been 
elected the Chief of this state-recognized 
Band, and we credit Weaver's testimony 
about the size and location of the Band. And 
we credit Weaver's testimony that members 
of the Band are divided among three 
different senate districts, which will make it 
more difficult for the Band to influence 
elections in those districts. We do not credit 
Weaver's testimony about the Band's ability 
to elect its candidate of choice under any of 
the plans presented because he did not offer 
any factual basis to support his opinion that 
the candidate of choice for 
the black population would necessarily be 
the same candidate of choice for the Band 
population. 
j. Testimony of Bernard Simelton 
The president of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People in 
Alabama, Bernard Simelton, testified on 
behalf of the Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs. He testified that the Association 
has been engaged in efforts to improve the 
relationship between the black and Hispanic 
communities in Alabama. He testified that 
the communities have become closer 
because of their shared disagreement with 
bills passed by the Republican Legislature. 
And he testified that the Association works 
actively with the MOWA Indians in the 
Baldwin and Washington County area. We 
credit Simelton's testimony about the 
Association's involvement with the Hispanic 
population and the MOWA Indians. 
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k. Testimony of Professor Allan J. 
Lichtman 
Professor Allan J. Lichtman provided expert 
testimony that voting is racially polarized in 
Alabama. Lichtman conducted ecological 
regression analysis based on county-level 
and precinct-level election returns to 
calculate how black and white persons voted 
in recent senatorial, presidential, and judicial 
elections. Based on this analysis, Lichtman 
concluded that in Alabama “African 
Americans invariably prefer Democratic 
candidates in general elections and [ ] whites 
invariably prefer Republican candidates.” In 
six general elections, Lichtman determined 
that the mean support 
of blacks for black Democrats was 94 
percent and that the mean support 
of blacks for white Democrats was 92 
percent. By contrast, the mean level of 
support by white voters for black Democrats 
was 19 percent and the mean level of 
support by white voters for white Democrats 
was 29 percent. Based on this data, 
Lichtman found that “polarization between 
African Americans and whites in general 
elections is greater when the Democratic 
candidate is African American rather than 
white.” Lichtman's ecological regression 
analysis also suggested that 100 percent 
of black voters in Jefferson County, 
Madison County, and Montgomery County 
vote for Democrats, regardless of whether 
the candidate is black or white. 
Comparatively, white voters in Jefferson 
County had a mean level of support 
for black Democrats of 19 percent and a 
mean level of support for white Democrats 
of 33 percent; white voters in Madison 
County had a mean level of support 
for black Democrats of 24 percent and a 
mean level of support for white Democrats 
of 36 percent; and white voters in 
Montgomery County had a mean level of 
support for black Democrats of 20 percent 
and a mean level of support for white 
Democrats of 41 percent. 
We credit Lichtman's testimony that 
most black voters in Alabama favor 
Democrats and that most white voters 
in Alabama favor Republicans, but we do 
not credit Lichtman's opinion that race is the 
motivating factor for this voting pattern 
in Alabama. Lichtman did not conduct any 
statistical analysis to determine whether 
factors other than race were responsible for 
the voting patterns. He did not consider 
affluence, strength of a political campaign, 
or party loyalty. Instead, he asserted 
repeatedly that the resulting voter patterns 
were similar, which suggests that race is the 
motivating factor… 
Lichtman also testified that the evidence 
suggests that Native Americans and 
Hispanics in Alabama are politically 
cohesive. Lichtman explained that 41 
percent of the registered voters who vote at 
the McIntosh High School precinct in Senate 
District 22 are Native Americans, and 23 
percent of the registered voters who vote at 
that precinct are black persons. The precinct 
cast 75 percent of its votes for the 
Democratic incumbent, W.J. Pat Lindsey, 
during the 2006 general election for the 
Legislature, and the precinct cast 87 percent 
of its votes for the Democratic candidate, 
Mark Keahey, during the 2010 general 
election. Based on these numbers from a 
single precinct, Lichtman concluded 
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that blacks and Native Americans ordinarily 
vote in coalition. Lichtman also reasoned 
that, because, “with the exception of Cuban–
Americans, Hispanics are overwhelmingly 
Democratic in their choice of candidates” 
and because most of the Hispanic population 
in Alabama is not Cuban American, the 
Hispanic population in Alabama must be 
politically cohesive. 
We do not credit Lichtman's opinions about 
the political cohesiveness of Native 
Americans and Hispanics in Alabama. 
Lichtman acknowledged that “[t]here is an 
insufficient concentration of Native 
Americans or Hispanics in the state 
of Alabama for ecological regression 
analysis.” And he relied upon data from a 
single precinct to speculate about the voting 
behavior of Native Americans and 
generalizations about Hispanics across the 
United States to speculate about Hispanic 
voting patterns in Alabama… 
Lichtman next testified that the illustrative 
districts introduced by the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs would give minorities 
a better opportunity to elect the candidates 
of their choice. The Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs introduced an illustrative map of 
Montgomery County that includes an 
additional majority-black House district; an 
illustrative map that preserves nine majority-
black House districts in Jefferson County; 
and an illustrative map of a minority-
opportunity Senate district in Madison 
County. Lichtman acknowledged that he did 
not look at any statewide plans, but testified 
that the data from previous elections 
suggests that these districts would provide 
minority voters a very good opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice. We credit 
Lichtman's testimony about these illustrative 
districts. 
l. Testimony of William S. Cooper 
William S. Cooper provided expert 
testimony about alternative redistricting 
plans for the Black Caucus plaintiffs. 
Cooper testified that he has been preparing 
redistricting plans for approximately 25 
years and has worked with Maptitude since 
the late 1980s. Cooper drew the redistricting 
maps, HB16 and SB5, introduced by 
Democratic members of the Legislature as 
alternatives to the plans adopted by the 
Committee. He used the data produced by 
the 2010 Census; the block equivalency files 
from the Alabama Reapportionment Office, 
which were linked to the versions of the 
plans produced by the Committee; and lists 
of some of the addresses of the incumbents. 
When counsel for 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs hired Cooper to 
draft alternative plans, counsel instructed 
Cooper to preserve the same number of 
majority-black districts and to avoid county 
splits to the extent possible, particularly 
within the Black Belt. Cooper testified that 
he drew the plan without any knowledge 
of Alabama politics, geography, or the 
locations of incumbents, and that he spent 
only 40 hours on the project. And he 
explained that he intended the plans that 
became HB16 and SB5 to serve as initial 
drafts that he would alter based on input 
from legislators, but the schedule of the 
Legislature did not permit any changes to 
the plans before the Democratic legislators 
introduced them. 
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Cooper acknowledged that the Legislature 
needed to make significant changes to the 
district lines because of the severe 
malapportionment of the existing districts, 
but he explained that the Legislature could 
have split fewer counties and precincts if the 
Committee had followed an overall 
deviation in population of 10 percent. 
Cooper testified that HB16 and SB5, which 
follow an overall deviation of 10 percent, 
split fewer counties and precincts than the 
Acts. Cooper explained that traditional 
redistricting principles protect the integrity 
of precincts, but he admitted that the 
districts adopted in 2001 had a similar 
number of precinct splits as the Acts. 
Cooper also testified that, in his opinion, the 
Acts pack the majority-black districts. He 
testified that the margins between the white 
population and the black population in those 
districts are much larger in Act 602 than in 
the HB16 plan, which he referred to as 
“smoking gun evidence that shows that 
there's been some packing in the Act 602 
house plan.” He also explained that the 
margins were smaller for the Senate 
districts, but that the margins again suggest 
packing. But he acknowledged that most of 
the majority-black districts in his plans were 
underpopulated by more than an overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent and that 
his plan for the House did not increase the 
total black population in District 84 to create 
a new majority-black district. 
We credit much of Cooper's testimony. We 
credit Cooper's testimony that the 
Legislature could have split fewer county 
and precinct lines if it had adopted a higher 
overall deviation in population. And we 
credit Cooper's testimony that his plans 
lowered the margins between the black and 
white populations in majority-black districts. 
But we do not credit Cooper's testimony that 
the Acts packed the majority-black districts 
based solely on data that compares the Acts 
to Cooper's plans without any consideration 
of the previous plans and the Committee's 
asserted goals to maintain a lower overall 
deviation in population equality and to avoid 
retrogression in those districts. 
m. Testimony of Theodore S. Arrington 
Theodore S. Arrington provided expert 
testimony on behalf of the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs that the majority-
black districts were packed to isolate and 
diminish the strength of black voters. 
Arrington testified that the 1993 and 2001 
redistricting plans drawn by Democratic 
legislators constituted a “dummymander” 
because they packed majority-black districts 
in a manner intended to help the Democratic 
Party, but the plans in fact hurt the Party. He 
testified that a 51 percent voting-age 
population is enough to give minority voters 
the opportunity to elect the candidate of 
their choice anywhere in the State, and he 
suggested that, “[c]ertainly, 54–56% 
concentration is enough everywhere.” He 
explained that, although experts used to 
think that a minority presence of 65 percent 
was necessary to ensure that the minority 
group would be able to elect the candidate of 
its choice, the increased registration and 
mobilization of black voters has reduced that 
number. Arrington speculated 
that black leaders may have agreed to have 
their districts “packed” in the last round of 
redistricting because of uncertainty over the 
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percentage of black voters required to have 
an opportunity to elect their candidate of 
choice and because black officials had a 
strong voice in the governing coalition. 
We do not credit Arrington's opinion that the 
districts in the new plan are packed. 
Arrington admitted on cross-examination 
that, in 2000, he testified that a district in 
which black persons made up a voting-age 
population of 61 percent would offer only an 
opportunity for black voters to elect the 
candidate of their choice, not a guarantee 
that black voters would be able to elect the 
candidate of their choice… 
Arrington also testified that, in his view, the 
districts were enacted for a discriminatory 
purpose. In his expert report, Arrington 
asserted that “[t]he purpose of the enacted 
plans is to perpetuate or create a kind of 
‘political apartheid’ such as the Supreme 
Court rejected in Shaw v. Reno and its 
progeny.” He reasoned, “Since the face of 
the Alabama Republican Party is white (e.g., 
all the G.O.P. legislators are white), the 
Republican super-majority in the legislature 
designed the districts to create a situation 
where the Democratic Party in the 
legislature would be all black.” As further 
support for the existence of this strategy, 
Arrington cited as evidence the affidavits of 
several white Democratic legislators who 
have been asked by Republicans to switch 
parties and the affidavits of 
several black Democratic legislators who 
have never been asked. Arrington also 
testified that, because the splitting of 
precincts bears more heavily on minority 
voters, the high number of precinct splits in 
the Acts is evidence of discriminatory 
purpose. And Arrington suggested that the 
departure from normal procedures in the 
passage of the legislation in a special session 
evidenced discriminatory intent, as did the 
greater access of Republican legislators to 
see and make changes to the plans because 
Democrats had only the illusion of 
participation in the process. 
We do not credit Arrington's opinion that the 
districts were enacted for an invidious 
discriminatory purpose. On cross-
examination, Arrington retreated from many 
of the points he made in his report. For 
example, he admitted on cross-examination 
that a party in power typically develops its 
plan by itself and that process is not, 
standing alone, evidence of an intent to 
discriminate on the basis of race… 
5. Evidence Presented by the State 
Defendants at Trial 
The State defendants introduced the 
testimony of four witnesses to rebut the 
evidence introduced by the plaintiffs. 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
testified at length about the goals of the 
Reapportionment Committee, the 
development of the plans, and the input they 
received from legislators. Randy Hinaman 
testified about his work on the plans. And 
Thomas L. Brunell testified as an expert on 
behalf of the State defendants. 
a. Testimony of Senator Gerald Dial 
Senator Dial testified on behalf of the State 
defendants that the Committee had six 
primary goals. First, the Committee wanted 
to comply with the requirement of one 
person, one vote by making the districts as 
equally populated as possible. Second, the 
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Committee wanted to avoid future litigation 
about compliance with the requirement of 
one person, one vote. Third, the Committee 
wanted to comply with the Voting Rights 
Act. Fourth, the Committee wanted to 
comply with section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act, which it understood to require that it 
not reduce the number of majority-
black districts or the approximate levels 
of black population within those districts. 
Fifth, the Committee wanted to draw 
districts to avoid incumbent conflicts. Sixth, 
the Committee wanted to preserve 
communities of interest when possible. With 
the exception of the decision to adopt an 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent, 
the guidelines adopted by the Committee 
were the same guidelines that had been used 
in 2001. And he testified that the Committee 
adopted the overall deviation of 2 percent 
before Hinaman became involved in the 
process. 
Senator Dial testified that the Committee 
held public hearings to obtain input from the 
public about how to draw the districts. The 
Committee held those hearings in 21 
locations throughout Alabama before the 
Committee produced any new plans, and the 
Committee advertised the hearings through 
various forms of media. At those hearings, 
members of the public asked the Committee 
not to split their counties, and Senator Dial 
relayed that information to Hinaman. 
Senator Dial thought that the process was 
fairer than the process used in the past 
because the Committee sought comments 
from the public before it produced the plans, 
instead of afterward. But he also knew that it 
would be unable to accommodate all of the 
requests of the public if the legislators were 
to comply with federal law.  
Senator Dial also testified that he consulted 
each of his 34 colleagues in the Senate about 
their preferences for their districts. He 
showed each senator the statistics for his or 
her district to explain how many people the 
district needed to gain or lose to fall within 
the guideline for population deviation. And 
he asked each senator about his or her 
preferences on population to gain or lose. He 
promised each senator that he would not 
draw districts with incumbent conflicts, but 
he could not accommodate all of the 
requests from his colleagues. 
Senator Dial explained that the systematic 
underpopulation of the majority-
black districts required significant changes 
to the district lines in the Senate, but that he 
incorporated input from the legislators who 
represented those districts as he enlarged 
those districts. He often refereed disputes 
among senators to try to accommodate 
particular requests. And he specifically 
incorporated ideas from black legislators. 
In Jefferson County, all three majority-
black districts needed to gain population, 
and Senator Smitherman, a Democrat who 
represented one of those districts, supplied 
Senator Dial with a map of proposed 
districts. Under that plan, Districts 18, 19, 
and 20 would gain population to fall within 
the overall deviation of 2 percent and would 
remain entirely within Jefferson County. 
Dial adopted about 99 percent of that plan. 
And Dial divided the rest of the population 
of Jefferson County among five majority-
white districts that extend outside of the 
County boundaries. Although Dial could 
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have used white population within Jefferson 
County to repopulate the majority-
black districts, he was concerned that doing 
so would have resulted in the retrogression 
of the majority-black districts and 
potentially created a problem for 
preclearance.  
In Mobile County, Senator Dial sought input 
from Senator Figures, who represented a 
majority-black district in Mobile that needed 
to gain population. Neither Senator Figures, 
nor any of the other senators from Mobile 
County, wanted another senator to join the 
Mobile County delegation, and the new plan 
accomplished that goal by changing the 
shape of District 22 to absorb much of the 
overpopulation from District 32 across the 
Mobile Bay in Baldwin County. Senator 
Sanders, who represented District 23, which 
bordered District 22 to the north, wanted to 
gain minority members from District 22 and 
give up population in Autauga County. 
Senator Dial partially accommodated those 
requests by removing District 23 from 
Autauga County and extending the district 
partially into District 22. 
Senator Dial also testified that the need to 
“grow” the majority-black districts in 
the Black Belt had a domino effect on the 
districts along the western edge of Alabama. 
District 24 moved north, District 21 moved 
north, District 6 moved north, and District 1 
moved west to accommodate some of the 
overpopulation in the former District 2. 
Senator Dial met with the senator from 
District 1, Senator Tammy Irons (D), about 
the proposed changes to her district and 
accommodated some of her requests, but 
was unable to accommodate further requests 
because he had no time to introduce an 
amendment during the consideration of the 
Senate plan by the Legislature. 
Senator Dial explained that the plans were 
introduced, considered, and approved in a 
special session of the Legislature. He 
explained that the plans went through the 
same process of committee hearings and 
consideration and debate on the floor that 
any other piece of legislation would undergo 
in the Alabama Legislature. He testified that 
a special session allows for greater 
opportunity to engage in debate and 
consideration because the Legislature 
considers no other bills during that time. He 
also testified that the Legislature in 2001 
had also adopted its redistricting plans 
during a special session. He testified that the 
first time he saw the alternative plans 
introduced at the special session, including 
the Sanders plan and the Reed–Buskey plan, 
was in committee or on the Senate floor and 
that none of the Senators who developed 
those plans ever consulted him or other 
Republican legislators about those plans.   
Senator Dial testified that he had no goal or 
intent to discriminate against the black 
population in Alabama during the 
redistricting. He testified that no member of 
the Senate who represented a majority-
black district had ever asked for a district 
with a black population of only 55 percent, 
and Senator Hank Sanders (D) told Senator 
Dial that he thought that all of the majority-
black districts should have 
ablack population of at least 62 percent. 
Senator Dial testified that, if he had 
suggested to the senators who represented 
the majority-black districts that new districts 
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with black populations of only 55 percent 
would be better for the black population 
in Alabama, those senators would not have 
responded favorably to his suggestion that 
he knew better than they did. A former 
Democrat turned Republican, Senator Dial 
testified that he had no contact with the 
Republican National Committee during the 
reapportionment process, was not aware of 
any national strategy to make the 
Republican Party the “white party” and the 
Democratic Party the “black party,” and had 
no private conversations about that alleged 
strategy. And he testified that, although the 
new districts the Legislature adopted were 
not perfect or the only way to draw the 
districts, they met the goals of the 
Committee to maintain the number of 
majority-black districts, to maintain the 
approximate percentages of 
the black population in those districts, to 
avoid incumbent conflicts, and to draw 
districts of approximately equal size. 
b. Testimony of Representative Jim 
McClendon 
Representative McClendon testified 
consistently with Senator Dial about the 
adoption by the Committee of the 
guidelines. He explained that an overall 
deviation of 2 percent just “ma[de] good 
sense” to him because it makes the districts 
more equal. He also testified that his 
impression was that the Department of 
Justice did not have a specific baseline for 
retrogression, but that it looked at relative 
numbers, so the Committee tried to match 
the percentages of the total black population 
in majority-black districts to the percentages 
in the 2001 districts based on the 2010 
Census numbers. 
Representative McClendon testified that he 
tried to accommodate requests from his 
colleagues, Democratic and Republican, in 
the plan for the House of Representatives. 
Representative McClendon testified that he 
offered to meet with all of the members of 
the House of Representatives to discuss their 
new districts, but that not every member of 
the House accepted that offer. 
Representative Thad McClammy (D) 
arranged a meeting with McClendon and, 
during that meeting, provided McClendon a 
proposed plan for the majority-
black districts in Montgomery to which the 
other legislators had agreed. McClendon 
passed that map along to Hinaman, with the 
instructions to incorporate that plan if 
possible. And when Representative Harper 
asked to gain 12 people from Greene County 
and the neighboring representative agreed, 
he incorporated that change into the plan. 
Representative McClendon admitted that 
redistricting is a political process, but denied 
having any racially discriminatory motive in 
his development of the redistricting plans. 
McClendon acknowledged making several 
statements that, under the new plans, the 
number of Republicans in 
the Alabama House would likely increase 
from 66 representatives to 68 to 70 
representatives and that the number of 
Republicans in the Senate would increase 
from 22 senators to 23 to 25. McClendon 
also admitted that, although he met with any 
member of the House who wanted to meet 
with him, only Republicans were given the 
opportunity to meet with Hinaman to work 
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on their districts. But he denied any intent to 
eliminate white Democratic members from 
the Legislature… 
c. Testimony of Randolph L. Hinaman 
Randolph L. Hinaman also testified on 
behalf of the State defendants. Hinaman is a 
political consultant who works primarily for 
members of the Republican Party and who 
has been involved in Alabama politics since 
the mid–1980s, when he served as the 
campaign manager and then the chief of 
staff for Congressman Sonny Callahan (R–
AL–01). In 2011 and 2012, he worked on 
the redistricting plans for the Alabama 
congressional delegation, which included six 
Republicans and one Democrat, and he drew 
plans for that delegation with zero deviation 
in population equality. Citizens for Fair 
Representation, Inc., a 501(c)(4) nonprofit 
organization located in Alabama, hired 
Hinaman to redraw the districts for the 
Alabama Legislature too. In accordance with 
his contract, Hinaman met with the 
Republican leadership to determine the 
goals of the redistricting, and those leaders 
instructed him to use an overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent, to preserve the 
majority-black districts without 
retrogression, to avoid incumbent conflicts if 
at all possible, and to comply with the other 
instructions included in the guidelines 
approved by the Reapportionment 
Committee. 
Hinaman explained that the effort to 
preserve the majority-black districts and 
bring them into compliance with the 
requirement of one person, one vote drove 
the development of the Acts. All of the 
majority-black districts were 
underpopulated, many significantly, and he 
needed to add population from contiguous 
districts to increase the total population of 
the districts without significantly lowering 
the percentage of the population in each 
district that was majority-black. He 
explained that the underpopulation of the 
majority-black districts in the Black Belt 
caused Senate Districts 21 and 6 to move 
north; Senate Districts 4, 5, and 1 to move 
east; and Senate District 22 to move south. 
He also explained that the underpopulation 
in Senate District 33 in Mobile County 
caused Senate District 34 to move and 
Senate District 22 to gain population from 
the overpopulated areas of Baldwin County. 
And Hinaman explained that the majority-
black House districts in Jefferson County 
were around 70,000 people short of the ideal 
population and any attempt to repopulate all 
nine of the majority-black districts with the 
population in Jefferson County would cause 
retrogression to the point that the plan might 
not be precleared. For that reason, Hinaman 
moved House District 53 to the Huntsville 
area, where he was able to create another 
majority-black House district. When 
necessary to avoid retrogression, Hinaman 
split precincts at the census block level. 
Hinaman testified that “no one gets 
everything they want in redistricting,” but he 
tried to accommodate the wishes of 
legislators where possible. He traveled 
to Alabama to meet with Republican 
legislators every couple of weeks during the 
regular session of the Legislature. Where the 
Republican legislators agreed upon 
boundaries and those particular boundaries 
did not pose a problem for either the 
requirement of one person, one vote or for 
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the preservation of the majority-
black districts, he accommodated those 
requests. Hinaman also accommodated the 
suggestions from Democratic legislators that 
he received from Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon. Hinaman 
incorporated almost in its entirety a map of 
the majority-black districts in Jefferson 
County drawn by one of the representatives 
for those districts. And Hinaman partially 
incorporated a map of the majority-
black districts in Montgomery County 
produced by one of the representatives for 
those districts. Hinaman also spoke with 
several Democratic members of the 
Legislature during the final week before the 
passage of the bill and accommodated 
requests from those legislators when all of 
the legislators affected by the requests 
agreed. 
Hinaman denied that he had any invidious 
purpose to discriminate against blacks when 
he drew the new districts. When asked on 
cross-examination about particular changes 
he could have made to the map, he 
responded that “you can pull out any district 
and draw it without taking regard to all the 
things that are around it[,][b]ut unfortunately 
the whole map has to fit together.” He 
explained, for example, that a map that 
draws an additional majority-black district 
in Montgomery County, like the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs' illustrative map, does 
not account for the need to bring District 69, 
another majority-black district, into 
Montgomery County. Hinaman also testified 
that he tried to draw another majority-black 
Senate district in Madison County, but that 
he could not draw such a district within 
deviation. 
We credit the consistent testimony of 
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon, 
and Hinaman about the Committee's goals 
and the creation of the new districts. And we 
credit the consistent and unequivocal 
testimony of Senator Dial, Representative 
McClendon, and Hinaman that none of them 
acted with a racially discriminatory purpose 
or motive during the redistricting process. 
d. Testimony of Thomas L. Brunell 
The State defendants introduced the expert 
testimony of Thomas L. Brunell to refute the 
expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs. 
Brunell testified that the adoption of the 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent 
is consistent with the decisions of other 
states around the country after Larios and 
benefits all citizens in Alabama. He 
explained that, although the Acts created 
many safe Republican seats, the overall 
deviation of 2 percent prevented the 
Legislature from creating a severe partisan 
gerrymander. He testified that the statistics 
from other states confirm that lower 
population deviations are less closely 
aligned with partisanship. And he explained 
that a lower population deviation is 
inherently more equal than a higher 
population deviation and that equality was 
the driving force behind the redistricting 
revolution. 
Brunell also testified that Arrington and 
Lichtman drew improper inferences about 
the voting behavior of the black population 
in Alabama when those experts opined that 
the districts were packed. Brunell explained 
that Arrington relied on the voting behavior 
in House District 85 to extrapolate about 
behavior across the State, but that voting 
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behavior is affected by a number of factors 
that will vary across the State, including the 
proportion of black and white voting-age 
population, the degree of cohesiveness 
among black and white voters, and the 
typical proportion of turnout. He testified 
that none of the experts in this matter has 
offered any empirical evidence to 
substantiate the opinion that a district with a 
voting-age population that is 51 
percent black will provide black voters the 
opportunity to elect the candidate of their 
choice. 
And Brunell testified, contrary to Cooper 
and Arrington, that the bimodal distribution 
of white and black populations in districts is 
neither bad policy nor illegal. As he 
explained, elected officials who represent 
highly competitive districts will find it more 
difficult to represent their districts because 
the voters of those districts will be so closely 
divided on controversial issues. If 50 percent 
of the voters in a district support a higher 
minimum wage and 50 percent want to 
abolish the minimum wage, the 
representative will have represented only 
half of the voters in the district no matter 
which policy option the representative 
favors. 
We credit Brunell's testimony that lower 
population deviations constrain the partisan 
desires of Legislatures, that the record 
evidence is insufficient to support any 
conclusion about the minimum level of 
the black voting-age population necessary to 
allow the black population to elect its 
candidate of choice, and that representation 
of competitive districts is more difficult than 
representation of a politically cohesive 
district. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, 
we consider the claims of vote dilution made 
by the Black Caucus and Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs. Second, we consider 
the claims based on intentional 
discrimination made by 
the Black Caucus and Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs. 
A. Vote Dilution 
“A plaintiff claiming vote dilution under § 2 
must initially establish that: (i) the racial 
group is sufficiently large and 
geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district; (ii) the 
group is politically cohesive; and (iii) the 
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to 
enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's 
preferred candidate.” The Supreme Court 
first established these conditions 
in Gingles, when it interpreted for the first 
time the 1982 revisions to section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. “When applied to a 
claim that single-member districts dilute 
minority votes, the first Gingles condition 
requires the possibility of creating more than 
the existing number of reasonably compact 
districts with a sufficiently large minority 
population to elect candidates of its choice.” 
When no showing of intentional 
discrimination has been made, “a 
sufficiently large minority population” 
means greater than 50 percent of the voting-
age population. And the first 
Gingles condition should not be read to 
define dilution as a failure to maximize. 
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The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
recognized the ability of a minority voter to 
state a claim for vote dilution in violation of 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act based on 
evidence of a coalition of two different 
minority groups, but the Eleventh Circuit 
has held that “[t]wo minority groups (in this 
case blacks and hispanics) may be a single 
section 2 minority if they can establish that 
they behave in a politically cohesive 
manner.” Although other circuits have 
disagreed with that decision, we are bound 
by it. A plaintiff who proves that two 
minority groups are politically cohesive may 
satisfy the first Gingles factor if a 
reasonably compact district could be formed 
in which those two minority groups make up 
a majority of the voting-age population. 
After the plaintiff has established the 
three Gingles elements, the plaintiff must 
also establish that the totality of the 
circumstances supports a finding that the 
voting scheme is dilutive. Relevant factors 
to this analysis include (1) the history of 
voting-related discrimination in the State; 
(2) the extent to which voting is racially 
polarized in the State; (3) the extent to 
which the State has used voting practices 
that tend to enhance the opportunity of 
discrimination against the minority group; 
(4) if there is a candidate slating process, the 
extent to which members of the minority 
group have been denied access to that 
process; (5) the extent to which members of 
the minority “bear the effects of 
discrimination in such areas as education, 
employment and health, which hinder their 
ability to participate effectively in the 
political process”; (6) the extent to which 
political campaigns have included overt or 
subtle racial appeals; and (7) the extent to 
which members of the minority have been 
elected to public office. Proportionality of 
majority-minority districts at the statewide 
level is a relevant fact in the totality of the 
circumstances. And, in some cases, a 
“significant lack of responsiveness” by 
elected officials to the needs of a minority 
group or a tenuous policy underlying the 
voting procedure adopted might also be 
probative of vote dilution. But the 
“defendant in a vote dilution case may 
always attempt to rebut the plaintiff's claim 
by introducing evidence of objective, non-
racial factors under the totality of the 
circumstances standard.” 
1. The Black Caucus Plaintiffs Failed To 
Prove the First Gingles Requirement for 
All of Their Claims. 
First, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argued that 
the Acts dilute the voting strength of 
blacks across the State, but they failed to 
prove that the Legislature could have created 
an additional reasonably compact district 
with a black voting-age population of 
greater than 50 percent anywhere in the 
State. The Black Caucus plaintiffs 
introduced HB16 and SB5 as evidence, but 
those plans do not create any additional 
majority-black districts. Instead, those plans 
actually create fewer opportunities 
for black voters to elect the candidates of 
their choice than does Act 602. Act 602 
preserved the same 27 majority-
black districts from the 2001 plan and 
increased the black percentage in District 85 
to make it a majority-black district in total 
population, though only a plurality district in 
voting-age population. HB16 also increased 
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the voting-age black population in District 
85 to make it a majority-black district, but 
did so at the cost of a formerly majority-
black district. Under that plan, District 84, 
which was a majority-black district under 
the 2001 plan, would have a voting-age 
population that is only 24.73 percent black. 
Because the Black Caucus plaintiffs have 
failed to prove that the Legislature could 
have created an additional majority-
black district and because the only plan they 
offered actually creates fewer opportunities 
for black voters in Alabama to elect their 
candidates of choice, 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs have failed to 
satisfy their burden. 
And even if the plans offered by 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs contained an 
additional majority-black district, we would 
conclude that the Black Caucus plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy the first Gingles requirement 
because the plans do not comply with the 
guideline of an overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent. The Committee 
adopted a guideline that required the 
redistricting plans to comply with an overall 
deviation of 2 percent, and the Committee 
was entitled to adopt that guideline. Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act concerns political 
processes that “are not equally open to 
participation by [minority groups] ... in that 
its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.” Nothing in 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act would 
require the State to adopt a higher 
population deviation and a less equal system 
for the election of its representatives to give 
minorities a better opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in 
the political process. Stated differently, 
minority voters are not entitled to greater 
voting power than non-minority voters. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot satisfy 
the first Gingles requirement with an 
illustrative plan that fails to meet the 
guideline of an overall deviation of 2 
percent. 
Second, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argued 
that Act 603 diluted the voting strength 
of black and Hispanic voters in Senate 
District 7, but they again failed to prove that 
the Legislature could have created a 
majority-minority district in that area. Under 
SB5, Senate District 7 would have a voting-
age population that is 40.10 percent black 
and 5.46 percent Hispanic. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs presented some 
testimony that the Hispanic voters in Senate 
District 7 are politically cohesive with black 
voters, but we need not decide whether they 
have met their burden on that point. Even if 
the black and Hispanic voters in Senate 
District 7 are politically cohesive, the 
minority groups do not make up a simple 
majority of the voting-age population in the 
district drawn in SB5. Because 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs have not proved 
that any coalition of black and Hispanic 
voters in Madison County is sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to make 
up a simple majority of Senate District 7, 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot establish 
the first Gingle requirement. And, in the 
alternative, we conclude that 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to meet 
their burden to establish the 
first Gingles requirement because their plan 
for Senate District 7, like their plan for the 
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State as a whole, follows an overall 
deviation in population of 10 percent. 
Third, the Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that 
Act 602 dilutes the votes of black voters in 
Jefferson County because the Act moved 
one of the majority-black House districts out 
of Jefferson County, but 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs have not 
produced a plan that would draw an 
additional majority-black district in 
Jefferson County without eliminating a 
majority-black district in another part of the 
State and would comply with the allowable 
overall deviation of 2 percent. HB16 draws 
nine majority-black districts in Jefferson 
County, but it follows an overall deviation 
of 10 percent. For the reasons already 
explained, the State was entitled to try to 
comply with the requirement of one person, 
one vote by setting an overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent. And the 
Black Caucus plaintiffs cannot prove vote 
dilution with illustrative maps that do not 
meet this requirement. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs also argue that 
the new Acts dilute the voting strength 
of black voters in Jefferson County because 
of the change in the balance of the local 
House delegation, but that claim is not 
justiciable for the reasons stated in our 
previous order, and even if it were, the claim 
would fail on the merits. Any system of 
local delegations for the next Legislature has 
not been adopted and will not be adopted 
until the organizational session conducted 
by the newly elected members in January 
2015. Because we cannot know if a system 
of local delegations will be adopted by the 
next Legislature or how it will be structured, 
the claim is not ripe for review and 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs lack standing to 
raise it. But, even if we could consider the 
claim, it would fail on the merits because 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs failed to prove 
that a plan could be drawn within the overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent that 
would contain the balance they seek. 
2. The Democratic Conference Plaintiffs 
Also Failed To Prove the First Gingles 
Requirement for All of Their Claims. 
First, the Democratic Conference plaintiffs 
argued that Act 602 dilutes the voting 
strength of black voters because it fails to 
create a minority opportunity House district 
in Jefferson County, but they failed to prove 
that the Legislature could have created an 
additional majority-black district in 
Jefferson County. The Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs submitted an 
illustrative map that divides Jefferson 
County into 15 House districts, nine of 
which are majority-black districts. But the 
illustrative map cannot satisfy the 
first Gingles requirement because it does not 
fit within a statewide plan as a whole. Act 
602 includes several House districts that 
cross into Jefferson County, and a new plan 
for Jefferson County cannot be simply 
inserted into the state plan. As Hinaman 
repeatedly explained, one can always redraw 
lines in a particular county, but the key is to 
fit the illustrative map into a statewide plan. 
The illustrative map also underpopulates 
each majority-black district by almost 5 
percent. As we explained, the State was 
entitled to choose a lower population 
deviation, and the plaintiffs cannot establish 
a results claim under section 2 when 
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the black population of Jefferson County is 
not sufficiently large and compact to create 
an additional majority-minority district 
within that deviation. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
argued that Act 602 dilutes the voting 
strength of blacks because it fails to create 
an additional majority-black House district 
in Montgomery County, but the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs have again failed to 
prove the first Gingles requirement. The 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs introduced 
an illustrative map that divides all of 
Montgomery County into five House 
districts. Four of those districts are majority-
black districts. And, unlike the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs' illustrative map for 
Jefferson County, the illustrative map for 
Montgomery County complies with the 
overall deviation of 2 percent. But, again, 
the illustrative map is not drawn in the 
context of a statewide plan. Act 602 brought 
an additional majority-black House district, 
District 69, into Montgomery County. The 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs' 
illustrative map does not account for the 
domino effect that its plan could have on 
District 69 or the other neighboring 
majority-black districts. In the absence of a 
statewide plan drawn to comply with overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent, we 
cannot conclude that the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs have met the 
first Gingles requirement. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
argue that Act 603 dilutes the black voting 
strength in Madison County, but the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs have again 
failed to satisfy the 
first Gingles requirement. The Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs introduced an 
illustrative map in which Senate District 7 
would be underpopulated by 4.96 percent 
and would have a voting-age population that 
is 45.18 percent white, 46.45 percent black, 
and 6.51 percent Hispanic. But this 
illustrative map fails to satisfy the first 
Gingles requirement for the same reasons 
that the other illustrative maps failed: it does 
not comply with the overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent, and it is drawn in 
isolation instead of as part of a statewide 
plan. Additionally, the record is not clear 
that the minority population would reach a 
majority of the voting-age population in this 
illustrative district, even if we concluded 
that the black and Hispanic populations in 
the area were politically cohesive. Both 
Rubio and Toussaint testified that a 
significant number of the Hispanics in the 
Huntsville area are not eligible to vote 
because they are not citizens. 
3. The Plaintiffs' Claims of Dilution by 
Packing Fail Too. 
Both the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
contend that Acts 602 and 603 dilute the 
strength of black voters by “packing” them 
into majority-black districts, that is, 
by “concentrati[ng] ... blacks into districts 
where they constitute an excessive 
majority,” but the record establishes 
otherwise. As the previous sections explain, 
neither set of plaintiffs offered any evidence 
that the Legislature could have drawn 
another majority-black district for either the 
House or the Senate as part of a statewide 
plan with an overall deviation in population 
159 
 
of 2 percent. Even though the former 
districts in both houses, after the 2010 
Census, were systematically and, in many 
cases, severely underpopulated, the 
Legislature chose to maintain 8 majority-
black districts in the Senate and to increase 
the number of majority-black districts in the 
House from 27 to 28 based on total 
population. Act 602 increased slightly the 
percentage of the black population in 14 of 
the former majority-black House districts, 
decreased slightly the population in the other 
13 majority-black House districts, and 
created 1 new majority-black House district 
in total population. Act 603 increased 
slightly the percentage of 
the black population in 5 of the 8 majority-
black Senate districts and decreased slightly 
the percentage of the black population in the 
other 3 majority-black Senate districts. The 
percentages of the black voting-age 
population in majority-black House districts 
range from 47.22 percent to 74.28 percent, 
and the percentages of the black votingage 
population in majority-black Senate districts 
range from 56.43 percent to 72.70 percent. 
The percentages of black voters in 20 of the 
28 majority-black House districts are below 
65 percent, and the percentages of black 
voters in 11 of those House districts are 
below 60 percent. Only 3 of the 28 majority-
black House districts have a black voting-
age population in excess of 70 percent, and 
two of those three districts are 
underpopulated. The percentages 
of black voters in 6 of the 8 Senate districts 
are below 65 percent, and the percentages 
of black voters in 4 of those Senate districts 
are below 60 percent. Only 1 majority-
black Senate district has a black voting-age 
population in excess of 70 percent, and that 
district is underpopulated. The 
overwhelming majority of the majority-
black districts, under both Acts, remain 
underpopulated, which is the opposite of 
what we would expect in a plan that 
packs black voters into majority-
black districts. Of the 28 majority-
black House districts, 21 remain 
underpopulated, and 6 of the 8 majority-
black Senate districts remain 
underpopulated. Even the 8 House districts 
and 2 Senate districts that are overpopulated 
are within 1 percent of the ideal population 
for a district. And the majority-
black districts under the Acts are roughly 
proportional to the black votingage 
population. That is, black persons are 24.86 
percent of the voting-age population 
in Alabama, and under the Acts, 22.86 
percent of the Senate districts and 26.67 
percent of the House districts are majority-
black districts. Nothing about Acts 602 and 
603 suggests that the Legislature 
diluted black voting strength through 
packing. 
The plaintiffs complain that the Legislature 
should have reduced substantially the 
percentages of black voters in several of the 
majority-black districts to increase the 
influence of black voters in adjacent 
majority-white districts, but there are, at 
least, two problems with that argument. 
First, the Supreme Court has held that 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not 
require the creation of either influence 
districts or crossover districts. These 
decisions make clear that the central concern 
of section 2 in redistricting is the creation of 
compact, majority-black districts where 
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necessary to allow black voters an 
opportunity to elect their preferred 
candidates: “Nothing in § 2 grants special 
protection to a minority group's right to form 
political coalitions.” Second, the plaintiffs 
utterly failed to prove how the Legislature 
could have accomplished this task. The 
plaintiffs again offered no evidence that the 
Legislature could have drawn more 
majority-black districts. Reed testified at 
trial that a majority-black district ordinarily 
needs to be about 60 percent black to 
allow black voters to elect their candidate of 
choice, and he stated that sometimes the 
percentage may need to be closer to 65 
percent. And black legislators told the 
Committee at public hearings that majority-
black districts ordinarily needed to have 
similar percentages of black voters. But the 
plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of 
how the Legislature could have drawn, in a 
statewide plan, the same number of 
majority-black districts with 60 or more 
percent black voters in those districts with 
an overall deviation in population of 2 
percent while still increasing the number of 
influence or crossover districts. 
4. Even if the Plaintiffs Had Proved All 
Three Gingles Requirements or the 
Packing of Black Voters, the Totality of 
the Circumstances Does Not Support a 
Claim of Vote Dilution. 
Even if the plaintiffs had proved all 
the Gingles requirements or the packing 
of black voters, they still would have been 
required to prove that “the totality of the 
facts, including those pointing to 
proportionality, showed that the new scheme 
would deny minority voters equal political 
opportunity.” Relevant factors include the 
history of voting-related discrimination in 
the State; the racial polarization of voting in 
the State; the extent to which the State has 
used discriminatory voting practices to 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination 
against the minority group; the extent to 
which minority group members bear the 
effects of past discrimination in areas such 
as education, employment, and health; the 
extent to which political campaigns have 
included overt or subtle racial appeals; the 
extent to which members of the minority 
have been elected to public office; the level 
of responsiveness of elected officials to the 
needs of a minority group; and the 
proportionality of majority-minority 
districts. 
No one can deny the abhorrent history of 
racial and voting-related discrimination in 
Alabama. The egregious practices of the 
past led to some of the landmark decisions 
in this area of law. For nearly 50 
years, Alabama was subject to the 
preclearance requirement under section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act. 
But that history of discrimination alone 
cannot establish that these particular Acts 
would deny minority voters equal political 
opportunity today. Earlier this year, the 
Supreme Court declared the coverage 
formula in section 4 of the Voting Rights 
Act, which subjected Alabama to the 
preclearance requirement, to be 
unconstitutional because Congress had not 
made sufficient findings to support its 
conclusion that the preclearance requirement 
is still necessary in Alabama. As the 
Supreme Court explained, “[v]oter turnout 
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and registration rates now approach parity,” 
“minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels,” and “[t]he tests and 
devices that blocked access to the ballot 
have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 
years.” 
We conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances does not support the 
conclusion that the Acts would 
deny black voters an equal opportunity to 
participate in the political process, and four 
factors weigh heavily in favor of our 
conclusion. First, black voters in 
Alabama are highly politically active. 
Second, black voters have successfully 
elected the candidates of their choice in the 
majority-black districts. Third, the majority-
black districts are roughly proportional to 
the black voting-age population in Alabama. 
Fourth, the record contains no evidence of 
racial appeals in recent political campaigns 
or of a significant lack of responsiveness to 
the needs of the black population. 
First, as the plaintiffs' own experts 
testified, black voters in Alabama are 
politically active and registered to vote in 
high numbers. Lichtman testified that 
“[t]oday African American participation in 
elections in Alabama is at least comparable 
and likely above white participation.” And 
Arrington agreed that “minority voters have 
become more likely to register and better 
mobilized,” which informed his opinion that 
majority-black districts could be created 
with smaller percentages of blacks. Reed 
testified that the Alabama Democratic 
Conference, which is an organization 
dedicated to the improvement of political 
opportunities for black voters, is active 
across the State and endorses candidates in 
almost every race. And Bernard Simelton 
testified that the Alabama Chapter of the 
National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People has also worked to build 
coalitions around the State with Hispanics 
and Native American groups like the 
MOWA Band of Choctaw Indians to 
increase the political influence 
of black voters. 
Second, black voters have successfully 
elected the candidates of their choice in the 
majority-black districts. In the House of 
Representatives, all 27 of the majority-black 
House districts are represented by 
Democrats, and 26 of those 27 districts are 
represented by black Democrats. In the 
Senate, all of the majority-black Senate 
districts are represented by Democrats, and 
seven of those eight districts are represented 
by black Democrats. The Acts preserve and 
indeed increase the number of these 
majority-black districts. 
Third, the majority-black districts are 
roughly proportional to the black voting-age 
population. Blacks constitute 24.86 percent 
of the voting-age population in Alabama. 
Under the Acts, 22.86 percent of the districts 
in the Senate will be majority-black districts 
and 26.67 percent of the districts in the 
House will be majority-black districts. 
Fourth, the record contains no evidence of 
racial appeals in recent political campaigns 
in Alabama or of a significant lack of 
responsiveness to the needs of blacks. The 
plaintiffs introduced some testimony about a 
partisan campaign trick during the last 
election in which a conservative radio host 
announced that, because of staffing 
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problems, Democrats should vote a day later 
than Republicans, but the record establishes 
that the Secretary of State immediately 
countered that misinformation. There is no 
evidence that any state official was involved 
in the trick. And the evidence establishes 
that the announcement was directed at 
Democratic voters generally, not minority 
voters. The plaintiffs also introduced 
evidence that Jefferson County recently 
closed Cooper Green, a hospital that served 
the indigent population in the County, many 
of whom are black, but the record 
establishes that Cooper Green had recently 
undergone extensive renovations before the 
fiscal crisis in the County led to its closure. 
And the plaintiffs introduced evidence that 
the Legislature has not been sensitive to the 
needs of the Hispanic population 
in Alabama, but that evidence is not relevant 
to the question whether the Legislature has 
been responsive to the needs of black voters. 
Because the overwhelming evidence in the 
record suggests that black voters have an 
equal opportunity to participate in the 
political process the same as everyone else, 
we conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances would not support a claim of 
vote dilution even if the plaintiffs could 
establish the Gingles requirements. 
B. Intentional Discrimination 
The plaintiffs next argue that the State 
defendants engaged in intentional 
discrimination on the basis of race when 
they drafted and adopted the new districts in 
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Fifteenth Amendment. The filings and 
arguments made by the plaintiffs on these 
claims were mystifying at best. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs routinely cited 
decisions of the Supreme Court on claims of 
racial gerrymandering, but never identified 
which districts they alleged were racially 
gerrymandered and introduced little 
evidence to prove a discriminatory intent. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs 
referred to their claims as claims of racial 
gerrymandering, but alternated between 
discussions of specific districts and the Acts 
as a whole and offered little guidance about 
how we should evaluate the Acts under strict 
scrutiny. We were presented with one set of 
plaintiffs who argued about discriminatory 
purpose and another set of plaintiffs who 
argued about strict scrutiny, but no set of 
plaintiffs who argued both. 
We construe the filings as making three 
different claims based on intentional 
discrimination. First, we construe the filings 
of the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs to argue 
that the Acts were promulgated for an 
invidious discriminatory purpose and have 
the effect of diluting minority voting 
strength. Second, we construe the filings of 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs as arguing 
that the Acts as a whole constitute racial 
gerrymanders. Third, we construe the filings 
of the Democratic Conference plaintiffs as 
also arguing that Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, 
and 26 constitute racial gerrymanders. The 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs lack 
standing to maintain the claims of racial 
gerrymandering, and all the claims of 
intentional discrimination, in any event, fail 
on the merits. 
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1. The Plaintiffs Failed To Prove that the 
Acts Were Motivated by an Invidious 
Discriminatory Purpose. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Acts not only 
result in the dilution of black voting strength 
in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act, but were motivated by an invidious 
discriminatory purpose, in violation of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
Although the Supreme Court earlier 
interpreted section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act to require proof of a discriminatory 
purpose, Congress later amended the statute 
to allow proof of only discriminatory results. 
Congress created the results test by deleting 
the phrase “to deny or abridge” and 
replacing it with the following language: “in 
a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of.” In its amendments, 
Congress “dispositively reject[ed] the 
position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 
which required proof that the contested 
electoral practice or mechanism was adopted 
or maintained with the intent to discriminate 
against minority voters.” But insofar as 
section 2 still forbids purposeful 
discrimination, it should be interpreted 
consistently with the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments, which require the 
plaintiffs to prove both that the redistricting 
plan was created with an invidious 
discriminatory purpose and that it results in 
the dilution of a minority's voting strength. 
“Determining whether invidious 
discriminatory purpose was a motivating 
factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent 
as may be available.” “Sometimes a clear 
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than 
race, emerges from the effect of the state 
action even when the 
governing legislation appears neutral on its 
face.... But such cases are rare.” When no 
such pattern emerges, we consider evidence 
such as “[t]he impact of the official action,” 
“[t]he historical background of the 
decision,” “[t]he specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision,” 
“[d]epartures from the normal procedural 
sequence,” and “[t]he legislative or 
administrative history.”  
 Based on the application of the Arlington 
Heights factors, we conclude that an 
invidious discriminatory purpose was not a 
motivating factor in the creation of the Acts. 
First, the impact of the Acts weighs against 
a finding of invidious discriminatory 
purpose because the Acts draw as many 
majority-black districts as possible within an 
overall deviation in population of 2 percent 
and leave many of the majority-
black districts underpopulated. Second, the 
historical background of the decision weighs 
against a finding of invidious discriminatory 
purpose because the Legislature used 
appropriate guidelines to fulfill its 
constitutional duty to redistrict itself without 
judicial intervention, contrary to the 
discriminatory failures to redistrict that mar 
the State's past. Third, the sequence of 
events leading up to the enactment of the 
Acts weighs against a finding of an 
invidious discriminatory purpose because 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
solicited and incorporated comments from 
the public and from their colleagues in the 
Legislature. The Acts adopted large portions 
of maps provided to Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon 
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by black legislators. And the Committee 
developed the Acts in compliance with 
neutral districting principles including the 
preservation of the core of existing districts, 
the requirement of one person, one vote, and 
respect for communities of interest. Fourth, 
the Legislature did not depart from normal 
procedures to pass the Acts, but followed 
roughly the same procedures as had the 
Legislature in 2001 when it enacted the last 
districts. Indeed, the Legislature improved 
upon those procedures: the Committee held 
even more public hearings than had the 
Committee in 2001; the Committee solicited 
public comment before the plans were 
drafted so as to enable the public to have 
greater influence on the product; and the 
Legislature passed the Acts in a special 
session that complied with all 
normal legislative procedures. Fifth, the 
record contains no contemporaneous 
statements made about the redistricting plan 
that suggest an invidious discriminatory 
purpose in the creation of the Acts; 
statements by Republicans that they desired 
to gain seats with the new districts speak to 
partisan, not racial, motives. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs argue 
that the passage of the Acts in a special 
session suggests discriminatory intent, but 
we disagree. The Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs identify several alleged procedural 
defects including the failure of the 
Legislature to redistrict itself in the first 
regular session after the census as required 
by the state constitution, the short notice for 
the final public hearing on the proposed 
districts, and the efforts of the Republicans 
to draft the districts behind closed doors. But 
these facts do not evidence discriminatory 
intent. The Legislature has never redistricted 
itself in the first regular session, and the 
Legislature followed the precedent 
established in 2001 of drawing the districts 
in a special session. Senator Dial explained 
that the Committee conducted the first 21 
public hearings before the initial plans were 
completed to give the public a greater 
opportunity to comment, in contrast with the 
public hearings held in 2001 when the plans 
were presented as a fait accompli. And the 
final hearing was held on short notice 
because of the short time left to pass the 
Acts in the special session. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
argue that the drawing of the district lines by 
Hinaman behind closed doors suggests an 
invidious racial purpose, but we disagree. As 
the plaintiffs' own expert conceded, the 
party in power ordinarily drafts redistricting 
plans behind closed doors. If anything, the 
record suggests that the Republicans were 
more open to discussion with the 
Democratic members of the Legislature than 
would be expected, particularly in the light 
of the Republican supermajority in each 
house. Senator Dial and Representative 
McClendon offered to meet with all of their 
colleagues, and the record is clear that they 
met with both Republicans and Democrats 
and that they incorporated suggestions from 
Democratic legislators into the plans. Even 
Hinaman, who contracted to assist the 
Republicans with the districts, worked on 
some boundary changes with Democratic 
representatives in the final week before the 
passage of the Acts. No invidious racial 
purpose has been proved about this process. 
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The Black Caucus plaintiffs and the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs also 
argued that the Acts were the product of a 
grand Republican strategy to make the 
Democratic Party the “black party” and the 
Republican Party the “white party,” but the 
record does not support that theory. Senator 
Dial and Representative McClendon 
credibly testified that they had never heard 
of such a strategy, had no personal interest 
in any such strategy, and did not even 
discuss the reapportionment process with the 
Republican National Committee. And the 
documentary evidence establishes that the 
Committee adopted the guidelines for 
reapportionment before Hinaman arrived to 
help the Republican leadership draft the new 
lines and that the only paperwork that 
Senator Dial and Representative McClendon 
received from the national party involved 
election returns and district statistics. The 
record contains no evidence that 
the Alabama Republican Party is engaged in 
any grand strategy to eliminate white 
Democrats. 
2. We Reject the Plaintiffs' Claims of 
Racial Gerrymandering. 
A claim of racial gerrymandering is 
“analytically distinct from a vote dilution 
claim.” “Whereas a vote dilution claim 
alleges that the State has enacted a particular 
voting scheme as a purposeful device to 
minimize or cancel out the voting potential 
of racial or ethnic minorities, an action 
disadvantaging voters of a particular race, 
the essence of the equal protection claim 
[for racial gerrymandering] is that the State 
has used race as a basis for separating voters 
into districts.” The Supreme Court first 
recognized this equal protection claim 
in Shaw, in which the Court explained that 
the segregation of races of citizens into 
different voting districts violates not only 
the Fifteenth Amendment, as it had 
previously determined in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, but also the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
a. The Black Caucus Plaintiffs Have 
Standing To Maintain Claims of Racial 
Gerrymandering Against the Acts as a 
Whole, but the Democratic Conference 
Plaintiffs Do Not. 
We must decide whether the plaintiffs in 
each action have standing to challenge the 
Acts as racial gerrymanders, and “the 
irreducible constitutional minimum of 
standing contains three elements.” “First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in 
fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, 
there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of. 
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” 
The Supreme Court has explained that 
“[d]emonstrating the individualized harm 
our standing doctrine requires may not be 
easy in the racial gerrymandering context, as 
it will frequently be difficult to discern why 
a particular citizen was put in one district or 
another.” “Only those citizens able to allege 
injury as a direct result of 
having personally been denied equal 
treatment may bring a challenge [of racial 
gerrymandering to a redistricting Act as a 
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whole], and citizens who do so carry the 
burden of proving their standing, as well as 
their case on the merits.” A citizen who files 
a claim of racial gerrymandering about a 
particular district will meet the requirement 
of personal injury when that plaintiff resides 
in the district that he alleges was the product 
of a racial gerrymander. But “where a 
plaintiff does not live in such a district, he or 
she does not suffer those special harms, and 
any inference that the plaintiff has 
personally been subjected to a racial 
classification would not be justified absent 
specific evidence tending to support that 
inference.” 
The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus has 
organizational standing to maintain its claim 
of racial gerrymandering because its 
members reside in nearly every challenged 
district. Ordinarily, “[a]n association has 
standing to bring suit on behalf of its 
members when its members would have 
standing to sue in their own right, the 
interests at stake are germane to the 
organization's purpose, and neither the claim 
asserted nor the relief requested requires 
individual members' participation in the 
lawsuit.” The parties stipulated that 
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus is 
“composed of every African–American 
member of the House and Senate.” The State 
defendants submitted a list of each house 
representative that includes the 
legislator's party and race. According to that 
list, 26 black Democrats are currently 
incumbents in House districts drawn under 
the 2001 plan. All black incumbents remain 
residents of their current House districts 
under the new House plan because the 
Legislature was mostly successful in 
avoiding incumbent conflicts when drawing 
the new districts. There was an incumbent 
conflict in House District 60 until the recent 
death of Representative Newton. All 26 
incumbents are members of the Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus and, as individual 
voters, would have standing to maintain a 
claim of racial gerrymandering because they 
are, by necessity, residents of the districts 
they represent. There is not a corresponding 
list of each senator that includes the 
legislator's party and race, but Senator 
Smitherman, Senator Ross, and Senator 
Figures are black incumbents who testified 
at trial about how the new senate plan 
affected their senate districts. Because the 
Legislature avoided all incumbent conflicts 
in the new Senate districts, these senators 
are residents of the new districts and would 
have standing as voters to maintain a claim 
of racial gerrymandering. Like the 26 
representatives, all black senators are also 
members of the Alabama Legislative Black 
Caucus. The black legislators represent the 
majority-black House and Senate districts 
that are the subject of the racial 
gerrymandering claim. A claim of racial 
gerrymandering is germane to the purpose of 
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, an 
unincorporated political organization of 
African Americans elected to 
the Alabama Legislature, and the 
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus represent
s voters whose rights to equal protection of 
law would be violated by redistricting plans 
that constitute a racial gerrymander. And 
their claim for injunctive relief does not 
require the participation of individual 
plaintiffs. Because we hold that 
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus has 
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organizational standing, we need not decide 
whether the Alabama Association 
of Black County Officials or any of its 
members have standing. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs, on 
the other hand, have not met their burden to 
establish standing to bring a claim of racial 
gerrymandering to the Acts as a whole. The 
record does not clearly identify the districts 
in which the individual members of the 
Alabama Democratic Conference reside 
under the Acts… And 
the Alabama Democratic Conference 
similarly offered no specific evidence that 
any of its members were subjected to a 
racial classification. 
b. We Dismiss the District–Specific Claims 
of Racial Gerrymandering Filed by the 
Democratic Conference Plaintiffs for Lack 
of Standing. 
We construe the filings of the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs also to present district-
specific racial gerrymandering challenges to 
Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, and 26 under Act 
603. But the Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs have not proved that they have 
standing to bring any of these claims. 
The Alabama Democratic Conference 
presented insufficient evidence that it has 
members who reside in these districts. And 
the individual Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence 
that they reside in these districts or were 
otherwise personally subjected to a racial 
classification during the districting process. 
The Alabama Democratic Conference has 
not proved that it has members who would 
have standing to pursue any district-specific 
claims of racial gerrymandering. At trial, 
Reed testified on behalf of the Conference 
that it has members in almost every county 
in Alabama, but the counties in Alabama are 
split into many districts. The Conference 
offered no testimony or evidence that it has 
members in all of the districts in Alabama or 
in any of the specific districts that it 
challenged in this matter. Because we 
cannot conclude, based on the evidence in 
the record, that the Alabama Democratic 
Conference has members who would have 
standing to bring the district-specific claims 
of racial gerrymandering in their own right, 
we must dismiss those claims for lack of 
standing. 
And the individual Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs have failed to prove that they have 
standing to bring any district-specific claims 
of racial gerrymandering. None of the 
individual plaintiffs testified that he or she 
will reside in any of those districts under the 
Acts. The parties agree that Toussaint is a 
registered voter in Madison County, and the 
record suggests that she voted in the former 
Senate District 7. But the record contains no 
evidence of her Senate district under the 
new map. The parties agree that Weaver is a 
registered voter in Washington County who 
votes in the former Senate District 22, but 
the record is silent about his assignment to a 
district under the Acts. And the parties agree 
that Pettway is a registered voter in 
Montgomery County in the former House 
District 73, but the record contains no 
evidence about either the Senate district 
where he currently votes or the Senate 
district where he would vote under the new 
Acts. None of the individual Democratic 
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Conference plaintiffs reside in Senate 
District 11. 
c. Even if All the Plaintiffs Had Standing 
To Assert Their Claims of Racial 
Gerrymandering, Those Claims Would Fail 
Because Race Was Not the Predominant 
Motivating Factor in the Creation of the 
Districts. 
Even if all the plaintiffs could establish that 
they have standing to bring their claims of 
racial gerrymandering, the claims would 
fail. Race was not the predominant 
motivating factor for the Acts as a whole. 
And race was not the predominant 
motivating factor for drawing Senate 
Districts 7, 11, 22, or 26. 
“Electoral district lines are facially race 
neutral, so a more searching inquiry is 
necessary before strict scrutiny can be found 
applicable in redistricting cases than in cases 
of classification based explicitly on race.” 
On its face, “[a] reapportionment statute 
typically does not classify persons at all; it 
classifies tracts of land, or addresses.” And 
“[s]trict scrutiny does not apply merely 
because redistricting is performed with 
consciousness of race. Nor does it apply to 
all cases of intentional creation of majority-
minority districts.” But strict scrutiny will 
apply when a state has subordinated 
traditional, legitimate districting principles 
to race, so that race was the predominant 
factor motivating the decision of the 
Legislature. And when strict scrutiny is 
invoked, the State must establish that its 
districting legislation is narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling interest.  
“Federal-court review of 
districting legislation represents a serious 
intrusion on the most vital of local 
functions.” “The courts, in assessing the 
sufficiency of a challenge to a districting 
plan, must be sensitive to the complex 
interplay of forces that enter a legislature's 
redistricting calculus.” Only when race is 
the “predominant factor motivating the 
legislature's redistricting decision” will strict 
scrutiny apply. “The distinction between 
being aware of racial considerations and 
being motivated by them may be difficult to 
make. This evidentiary difficulty, together 
with the sensitive nature of redistricting and 
the presumption of good faith that must be 
accorded legislative enactments, requires 
courts to exercise extraordinary caution in 
adjudicating claims that a State has drawn 
district lines on the basis of race.” 
i. The Acts 
When the Legislature undertook the task of 
drawing the new House and Senate districts 
after the 2010 Census, the main priority of 
the Legislature was to comply with the 
constitutional mandate of one person, one 
vote. To accomplish this task, the 
Reapportionment Committee selected a 
guideline of an overall deviation in 
population of plus or minus 1 percent, and 
the Legislature applied this guideline of an 
overall deviation of 2 percent to every 
district before satisfying any other 
redistricting principles. The guidelines 
adopted by the Reapportionment Committee 
and the consistent testimony of Senator Dial, 
Representative McClendon, and Hinaman 
establish that the Legislature also considered 
race when required by federal law: the 
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Legislature sought to comply with sections 2 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act by 
preserving—and, in the House, increasing—
the majority-black districts and by not 
substantially reducing the percentage 
of black persons in those districts. But the 
guidelines and the consistent testimony of 
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon, 
and Hinaman proved that the State followed 
the guideline of an overall deviation of 2 
percent, without exception, and then applied 
the following neutral redistricting principles 
when feasible: to preserve the core of 
existing districts; to avoid incumbent 
conflicts; to draw compact and contiguous 
districts; and to appease incumbents by 
accommodating their preferences whenever 
possible. Finally, the Legislature considered 
partisan data to preserve the Republican 
supermajority in the Legislature. “The 
record does not reflect a history 
of purely race-based districting revisions.” 
Although race was a factor in the creation of 
the districts, we find that the Legislature did 
not subordinate traditional, race-neutral 
districting principles to race-based 
considerations. The Legislature did not 
create majority-black districts for the first 
time nor aim to increase or decrease the 
percentage of the black populations within 
the majority-black districts, most of which 
remained in the same geographic areas. The 
2010 Census revealed relatively modest 
growth of the black population 
in Alabama from 2000 to 2010. But the 
concentrations of the black population had 
declined in some areas and shifted in other 
areas, leaving all majority-black districts 
significantly underpopulated. And the 
Legislature moved districts to correspond 
with population growth and to comply with 
the overall deviation in population of 2 
percent. The Legislature moved House 
District 53, a majority-black district, from 
Jefferson County, where there were several 
severely underpopulated majority-
black districts, to Madison County, where 
the black population had increased and 
where a new, compact majority-
black district could be drawn instead. The 
Legislature moved House District 73, which 
had never been a majority-black district, 
from Montgomery County, another area 
with underpopulated majority-
black districts, to Shelby County, an area 
with severely overpopulated majority-white 
districts. Above all, the Legislature followed 
a lower overall deviation in population to 
create more equality among districts 
throughout the State. 
As it corrected the malapportionment of the 
districts, the Legislature avoided reducing 
significantly the proportion of black persons 
in each majority-black district, but it 
followed no bright-line rule. The Legislature 
reduced the percentage of black persons in 
majority-black districts where necessary to 
achieve other objectives. The Legislature 
maintained the cores of existing districts, 
made districts more compact where possible, 
kept almost all of the incumbents within 
their districts, and respected communities of 
interest where possible. The new districts 
are not so “bizarre on [their] face that [they 
are] unexplainable on grounds other than 
race,” nor were they approved after the 
Department of Justice had rejected two 
previous redistricting plans under a 
“maxblack” plan, nor is there 
“overwhelming evidence that the shape[s] 
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[of the districts were] essentially dictated by 
racial considerations of one form or 
another.” We find that the Legislature was 
not predominantly motivated by racial 
considerations when it adopted the new 
districts. 
When the Legislature adopted a guideline 
for less deviation in population equality, it 
reduced, from the outset, its ability to pack 
voters for any discriminatory purpose, 
whether partisan or racial. After the 2000 
Census, the Legislature adopted an overall 
deviation of 10 percent and systematically 
underpopulated majority-black districts at 
the expense of majority-white districts that 
the Legislature, in turn, overpopulated. 
When the Legislature, after the 2010 
Census, adopted a guideline that required a 
smaller deviation in population equality, it 
reduced the potential for this kind of 
discrimination, whether in favor of or 
against a racial minority. Had the 
Legislature intended to pack black voters in 
majority-black districts, after the 2010 
Census, the Legislature could have adopted, 
as before, a guideline that allowed more 
population inequality and then 
overpopulated the majority-black districts. 
But the Legislature did the opposite: it 
adopted a guideline for greater population 
equality and slightly underpopulated the vast 
majority of the majority-black districts. And 
the guideline for greater population equality 
limited the ability of the drawer of the 
district lines, Hinaman, to place more voters 
of any kind into a particular district. 
With a tighter guideline for population 
equality, geography also limited the 
potential for discrimination. Voters are not 
fungible commodities that can be moved 
anywhere in a state. Hinaman took 
population concentrations, including racial 
groups tied to particular geographical 
locations, as fixed numbers for purposes of 
drawing the new districts. Hinaman used 
existing House and Senate districts to draw 
the new district lines, and his choice of 
which voters to add or subtract from each 
district was limited by which populations 
abutted the existing districts. Hinaman also 
could not abandon the previous district lines 
without invariably creating more incumbent 
conflicts and disrupting communities of 
interest. 
Above all, the guideline for greater 
population equality eliminated the partisan 
gerrymander that existed in the former 
districts. Indeed, this fact explains why both 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs have 
challenged the use of an overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent throughout this 
litigation and have refused to offer into 
evidence an alternative statewide plan for 
redistricting that conforms to this guideline. 
Although the plaintiffs have argued that this 
guideline contributed to a racial 
discriminatory purpose in the design of the 
new districts, the plaintiffs have advanced 
that losing argument precisely because they 
have recognized all along that this guideline 
eliminates the partisan advantage that the 
plaintiffs created and enjoyed in the former 
districting plan. 
Hinaman balanced and satisfied five lawful 
objectives with respect to the majority-black 
districts. First, to comply with the guarantee 
of one person, one vote and avoid litigation 
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of the kind that occurred in Larios, Hinaman 
repopulated the majority-black districts, all 
of which were underpopulated, and brought 
them within the guideline for population 
equality. Second, to comply with sections 2 
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Hinaman 
maintained the same number of majority-
black districts. A decade earlier, the 
plaintiffs who served as Democratic leaders 
in the Legislature did the same thing when 
they drew new district lines, and the 
plaintiffs do not contend that Hinaman 
should have done otherwise in 2012. Third, 
to comply with section 5, Hinaman avoided 
a significant reduction in the percentages 
of black voters in the majority-black districts 
that he preserved. Again, a decade earlier, 
several of the plaintiffs did the same thing, 
but now they contend that Hinaman was 
wrong to do so. Fourth, to assist the passage 
of the redistricting plan in the Legislature, 
Hinaman avoided, as much as possible, the 
placement of more than one incumbent 
legislator in each district. And fifth, to 
preserve communities of interest, Hinaman 
preserved, as much as possible, the core of 
each existing district. As he had done before 
for both the federal judiciary and the 
Legislature in earlier cycles of redistricting, 
Hinaman ably balanced all these objectives 
and avoided the pitfalls of racial 
gerrymandering. 
The trial testimony of Senator Dial, 
Representative McClendon, and Hinaman, 
taken on whole, establishes that the primary 
reason they added population to majority-
black districts was because those districts 
were severely underpopulated. What 
population was added to a particular district 
was then informed by other considerations, 
including avoiding retrogression and 
dilution of minority votes. The Committee 
established the 2 percent guideline as the 
nonnegotiable baseline for redistricting, and 
Hinaman satisfied that guideline in every 
district. And the percentage 
of black population in many majority-
black districts decreased, which supports the 
inference that Hinaman subordinated racial 
considerations to the guideline of an overall 
deviation in population of 2 percent. 
We agree with our dissenting colleague that 
all districting principles were subordinated 
to a single consideration, but our dissenting 
colleague identifies the wrong one. Our 
dissenting colleague asserts that race 
predominated over every other districting 
principle, but the consistent testimony of 
Senator Dial, Representative McClendon, 
and Hinaman established that the 
constitutional requirement of one person, 
one vote trumped every other districting 
principle. Each district in both houses 
satisfies the guideline of an overall deviation 
in population of 2 percent. To comply with 
that guideline, Hinaman had to repopulate 
severely underpopulated majority-
black districts and depopulate severely 
overpopulated majority-white districts. 
While accomplishing this primary task, 
Hinaman also tried to satisfy sections 2 and 
5 of the Voting Rights Act. Our dissenting 
colleague discounts Hinaman's paramount 
commitment to population equality and 
instead faults a few majority-black districts 
and several precinct splits as examples that 
the drafters employed a “rigid quota.” 
Hinaman split many precincts to comply 
with the guideline of an overall deviation in 
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population of 2 percent. When asked why he 
would split a voting precinct, Hinaman 
replied, “I guess the categories for splitting a 
voting precinct would be for the creation of 
ablack [m]ajority district, for not 
retrogressing a black [m]ajority district, for 
deviation obviously because you had to get 
to plus or minus 1 percent. Those would be 
the normal reasons.” This testimony 
explains why precinct splitting occurred 
often in counties with only majority-white 
districts, and it suggests that at least some of 
the precinct splits in majority-black districts 
also were attributable to the 2 percent 
guideline. 
Hinaman honored requests from incumbents 
too, even when it meant splitting precincts… 
Taken as a whole, Hinaman's testimony 
confirms that race was not the predominant 
motivating factor in precinct splitting. And, 
even where it occurred, precinct splitting 
was less of an evil to be avoided in 
redistricting than the subordination of other 
redistricting criteria, such as compliance 
with the Constitution and the Voting Rights 
Act. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that the 
percentages of black populations in the 
majority-black districts evidence that race 
was the predominant factor when the 
Legislature drew the new House and Senate 
plans, even though these percentages closely 
resemble the percentages that 
the Black Caucus endorsed and helped to 
enact into law only a decennial census 
ago. Our dissenting colleague joins their 
lament and expresses frustration with the 
“high percentages” of the black population 
in the majority-black districts although he 
acknowledges that “conditions 30 years ago 
or 20 years ago or even a decade ago (in or 
around 2001) may have justified” them. 
These arguments beg a question: what has 
changed in the last few years to support the 
conclusion, from the perspective of 
the Black Caucus plaintiffs, that the new 
majority-black districts are unconstitutional 
when the old majority-black districts were 
constitutional? The answer is simple: the 
Republicans now control the Legislature 
instead of the Democrats. 
We refuse to apply a double standard that 
requires the Legislature to follow one set of 
rules for redistricting when Democrats 
control the Legislature and another set of 
rules when Republicans control it. After the 
2000 Census, nothing changed that would 
have relaxed the constitutional and statutory 
standards that governed redistricting. On the 
contrary, in 2006, Congress amended 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to make 
the standard for retrogression “more 
stringent.” And in Larios, a three-judge 
district court in this Circuit expressed 
concern that an overall deviation in 
population of 10 percent was no longer a 
“safe harbor” for purposes of the one person, 
one vote command of the Equal Protection 
Clause, particularly in the light of 
developing technology that makes it 
possible to achieve substantially greater 
population equality. At trial, the plaintiffs 
offered no credible evidence that the 
percentages of the black population in the 
majority-black districts adopted only ten 
years earlier were no longer warranted. 
Although Arrington opined that a 51 
percent black majority is now sufficient to 
allow black voters to elect their preferred 
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candidates of choice, he offered no election 
data for any of the majority-black districts 
in Alabama to support that conclusion. 
Arrington admitted that he testified in 
another action in 2000 regarding a four-
district plan for Dallas County, Alabama, 
that a district in which black persons made 
up a voting-age population of 61 percent 
would be considered “a swing district” that 
would offer only an opportunity 
for black voters to elect the candidate of 
their choice, not a guarantee 
that black voters would be able to elect the 
candidate of their choice. And Arrington 
acknowledged that “I haven't drawn any 
plans for Alabama, so I don't know some of 
the nitty-gritty of some of the districts.” 
Reed testified, on the other hand, that a 
majority-black district in Alabama ordinarily 
needs to be about 60 percent black in total 
population to allow black voters to elect 
their candidate of choice and, in some cases, 
might need to be closer to 65 percent. Reed 
has, of course, been the chairman of 
the Alabama Democratic Conference since 
1970 and has designed several redistricting 
plans in Alabama. As he testified at trial, 
“I've been involved in 
reapportionment legislation and litigation 
[in Alabama] for many years.... I've been 
actively involved in drawing district lines 
and participating in the reapportionment 
process, as well as drafting plans for 
reapportionment, the Legislature, state board 
of education, and many, many local 
jurisdictions.” We credit Reed's testimony 
based on his wealth of experience in 
redistricting and elections in Alabama. 
ii. Senate District 7 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs argue 
that the Legislature subordinated traditional 
redistricting principles when it drew Senate 
District 7. Under the 2001 plan, Senate 
District 7 is located entirely within Madison 
County and runs from the Alabama–
Tennessee border down the center of the 
County through Huntsville. The district 
divides into two feet-like segments at the 
bottom. According to the 2010 Census, the 
2001 Senate District 7 had a total population 
that was 60.28 percent white and 32.14 
percent black. The left foot of the district 
reached into a small portion of southwest 
Huntsville known as “Little Mexico” 
because its population is largely Hispanic. 
The majority-white district was 
overpopulated by 9.04 percent and 
surrounded by other majority-white districts 
that were also overpopulated. District 2, its 
western neighbor, was overpopulated by 
31.12 percent. Senator Dial refereed 
extensive negotiations between the 
Republican incumbent in District 7 and the 
Republican incumbents from the 
neighboring districts. Under the final plan, 
Act 603 brings District 7 within the target 
deviation by eliminating the left foot of the 
district and moving 10,151 blacks from the 
western edge of the district into District 1, a 
majority-white district represented by a 
Democrat. Although District 1 had not 
previously shared a border with District 7, 
the Act brought the majority-white district 
across the northern border of the State into 
Madison County to gain this population. 
Under the new plan, District 7 has a total 
population that is 65.56 percent white and 
27.34 percent black. It is more compact than 
174 
 
its predecessor and is still located entirely 
within Madison County. 
We find that the Legislature did not 
subordinate traditional redistricting 
principles to race when it created District 7. 
The Legislature maintained most of District 
7 in accordance with the traditional respect 
for existing districts. The Legislature 
reduced the population in Senate District 7 
to bring it within the allowable range of 
population deviation in an effort to comply 
with the requirement of one person, one 
vote. After extensive negotiations among the 
Republican incumbents, the Legislature took 
the excess population from the western edge 
and put the population, which is 
largely black and votes heavily Democratic, 
in the district of a Democratic incumbent. 
The new district is more compact, falls 
within the target population deviation, and 
maintains a substantial minority population. 
We find that the new district lines comply 
with traditional redistricting principles and 
that the movement of the black population 
from the western edge of the district was 
made largely for partisan, not racial, 
purposes. 
iii. Senate District 11 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs next 
argue that the Legislature subordinated 
neutral districting principles to race when it 
drew Senate District 11. District 11 changed 
substantially in Act 603. Under the old plan, 
District 11 had a crescent shape that 
included all of Talladega County, Coosa 
County, and a small portion of Elmore 
County. In 2010, District 11 was 
underpopulated by 8.39 percent and had a 
total population that was 62.59 percent 
white and 33.95 percent black. Under Act 
603, District 11 has moved north and now 
follows the shape of a backwards C that 
begins in the southern part of St. Clair 
County, swoops through Talladega County, 
and ends in the southwestern portion of 
Shelby County. The new plan moves the 
central portion of Talladega County, which 
has a substantial black population, into 
District 15 with a portion of Shelby County, 
which is heavily white. The total population 
of District 11 is 81.66 percent white and 
14.96 percent black. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs have 
not proved that the Legislature subordinated 
neutral districting principles to race when it 
created District 11. Despite substantial shifts 
of other districts, Hinaman preserved the 
core of the district in Talladega County, 
where the incumbent lived. Hinaman also 
largely followed county lines on the western 
borders. The district is also contiguous and 
complies with the overall deviation in 
population of 2 percent. Although the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs introduced 
evidence that the maps could have been 
drawn to make District 11 more compact by 
swapping the population from Shelby 
County in District 11 with the population 
from Talladega County in District 15, that 
fact does not establish that race was the 
predominant factor. Partisanship could have 
similarly explained the decision to place the 
central portion of Talladega in District 15. 
As Reed testified, a redistricting plan can be 
drawn many ways, and we find that the 
evidence does not support a finding that race 
predominated over other factors in the 
creation of this district. Even if the 
Democratic Conference plaintiffs could 
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prove that they have standing to bring their 
claim of racial gerrymandering about Senate 
District 11, the claim would fail because we 
find that the Legislature did not subordinate 
neutral districting principles when it drew 
that district. 
iv. Senate District 22 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs next 
argue that the Legislature subordinated 
neutral districting principles to race when it 
drew Senate District 22. District 22 is a 
sprawling district located in 
southwest Alabama. In 2010, District 22 had 
a total population that was 65.96 percent 
white, 28.30 percent black, and 3.44 percent 
Native American. It is sandwiched between 
the Black Belt to its north and the Mobile 
County area to its south. Although its 
population was within 1 percent of the ideal 
population in 2010, it bordered several 
severely malapportioned districts. The 
majority-black districts to its north were 
underpopulated by 42,357 people. The three 
districts located within Mobile County to its 
south were underpopulated by 15,656 
people. And the district located in Baldwin 
County to its south was overpopulated by 
19,055 people. Although the drafters 
considered whether they could bring one of 
the districts in Mobile County across Mobile 
Bay to capture some of the overpopulation 
from Baldwin County, the Republican 
incumbent in Baldwin County objected to 
that proposal. Because of that objection, Act 
603 extended District 22 into Baldwin 
County and reduced its population in Mobile 
County, thereby dividing the MOWA Band 
of Choctaw Indians among three districts. 
Act 603 also repopulates the majority-
black districts from contiguous portions of 
the former District 22. Despite these 
population shifts, District 22 maintains a 
similar shape under the Act and crosses into 
all of the same counties that it had crossed 
into in 2001. The total population of the 
district is 73.17 percent white, 21.52 
percent black, and 2.68 percent Native 
American. 
We find that the Legislature did not 
subordinate traditional neutral districting 
principles to race when it drew District 22. 
The need to bring the neighboring districts 
into compliance with the requirement of one 
person, one vote served as the primary 
motivating factor for the changes to District 
22. The protection of the interests of 
incumbents also served as a motivating 
factor to the changes to District 22 because 
the drafters decided to bring District 22 into 
the overpopulated areas of Baldwin County 
in part because the incumbent rejected any 
proposal in which a district from Mobile 
County would cross Mobile Bay into 
Baldwin County. Finally, the preservation of 
existing districts served as a motivating 
factor in the shape of District 22 and the 
locations at which it crossed county 
boundaries. Although the Legislature moved 
the northern boundaries of District 22 to 
repopulate the majority-black districts 
without retrogression, that decision was 
motivated as much by the effort to comply 
with the requirement of one person, one vote 
as by the effort to avoid retrogression. 
Finally, there is a practical, geographical 
feature that materially restricts redistricting 
options in Mobile County: it is cabined in by 
Mississippi, the Gulf of Mexico, and Mobile 
Bay. And, on this record, we cannot find 
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that the effort to avoid retrogression or to 
preserve the majority-black district “had a 
qualitatively greater influence on the 
drawing of the district lines” than the other 
traditional criteria. 
v. Senate District 26 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs did 
not plead in their complaint a claim of racial 
gerrymandering about District 26, but we 
heard substantial testimony about Senate 
District 26 at trial. District 26 is a majority-
black district in Montgomery County 
currently represented by Senator Quinton 
Ross (D). Under the old plans, Senate 
District 26 included most of Montgomery 
County, following the county lines, except 
for a boot shaped segment of Montgomery 
included within District 25. In 2010, District 
26 was underpopulated by 11.64 percent and 
had a total population that was 22.03 percent 
white and 72.75 percent black. To 
repopulate District 26, Hinaman added 
populous precincts in the City of 
Montgomery, which shared many 
characteristics with the other areas of 
District 26 and included both black and 
white persons. Hinaman removed most of 
the rural portion of Montgomery County 
from District 26 to create a land bridge 
between the former area of District 25 and 
Crenshaw County. As Hinaman explained, 
District 25 needed to gain population when 
Act 603 moved District 30 entirely north of 
Montgomery. Under the new plans, District 
26 is still slightly underpopulated and has a 
total population that is 19.51 percent white 
and 75.22 percent black. 
The Democratic Conference plaintiffs have 
failed to prove that the Legislature 
subordinated neutral districting principles to 
race when it created District 26. Race was a 
factor in the drawing of District 26. The 
Legislature preserved the District as 
majority-black and the percentage of the 
population that was black. But the 
Legislature also preserved the core of the 
existing District. District 26 follows the 
county lines at its northwestern border and 
follows the existing district lines along its 
northeastern border. It maintains a similar 
shape around the City of Montgomery, and 
it includes two protrusions into Montgomery 
County that largely follow highway lines. 
The inclusion of additional precincts in the 
City of Montgomery north 
of Alabama Route 80 is a reasonable 
response to the underpopulation of the 
District. On this record, we cannot find that 
the Legislature subordinated traditional 
districting principles to race. 
Because the Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs failed to prove that the State 
subordinated traditional districting criteria 
when they drew Senate Districts 7, 11, 22, 
and 26, we need not consider whether the 
Districts would satisfy strict scrutiny. The 
claims of racial gerrymandering fail. 
3. Even if the Plaintiffs Had Proved that 
the Acts Were Primarily Motivated by a 
Discriminatory Purpose, the Acts Would 
Satisfy Strict Scrutiny. 
Even if the State defendants had 
subordinated traditional districting 
principles to racial considerations when they 
drew the challenged Districts, the Districts 
would satisfy strict scrutiny. Although the 
Supreme Court has never decided whether 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act is a 
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compelling state interest, we conclude that 
compliance with the Act is a compelling 
state interest. And we conclude that a plan 
will be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest when the race-based action taken 
was reasonably necessary under a 
constitutional reading and application of the 
Act. 
The Alabama Legislature maintained the 
number of majority-black districts and 
avoided significantly decreasing the 
percentages of black voters in those districts 
to comply with section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. All parties agree, and our 
dissenting colleague admits, that “Senator 
Dial and Representative McClendon 
believed that their obligation under the 
Voting Rights Act included preserving the 
existing number of black majority districts.” 
We find that Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon also believed 
that they needed to maintain approximately 
the same percentages of black voters in 
those majority-black districts to avoid 
retrogression of black voting strength in 
violation of section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act. And we find that Senator Dial and 
Representative McClendon believed that any 
significant reduction of the black population 
in the majority-black districts would also 
likely cause a problem with preclearance of 
the plans by the Department of Justice. 
The Black Caucus plaintiffs argue that, 
in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, the 
Supreme Court nullified the interest of the 
State defendants in complying with section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act, but we disagree. 
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court 
declared the coverage formula in section 4 
of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional 
because it was “based on decades-old data 
and eradicated practices.” Shelby 
County expressed no opinion about the 
constitutionality of section 5 and, even if it 
had, that decision would not change our 
analysis. All parties agree that the State 
of Alabama was governed by the 
preclearance requirement of section 5 when 
the Committee drafted and the Legislature 
approved the new districts. We evaluate the 
plans in the light of the legal standard that 
governed the Legislature when it acted, not 
based on a later decision of the Supreme 
Court that exempted Alabama from future 
coverage under section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
But we cannot uphold the districts unless the 
Acts are narrowly tailored to comply with 
section 5. “Although [the Supreme Court] 
ha[s] not always provided precise guidance 
on how closely the means (the racial 
classification) must serve the end (the 
justification or compelling interest), [the 
Supreme Court] ha[s] always expected that 
the legislative action would substantially 
address, if not achieve, the avowed 
purpose.” “[T]he purpose of § 5 has always 
been to insure that no voting-procedure 
changes would be made that would lead to a 
retrogression in the position of racial 
minorities with respect to their effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise.” “By 
enacting section 5, Congress aimed to 
guarantee that minorities' new gains in 
political participation would not be undone.” 
When the Legislature confronted the task of 
redistricting after the 2010 Census, Congress 
had recently made the standard for 
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preclearance under section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act “more stringent.” In 2006, 
Congress extended the operation of section 5 
and amended its text “to prohibit more 
conduct than before.” Congress stated in its 
findings that “[t]he effectiveness of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been 
significantly weakened by the United States 
Supreme Court decisions in [Reno v. Bossier 
Parish School Board and Georgia v. 
Ashcroft] which have misconstrued 
Congress' original intent in enacting the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the 
protections afforded by section 5 of such 
Act.” 
In Reno v. Bossier Parish, the Supreme 
Court ruled that section 5 “does not prohibit 
preclearance of a redistricting plan enacted 
with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive 
purpose,” but Congress overturned that 
decision and amended section 5 to prohibit 
any change in voting practice or procedure 
with a racially discriminatory purpose. 
In Bossier Parish, the plaintiffs argued that 
the Bossier Parish School Board had a 
racially discriminatory purpose when it 
refused to create any majority-
black districts, even though 
the black population of that jurisdiction was 
approximately 20 percent of the total 
population. The Supreme Court ruled that it 
was irrelevant whether the Board acted with 
a racially discriminatory purpose so long as 
its redistricting plan was not enacted with a 
retrogressive purpose. The Court explained 
that “§ 5 prevents nothing but backsliding, 
and preclearance under § 5 affirms nothing 
but backsliding.” Congress rejected this 
interpretation by adding the following 
language to section 5: “[t]he term ‘purpose’ 
... shall include any discriminatory purpose.” 
In Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court 
ruled that section 5 allows states to consider 
“the totality of the circumstances,” including 
“the extent of the minority group's 
opportunity to participate in the political 
process [and] the feasibility of creating a 
nonretrogressive plan,” drawing district 
lines, but Congress overturned that holding 
and limited consideration to the minority 
voters' ability to elect their preferred 
candidate. In Georgia, the Court stated that 
“a court should not focus solely on the 
comparative ability of a minority group to 
elect a candidate of choice ... [because this 
factor] cannot be dispositive or 
exclusive.” The Court also explained that 
section 5 “gives States flexibility to choose,” 
between two options: a covered jurisdiction 
may either create “safe” majority-
black districts “in which it is highly likely 
that minority voters will be able to elect the 
candidate of their choice,” or spread out 
minority voters over a greater number of 
districts where the voters “may have the 
opportunity to elect a candidate of their 
choice.” The Court stated that the “other 
highly relevant factor in a retrogression 
inquiry is the extent to which a new plan 
changes the minority group's opportunity to 
participate in the political process,” 
including whether the new plan creates “ 
‘influence districts'—where minority voters 
may not be able to elect a candidate of 
choice but can play a substantial, if not 
decisive, role in the electoral process.” The 
Court reversed a denial of judicial 
preclearance because the district court had 
“focused too heavily on the ability of the 
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minority group to elect a candidate of its 
choice in the majority-minority 
districts.” The Court then remanded for the 
district court to consider whether a 
districting plan that reduced the percentages 
of black voters in several majority-
black districts and increased the number of 
influence districts was 
retrogressive. Congress rejected the 
interpretation in Georgia and “sought to 
make clear that it was not enough that a 
redistricting plan gave minority voters 
‘influence’; a plan cannot diminish their 
ability to elect candidates.” “In making its 
Amendments, Congress sought to restore the 
‘ability to elect’ standard promulgated by 
the Supreme Court in Beer [v. United 
States].”   
To overturn Bossier 
Parish and Georgia, Congress added 
subsections (b) through (d) to section 5 to 
prohibit “[a]ny” voting change that “has the 
purpose of or will have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of any” voter “on 
account of race or color ... to elect their 
preferred candidates of choice” and stated 
that the purpose of that new language was 
“to protect the ability of such [voters] to 
elect their preferred candidates of choice.” 
“The 2006 Amendments clarified that 
Congress intended a Section 5 inquiry to 
focus on whether a proposed voting change 
will diminish the ‘ability of minority 
citizens to elect preferred candidates of 
choice.’ ” The relevant question now is 
“whether the candidate minorities voted for 
in the general election under the benchmark 
plan is equally likely to win under the new 
plan. If not, then minorities' ability to elect 
their preferred candidate is diminished.” 
To comply with this “more stringent” 
version of section 5, 
the Alabama Legislature correctly concluded 
that it could not reduce the number of 
majority-black districts and that it could not 
significantly reduce the percentages of black 
voters in the majority-black districts because 
to do so would be to diminish black voters' 
ability to elect their preferred candidates. 
Congress eliminated the option that a state 
could choose, under Georgia, to create 
“opportunity” or “influence” districts instead 
of “safe” districts that guarantee the ability 
of minorities to elect their preferred 
candidates. The 2006 amendments created 
one consideration for a state: whether 
minority voters are less able to elect their 
preferred candidate under the new plan, not 
whether they have the opportunity to 
elect their preferred candidate. Congress 
limited the redistricting options of states so 
that any diminishment in a minority's ability 
to elect its preferred candidates violates 
section 5. Contrary to the plaintiffs' 
arguments, the Legislature could not 
spread black voters out to other districts and 
substantially reduce the percentages 
of black voters within the majority-
black districts because that change, by 
definition, would diminish black voters' 
ability to elect their preferred candidates. To 
comply with section 5, 
the Alabama Legislature chose the only 
option available: to protect the voting 
strength of black voters by safeguarding the 
majority-black districts and not substantially 
reducing the percentages of black voters 
within those districts. The purpose of section 
5 has always been to insure that minorities 
did not lose the political gains they have 
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acquired, and “plans that preserve or 
actually increase minority voting strength 
[are not retrogressive].” 
The Legislature sought to avoid 
diminishing black voters' ability to elect 
their preferred candidates. The Legislature 
preserved, where feasible, the existing 
majority-black districts and maintained the 
relative percentages of black voters in those 
majority-black districts. The Acts maintain 8 
majority-black districts in the Senate and 
increase the number of majority-
black districts in the House from 27 to 28 
based on total population. The population 
levels in the existing majority-black districts 
had proven sufficient to provide 
the black voters in those districts the 
opportunity to elect the candidates of their 
choice. All of the current 27 majority-
black House districts are represented by 
Democrats, and 26 of those 27 districts are 
represented by black Democrats. All of the 
majority-black Senate districts are 
represented by Democrats, and 7 of those 8 
districts are represented by black Democrats. 
Using the 2010 Census data, the percentages 
of the black voting-age populations in the 
majority-black districts under the Acts 
remain relatively constant when compared 
to the 2001 plans. The percentages of 
the black voting-age populations in 21 of the 
28 majority-black House districts vary less 
than plus or minus 5 percent. And 16 of the 
28 majority-black House districts vary less 
than plus or minus 2 percent. The largest 
deviation occurs in House District 59 where 
the black voting-age population increased 
from 64.25 percent to 74.28 percent. But the 
Legislature fairly balanced the overall 
percentages of the black voting-age 
populations in the majority-black House 
districts, with 13 districts decreasing and 15 
districts increasing. The deviations in 
percentages of the black voting-age 
populations in the majority-black Senate 
districts are perfectly divided: 4 decreased 
and 4 increased. And 4 of the 8 majority-
black Senate districts vary less than plus or 
minus 2 percent. The largest deviation 
occurs in Senate District 20 where the black 
voting-age population decreased from 74.44 
percent to 59.03 percent. 
We conclude that the Acts are narrowly 
tailored to comply with section 5 as 
amended in 2006. The Legislature correctly 
concluded that the more stringent version of 
section 5 that Congress enacted in 2006 
required the Legislature to maintain, where 
feasible, the existing number of majority-
black districts and not substantially reduce 
the relative percentages of black voters in 
those districts. And our conclusion is 
consistent with the decision of the 
Department of Justice to preclear the Acts. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Redistricting has been called a “political 
thicket,” where judicial decrees can “cut 
deeply into the fabric of our federalism,” but 
our review of a redistricting plan, once 
adopted, is limited. We do not consider 
whether a redistricting plan is “bad,” as 
Reed described the redistricting Acts 
adopted by the Legislature last year. Nor do 
we consider whether a plan is good or one 
that we would have drawn. We consider 
only whether a plan violates the Voting 
Rights Act and the Constitution. These plans 
violate neither. We DISMISS the claims of 
racial gerrymandering filed by the 
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Democratic Conference plaintiffs for lack of 
standing; in the alternative, 
we GRANT judgment in favor of the State 
Defendants on the claims of racial 
gerrymandering filed by the Democratic 
Conference plaintiffs. We DISMISS as not 
justiciable the claim of vote dilution based 
on the local House delegation in Jefferson 
County; in the alternative, 
we GRANT judgment in favor of the State 
Defendants on the claim of vote dilution 
based on the local House delegation in 
Jefferson County. We GRANT judgment in 
favor of the State defendants on all 
remaining claims. A separate final judgment 
will follow. 
THOMPSON, District Judge, dissenting. 
In these two cases, 
the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus, 
various elected black officials, and others 
challenge the redistricting plans for 
the Alabama House and Senate. 
Specifically, they challenge each majority-
black House and Senate District in addition 
to Senate Districts 7, 11 and 22. Despite the 
multiplicity of claims and responses in this 
litigation, in my view the two cases are 
actually quite simple. As explained below, 
the drafters of these plans labored under the 
false belief that § 5 of the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”) required them to adopt for each 
majority-black district a particular 
percentage of black population, ranging as 
high as 78.1% black. Therefore, the drafters 
sifted residents by race across the State 
of Alabama in order to achieve for each such 
district, where possible, what I believe can 
only be characterized as naked “racial 
quotas.”  
I must reject Alabama's redistricting plans 
for essentially five reasons. First, Alabama's 
use of such a quota for any district warrants 
strict scrutiny. Second, the State's argument 
that its solution was required by § 5 is not 
supported by the correct interpretation of 
that statute. Third, in any event, 
because Alabama is no longer subject to 
preclearance under § 5, that statute cannot 
serve as the basis for the quotas. Fourth, the 
quota for each district in which it was used 
is not grounded in current political, social, 
and racial conditions in that district that 
would warrant its use. Fifth, the State's 
redistricting plans “threaten[ ] to carry us 
further from the goal of a political system in 
which race no longer matters—a goal that 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
embody, and to which the Nation continues 
to aspire.”  “As a Nation we share both the 
obligation and the aspiration of working 
toward this end.” I respectfully dissent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
I agree with the majority that the complaints 
in this matter are best construed as bringing 
three sets of claims: claims of vote dilution 
in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act; 
claims that the plans were drafted with 
invidious racial discrimination in violation 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments; and claims that the plans 
constitute a racial gerrymander in violation 
of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. As to the last, I 
would read both complaints as alleging that 
the plans in their entirety constitute racial 
gerrymanders and, as stated, also 
specifically challenging each majority-
black House and Senate District in addition 
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to Senate Districts 7, 11 and 22. Because I 
believe the plaintiffs are entitled to relief on 
their racial-gerrymandering claims and 
because that relief would require the drafting 
of new plans, I do not reach the other 
claims. 
The majority opinion thoroughly recites the 
testimony and evidence presented in these 
consolidated cases. I will therefore 
summarize only the facts relevant to the 
racial-gerrymandering claims on which I 
would strike down these plans. 
The Reapportionment Committee adopted 
guidelines to govern the reapportionment 
process, setting forth a number of factors to 
consider in drafting the new maps. One key 
factor was compliance with § 5 of the VRA. 
Other factors included a newly adopted rule 
limiting the total population deviation 
among districts to 2%, preserving of the core 
of existing districts, avoiding conflicts 
between incumbents, ensuring compactness, 
and accommodating incumbent preferences. 
Under § 5, a covered jurisdiction must seek 
preclearance of new redistricting plans from 
either the Attorney General of the United 
States or the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. Alabama was a 
covered jurisdiction until the Supreme 
Court's decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder, decided after this case was filed but 
before trial. 
Each of the drafters shared the same very 
specific (but incorrect) understanding of 
what compliance with § 5 involved: they 
believed they would need (1) to maintain the 
same number of majority-black districts as 
had existed under the 2001 redistricting 
scheme; and (2), more importantly for this 
case, to maintain, to the extent possible in 
each such district, the same percentage 
of black residents as that district was 
determined to have had when the 2010 
census data were applied to the 2001 district 
lines. The drafters acknowledged that this 
might not always be possible; but they 
believed § 5 required them to match the 
previous percentage of black population 
insofar as it was possible to do so. 
This understanding meant that for each 
majority-black district, the drafters adopted 
a district-specific racial quota. For example, 
if the 2010 census data indicated that a 
particular district as drawn in 2001 was 
75% black in 2010, then the drafters 
believed that § 5 required them to draw that 
district's new boundaries such that it 
remained 75% black. 
These quotas, supposedly required by § 5, 
posed a challenge for the drafters. Many of 
the majority-black districts as drawn in 2001 
were ‘under-populated’ once the 2010 
census data were applied. ‘Under-
population’ refers to a district which has 
fewer residents than is required by the 
constitutional principle of one-person-one-
vote. This meant that if no changes were 
made to their boundaries those districts 
would have less population than the 
Constitution required. 
In order to address the under-population of 
the majority-black districts, the drafters 
needed to add people, often many thousands 
of people. The drafters' quotas for those 
districts meant, in turn, that the large 
majority of those newcomers would need to 
be black. To illustrate, if 10,000 people 
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needed to be added to the 75% black district 
discussed above in order to address its 
under-population, then per the drafters' 
understanding of retrogression under § 5 
they would need to add at least 7,500 black 
people to maintain the same percentage 
of black residents overall. 
This problem was exacerbated by the rule 
the committee adopted mandating that the 
population of the least and most populated 
districts differ by no more than 2% of the 
ideal population.
 The “ideal population” 
refers to the population each district would 
have if the State's total population were 
evenly divided among them. Prior to the 
current round of redistricting, 
the Alabama legislature had consistently 
used a 10% total deviation rule in drafting 
its state legislative redistricting plans. 
Because of the new 2% rule, under-
populated districts needed to add even more 
population than they would have needed 
with a more traditional 10% deviation rule; 
often, the 2% rule required thousands of 
additional residents.
 
And adding those 
thousands of additional residents meant, in 
turn, that the drafters would need to find 
many more black people to satisfy their 
quotas. 
Indeed, the challenge the drafters created for 
themselves was enormous, as the sheer 
numbers show. The drafters' (incorrect) 
understanding of the requirements of § 5, in 
combination with their adoption of the 2% 
rule, meant that they needed to find over 
120,000 additional black people to add to 
the majority-black House Districts. This 
amounted to 19.7% of the black people in 
the State of Alabama who did not already 
live in a majority-black House District. The 
story is similar in the Senate. There, the 
drafters would need over 106,000 
additional black people to satisfy their twin 
goals for the majority-black districts. This is 
15.8% of the black population 
of Alabama not already living in a majority-
black Senate District. 
But even those percentages understate the 
challenge the drafters faced. Many of the 
black people not already living in majority-
black districts were likely dispersed around 
the State; but the drafters sought to find 
those additional 120,000 black people in 
areas contiguous to the existing majority-
black House Districts. If a given majority-
black district were surrounded by 
overwhelmingly black areas that were not 
already part of one of the majority-
black districts, then this task might prove 
relatively easy. For example, if a majority-
black district needed 10,000 additional 
residents, and 75% of those residents needed 
to be black to comply with the drafters' 
quota, then adding a nearby neighborhood 
containing 10,000 people of whom 75% 
were black would fit the bill. But if the 
available areas near a majority-black district 
were racially diverse, or even predominantly 
white, then a more artful approach would be 
required to add the requisite population 
without lowering the percentage 
of black residents. Thus, for example, if the 
75% black district were surrounded by areas 
in which only 50% of the population was 
black, then the drafters would need to find 
some method of sorting the black people 
from the white in order to add population 
that was 75% black. They would not be able 
to add population en masse, but would need 
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to finely craft lines in order to include 
enough black residents and exclude enough 
white ones. 
With this view of the challenges he faced, 
Hinaman set to work drafting these plans. 
Underscoring the focus on compliance with 
the drafters' understanding of § 5, he began 
his work by drawing the majority-
black districts. The maps Hinaman drew 
contain 27 majority-black House Districts 
(“HD”) and eight majority-black Senate 
Districts (“SD”); this is the same number as 
existed under the 2001 plan. 
However, the districts are not all drawn in 
the same place. Faced with under-population 
in the majority-black districts, Hinaman 
concluded that he could not draw the same 
number of majority-black districts in 
Jefferson County without lowering the 
percentages of black population in those 
districts. That outcome was unacceptable; 
Hinaman, like the other drafters, believed 
that § 5 required him to meet the quota of 
the previous percentage of black population. 
Hinaman never actually tried to draw nine 
majority-black districts in Jefferson County, 
and so could not say how much lower 
the black percentages would have been; in 
fact, he believed it would have been possible 
to draw nine such majority-black districts. 
Instead of doing so, he concluded that the 
prospect of lower black percentages in the 
majority-black House Districts left him no 
choice: he had to eliminate one of the 
districts, HD 53, from Jefferson County, 
relocate it elsewhere, and use 
its black population to maintain 
the black percentages in the remaining 
Jefferson County districts. 
Hinaman took similar action in Montgomery 
County. There, he was again confronted 
with under-population in the majority-
black districts. This time, his approach was 
to eliminate HD 73, a plurality-
black district, and use its 
substantial black voter population to 
maintain the level of black population in the 
majority-black districts. As McClendon put 
it, “The minority districts in Montgomery 
were underpopulated” and so “[w]e needed 
to pick up minorities from somewhere.” In 
other words, the previous HD 73, like the 
previous HD 53, was eliminated in order to 
satisfy the drafters' racial quotas for the 
surrounding majority-black districts. 
Eliminating two districts and redrawing 
them in another part of the State created 
conflicts between incumbents. Under the 
new plan, the incumbents of HD 53, 
Demetrius Newton, and HD 73, Joe 
Hubbard, were left living in 
another legislator's district. One of the 
drafters' goals was to avoid such conflicts 
among incumbents. But as the elimination of 
these two districts demonstrates, the drafters' 
priority of meeting the racial quotas for 
majority-black districts trumped the goal of 
incumbent protection. As Hinaman testified 
when he was asked about separating 
incumbents: “Well, it was a goal. It was a 
nice goal. Didn't always work out.” 
Hinaman took such dramatic steps to 
achieve the racial quotas, which he believed 
§ 5 required, throughout the State. One 
glaring example is SD 26. That district, 
represented by Senator Quinton Ross, was 
under-populated by nearly 16,000 people 
from the ideal population. With the 2010 
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census data, his district was already 
72.75% black. At trial, Ross noted that if 
only white people had been added to 
repopulate his district, it still would have 
been about 64% black; Ross testified he 
would have been comfortable with an even 
lower percentage of black residents. Instead, 
the Senate plan added 15,785 people to his 
district, of whom only 36 were white; 
14,806 were black. That is, just .2% of the 
net population addition to SD 26 was white; 
as the Alabama Democratic Conference 
plaintiffs note, “This compares unfavorably 
to the 1.00 percent of the black voters who 
were left in the City of Tuskegee after the 
racial gerrymander in Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot.” Ross testified that, given the 
demographics of the area, to locate so 
many black people and so few white people 
near his district, “You have to make sure 
you look hard to find them.” 
Hinaman indeed went out of his way to 
locate so many black people in the vicinity 
of SD 26 and to exclude white people from 
the district. Ross testified that the population 
in the current SD 26 is highly segregated 
and that the boundaries in the new plan track 
those racial lines. Ross stated that, despite 
the under-population of his district, the new 
plan actually split precincts that were 
already part of SD 26, moving white 
portions of those precincts out of his district 
while retaining only the black portions; in 
other words, despite needing a huge number 
of new residents, Hinaman removed white 
residents already living in SD 26. This 
followed the pattern of the precinct splits 
between Ross' district and white-majority 
SD 25, which gave the black-majority 
portions of precincts to SD 26 and the white-
majority portions to SD 25. The new SD 26 
wraps around and excludes a portion of 
Montgomery which Ross testified is 
predominantly white, and the resulting 
district is not compact. By taking these 
various steps to remove white residents and 
add black ones, the drafters achieved and 
even exceeded their quota of 
72.75% black for this district; in the new 
plan, SD 26 is over 75% black. 
Hinaman followed a similar pattern of 
‘looking hard’ for black people throughout 
the State in order to achieve the quotas. 
Precinct splits like those Ross described 
were a major characteristic of these plans. 
One of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses, 
William Cooper, testified that there was 
“massive precinct splitting” statewide. 
Indeed, about 25% of all precincts were 
split, and dozens of precincts were split 
among two, three, or four different districts. 
Furthermore, Hinaman split those precincts 
largely along racial lines. Indeed, Hinaman 
acknowledged that he used precinct splits in 
hunting for black residents. He agreed that, 
to avoid retrogression, he would first “reach 
out to find black precincts.” But, he testified, 
when adding whole precincts lowered the 
percentage of black residents in the new 
district, he would split precincts to achieve 
the racial quotas. 
In fact, the evidence establishes that 
Hinaman principally relied on the race of 
individuals living in split precincts in 
deciding how to distribute them among 
districts. As I will explain, this is clear 
because in deciding how to split precincts, 
Hinaman had access to the racial makeup of 
mapping units smaller than precincts; but he 
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had no accurate data about the political 
makeup of those sub-precinct units. Thus, 
the fact that Hinaman's precinct splits track 
race cannot be explained by race correlating 
with party affiliation, for example. For in 
choosing which residents of split precincts 
would be in majority-black districts and 
which would not, Hinaman knew those 
residents' race but not their political 
affiliation or voting history. 
… 
At the precinct level, there are “political” 
data: for example, what candidates won and 
lost in that precinct in past elections, and by 
how many votes. This can show the partisan 
breakdown of the population of a precinct. 
But because of the secret ballot, no political 
data are available at the block level. Cooper, 
who has 25 years of experience drawing 
redistricting maps, explained that there were 
no accurate political data at that level 
because “you don't really know where ... 
individuals who turned out to vote for X or 
Y candidate actually live” within a precinct. 
By contrast, because demographic data are 
collected by the Census Bureau on a house-
by-house basis and aggregated at the census 
block level, accurate racial data are available 
for particular census blocks. Another of 
plaintiffs' experts, Theodore Arrington, 
noted that the census file from which 
Hinaman was working was “rich in racial 
data.” Hinaman acknowledged that “when I 
was working on the [m]ajority black districts 
I had the racial data.” 
When Hinaman split precincts, as he did in 
SD 26, he relied on those racial data. He 
could not have done so based on political 
data, because none were available at the 
census block level. The only reasonable 
conclusion is that he split precincts based on 
the information that was available: namely, 
demographic data reflecting the race of the 
individuals who lived in each census block. 
And the evidence establishes that the 
reliance on racial data at the census block 
level was common statewide: as Cooper 
observed, because so many precincts were 
split, “[c]learly there was a focus on census 
blocks.” In other words, clearly there was a 
focus on race. 
The drafters' belief that § 5 required a 
particular quota for each majority-
black district also meant that they would 
reject suggestions from legislators when 
suggested changes failed to achieve those 
quotas. For example, Senator Marc Keahey 
(SD 22) testified at trial that he submitted to 
Dial close to ten proposed maps for his 
district, to each of which the incumbents of 
the neighboring black-majority SD 23 and 
SD 24 had agreed. Dial had told Keahey that 
he would consider such proposals with the 
other senators' support as long as they did 
not cause retrogression in majority-
black districts; Keahey understood his 
proposals to meet that requirement. 
However Dial rejected all of Keahey's 
proposals as retrogressive. Eventually, 
Keahey came to understand the source of the 
disagreement. Keahey had sought to match 
the previous percentage of black residents in 
those districts using the 2000 census 
data, because that is what he thought Dial 
required. But Dial's understanding of § 5 
meant that the new districts needed to match 
the percentage of black population in the 
2001 districts with the 2010 census 
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data. That is, in Dial's view Keahey had 
used the wrong quota; because Keahey's 
proposals did not achieve the correct quota, 
the drafters would not even consider them, 
despite the preferences of all the affected 
incumbents. 
Keahey's testimony demonstrates that Dial's 
adherence to particular quotas was strikingly 
rigid. For example, one of the majority-
black districts that borders Keahey's district 
is SD 23, represented by Senator Sanders. 
Using the 2000 census data, as Keahey 
originally did, SD 23 was 62.31% black. But 
using Dial's actual standard, namely the 
2001 districts with 2010 census data, SD 23 
was 64.79% black. Thus if Keahey offered a 
suggested change, to which Senator Sanders 
had agreed, that maintained 
62.31% black population in SD 23 but did 
not achieve 64.79% black population, Dial 
would automatically reject such a change as 
“retrogressive.” Indeed, Dial agreed that he 
rejected Keahey's proposals on just this 
basis. He testified that according to his 
understanding of § 5, a drop of even one 
percentage point would be retrogressive. 
The use of a rigid quota could not be clearer. 
In sum, then, the drafters believed that § 5 
required them to sift through surrounding 
districts for black people in order to achieve 
particular racial quotas for each district. In 
seeking to meet those quotas, they 
eliminated existing districts, created 
conflicts between incumbents, ignored 
legislators' preferences, and split a huge 
volume of precincts. 
The drafters were quite successful in 
achieving their quotas. Of the majority-
black districts, the black percentage of the 
population in 13 House Districts and three 
Senate Districts is within one percentage 
point of the goal of maintaining the same 
percentage of black residents even after 
repopulating the districts, often with 
thousands of new individuals. Seven House 
Districts and three Senate Districts have an 
even higher percentage of black population 
than before. 
In some districts, the rigidity of these quotas 
is on full display.
 
HD 52 needed an 
additional 1,145 black people to meet the 
quota; the drafters added an additional 
1,143. In other words, the drafters 
came within two individuals of achieving the 
exact quota they set for the black population, 
out of a total population of 45,083; those 
two people represent .004% of the district. 
In HD 55, the drafters added 6,994 
additional black residents, just 13 
individuals more than the quota required, 
and in HD 56 they added 2,503 residents, 
just 12 individuals more than the quota 
required, both out of a total population of 
45,071. In the Senate, SD 23 contains 116 
more black individuals than were needed to 
achieve the drafters' quota of adding an 
additional 15,069 black people, out of a total 
population of 135,338; in other words, the 
difference between the quota and the 
additional black population in the ultimate 
plan represents .086% of the district. 
The plans were enacted over the opposition 
of every black legislator in the State, and 
precleared by the Justice Department. Two 
sets of plaintiffs, including the Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus, 
the Alabama Democratic Conference, and a 
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number of individuals, brought these 
lawsuits challenging their legality. 
II. DISCUSSION 
The majority rejects the plaintiffs' racial-
gerrymandering claims on two bases: first, 
that race was not the predominant factor in 
drawing these plans; and, second, that even 
if strict scrutiny applies, the maps were 
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling 
purpose of compliance with § 5 of the VRA. 
I disagree on both points. I will first review 
the standard for a racial-gerrymandering 
claim, and will then address the majority's 
conclusions in turn. 
A. Legal Standard 
The Fourteenth Amendment's equal 
protection clause provides that, “No State 
shall ... deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” The central purpose of the clause “is 
to prevent the States from purposefully 
discriminating between individuals on the 
basis of race.” “ ‘[A]t the heart of the 
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection 
lies the simple command that the 
Government must treat citizens as 
individuals, not as simply components of a 
racial, religious, sexual or national class.’ ” 
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court 
recognized a claim under the equal 
protection clause that was “analytically 
distinct” from somewhat similar vote-
dilution claims. Where a purposeful-dilution 
claim alleges that a redistricting plan was 
enacted with the purpose of “minimiz[ing] 
or cancel[ing] out the voting potential of 
racial or ethnic minorities,” “the essence of 
the equal protection claim recognized 
in Shaw is that the State has used race as a 
basis for separating voters into districts.” If 
race is so used, then the redistricting plan is 
subject to strict scrutiny. 
Redistricting legislation generally does not 
explicitly refer to race; rather, it “classifies 
tracts of land, precincts, or census blocks, 
and is race neutral on its face.” In addition, 
the Supreme Court has consistently 
recognized that redistricting is a complex 
process, and that legislatures will nearly 
always be “aware” of racial demographics. 
Such awareness of race is never enough to 
trigger strict scrutiny. 
Instead, the Court has required that 
a Shaw plaintiff show “that race was the 
predominant factor motivating the 
legislature's decision to place a significant 
number of voters within or without a 
particular district.” More specifically, a 
plaintiff must establish that “the legislature 
subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles, including but not 
limited to compactness, contiguity, and 
respect for political subdivisions or 
communities defined by actual shared 
interests, to racial considerations.”  
The plaintiff in such a case may carry this 
burden in a number of ways. In some 
instances, circumstantial evidence, including 
the shape of the district and the demographic 
splits created by its borders, is sufficient to 
establish that the boundaries are 
“unexplainable on grounds other than race.” 
In other cases, there is direct evidence that 
race was the predominant factor in the 
legislature's decision-making. But, in any 
event, the rule is clear: if race was the 
predominant factor, strict scrutiny applies. 
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To survive strict scrutiny, a racial 
classification must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling state interest. While 
such scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact,” the State is required to 
establish the “most exact connection 
between justification and classification.” 
B. Race Predominated 
Race was the predominant factor in the 
drafters' decisions to draw the majority-
black districts as they did. This is clear from 
an examination of the racial quotas they 
adopted, even standing alone. Such quotas, 
under the circumstances of this case and 
without any justification other than race, 
require the court to strike down this plan 
unless the State can satisfy strict scrutiny. 
Furthermore, although no additional 
evidence is necessary in this case, there is 
ample circumstantial evidence that various 
other districting factors were subordinated to 
race in the drafting of those majority-black 
districts. The majority's arguments to the 
contrary are unpersuasive; strict scrutiny 
must apply. 
i. 
From start to finish, Hinaman, Dial and 
McClendon were focused on drafting 
majority-black districts that would be 
precleared under § 5 of the VRA. 
They believed that § 5's non-retrogression 
principle required them to maintain (as 
nearly as possible) the same percentage 
of black residents in any given majority-
black district as that district had when the 
2010 census data was applied to the 2001 
district boundaries.  
The direct evidence of the drafters' goals and 
intentions comes straight from their lips. 
Dial, for example, had the following 
exchange at his deposition: 
“Q. So you did not want the total 
population of African–Americans to 
drop in [SD 23]? 
“A. That's correct. 
“Q. Okay. And if that population 
dropped a percentage, in your opinion 
that would have been retrogression? 
“A. Yes, sir. 
“Q. So if—And I'm not saying these are 
the numbers, but I'm just saying if 
Senator Sanders' district had been 65 
percent African–American, if it dropped 
to 62 percent African–American in total 
population, then that would have been 
retrogression to you? 
“A. In my opinion, yes. 
“Q. And so that's what you were trying 
to prevent? 
“A. Yes.” 
By their own candid admissions, the drafters 
acknowledged that they understood § 5 to 
mean that for each majority-black district 
they needed to achieve a set percentage 
of black population, defined by the 
percentage in that district as drawn in 2001 
with the 2010 census data. 
This kind of requirement has a name: racial 
quota. “Quotas impose a fixed number or 
percentage which must be attained.” The 
Supreme Court's equal protection cases have 
time and again treated this type of “rigid 
racial quota” with the highest skepticism. 
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The drafters did not deny adopting such 
percentages or quotas. To the contrary, when 
confronted with the suggestion that partisan 
politics, rather than race, actually motivated 
the how the majority-black districts were 
drawn, the drafters vehemently denied it. 
When asked about the use of partisan data at 
his deposition, Dial explained: 
“... what I did was begin with the 
minority districts to ensure they were 
not regressed, and each one of them had 
to grow. And as we did those, then I 
filled in the blanks around those with 
what was left of the districts. So I didn't 
look at partisan to say how many 
Republicans are here or how many 
Democrats are here. I began my process 
by filling in the minority districts, not to 
do away with any of those and not to 
regress any of those. And as they grew, 
we made sure that they grew in the 
same proportion [of black residents] 
that they had or as close to it as 
possible. And what was left, we just—it 
was basically fill in the blanks with 
what was left.” 
When asked at trial, “Weren't you aware 
when you were drawing the [S]enate 
[D]istricts that the Republicans' goal in this 
state was to maintain your super majorities 
in the Legislature?,” Dial denied that was his 
goal: 
“... I established my goal as maintaining 
the minority districts and passing a plan 
that would meet Justice Department. 
That was my ultimate goal, and that's 
what I worked for ... The numbers 
themselves were actually to insure that 
we did not regress the minority districts, 
and we filled in what was left.” 
In this case, time and again the drafters have 
emphasized that in drawing the majority-
black districts they were motivated by a 
desire to obtain preclearance. And time and 
again they have articulated their 
understanding that § 5 meant they needed to 
achieve racial quotas. 
ii. 
These percentages or quotas in the 
State's legislative plans must fall of their 
own weight unless they can survive strict 
scrutiny. Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court's 
first effort to apply the Miller predominant-
factor standard to a legislative plan in which 
many of the districts were being challenged, 
is particularly instructive. At first blush, it 
might appear that Vera is of little 
precedential value because the decision is so 
fractured, with a plurality opinion, three 
concurrences, and two dissents. However, 
the array of opinions is helpful for two 
reasons: First, they offer a nuanced view of 
how the Justices think the 
Miller predominant-factor standard should 
be applied. Second, and perhaps most 
importantly here, under all of the opinions, 
the quotas in Alabama's legislative 
redistricting plans would fail unless they can 
survive strict scrutiny. Or, to put it another 
way, no matter how one defines 
the Miller predominant-factor standard, the 
quotas warrant strict scrutiny. 
First, there is the Vera plurality opinion. The 
opinion first acknowledged that it was 
confronted with an array of factors that went 
into a legislative redistricting plan. The 
opinion therefore explained that, “Because it 
is clear that race was not the only factor that 
motivated the legislature to draw irregular 
district lines, we must scrutinize each 
challenged district to determine whether the 
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District Court's conclusion that race 
predominated over legitimate districting 
considerations, including incumbency, can 
be sustained.” Similarly here, because it is 
contended that race was not the only factor 
that motivated the Alabama Legislature to 
draw the challenged district lines the way it 
did, we must scrutinize each challenged 
district individually to determine whether 
race predominated over legitimate districting 
considerations. 
For each district, the critical question is 
whether race was “the predominant factor 
motivating the legislature's [redistricting] 
decision” for that district. In this case, we 
are confronted with districts in which (1) the 
drafters announced a racial percentage or 
quota; (2) the drafters achieved that quota; 
and (3) there is no explanation for those 
actions other than race. For example, it is 
clear that one factor and one factor alone 
explains the fact that SD 26 is over 
75% black: race. Nothing else explains that 
percentage. And the same is true for SD 24. 
One factor and one factor alone explains the 
fact that SD 24, with a quota of 
62.8% black, is 63.3% black: race. And the 
same is true for SD 23. One factor and one 
factor alone explains the fact that SD 23, 
with a quota of 64.79% black, is 64.81% 
black: race. 
Also, the same is true for majority-
black House Districts. One factor and one 
factor alone explains the fact that HD 55, 
with a quota of 73.54% black, is 
73.6% black: race. One factor and one factor 
alone explains the fact that HD 67, with a 
quota of 69.14% black, is 69.2% black: race. 
One factor and one factor alone explains the 
fact that HD 57, with a quota of 
68.49% black, is 68.5% black: race. 
The State has not offered, and on this record 
cannot offer, any alternative explanation that 
would explain away the State's apparent use 
of race. In Vera, the State had argued that 
incumbency protection, rather than race, had 
motivated what appeared to be racial 
gerrymandering. Because the State had 
pointed to a race-neutral factor that might 
correlate to race, the plurality found it 
necessary to examine each district closely to 
determine whether that race-neutral factor 
explained the apparently racial lines the 
State had drawn better than race did. But 
here the State has offered no race-neutral 
explanation for the black percentages in the 
majority-black districts; no race-neutral 
explanation for why SD 26, for example, is 
75% black. In fact, Dial explicitly rejected 
the idea that partisan politics, rather than the 
racial quotas, motivated the drawing of the 
majority-black districts. In the absence of 
such an explanation, the plurality 
in Vera would have no difficulty striking 
down districts like those presented in this 
case, namely districts drawn to achieve 
racial quotas. 
Second, there is Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion. While she wrote 
separately to explain why “compliance with 
the results test of § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act (VRA) is a compelling state interest” 
and why “that test can coexist in principle 
and in practice with Shaw,” she accepted the 
plurality opinion's understanding of 
the Miller predominant-factor standard; this, 
of course, is unremarkable, since she wrote 
the plurality opinion as well. Therefore, for 
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the same reason that Alabama's quotas 
warrant strict scrutiny under the plurality 
opinion, they warrant the same under Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence. 
Third is Justice Kennedy's concurrence. 
While he joined the plurality opinion, he 
expressly and unequivocally stated in his 
discussion of the Miller predominant-factor 
standard that, “In my view, we would no 
doubt apply strict scrutiny if a State decreed 
that certain districts had to be at least 50 
percent white, and our analysis should be no 
different if the State so favors minority 
races.” Similarly, because Alabama has 
decreed that SD 26 must be 72% black, no 
matter what the other demographics are, and 
because it drew SD 26 so as to make it 75% 
black, it would be difficult, if not impossible 
to explain to Justice Kennedy why SD 26 
would not be subject to strict scrutiny. And 
the same would apply to SD 23's 64% quota, 
SD 24's 62% quota, and so forth. And the 
same would apply to HD 55's 73% quota, 
HD 57's 68% quota, and so forth. 
Fourth, there is Justice Thomas's 
concurrence, in which Justice Scalia joined. 
Justice Thomas stated that “Georgia's 
concession that it intentionally created 
majority-minority districts was sufficient to 
show that race was a 
predominant, motivating factor in its 
redistricting.” He further stated that, “Strict 
scrutiny applies to all governmental 
classifications based on race, and we have 
expressly held that there is no exception for 
race-based redistricting.” One does not need 
to think long to know what Justice Thomas's 
views on Alabama's quotas would be. 
Fifth and finally, four Justices 
in Vera dissented and concluded that the 
challenged legislative plan did not warrant 
strict scrutiny. Though the majority in this 
case reaches a similar result about 
the Alabama plan, I do not think the 
majority can take solace from the reasoning 
of the Vera dissenters. Justice Stevens wrote 
a dissent in which Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer joined; Justice Souter wrote a 
separate dissent, but stated that he agreed 
with Justice Stevens's application of 
the Miller predominant-factor standard. For 
this reason, I will discuss only Justice 
Stevens' opinion. Justice Stevens stated that 
“the typically fatal skepticism that we have 
used to strike down the most pernicious 
forms of state behavior” need not apply only 
if three conditions are met: “the state action 
(i) has neither the intent nor effect of 
harming any particular group, (ii) is not 
designed to give effect to irrational 
prejudices held by its citizens but to break 
them down, and (iii) uses race as a 
classification because race is relevant to the 
benign goal of the classification.” There is 
absolutely nothing in the record to support 
the conclusion that these conditions are 
present as to Alabama's redistricting plans. 
Indeed, it appears that the only racial 
dynamic at play in Alabama's plans is that 
white members of the Alabama legislature, 
and the white ones alone, have expressly and 
specifically targeted black legislators and 
the members of their districts for difference 
in treatment solely because of the race of 
those legislators and over 
those black legislators' deep and vocal 
objections. 
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This aspect of this case, in particular, bears a 
disturbing similarity to Gomillion, where the 
Supreme Court condemned the redrawing of 
Tuskegee, Alabama's municipal boundaries 
by white members of 
the Alabama Legislature so as to exclude 
almost all the black citizens of that 
community. Admittedly, there are some 
fundamental differences between this case 
and Gomillion: This case is based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and Gomillion was 
based principally on the Fifteenth 
Amendment, although it has also been read 
as a Fourteenth Amendment case; this case 
involves a Shaw claim, whereas 
Gomillion involved an invidious 
discrimination claim, although 
again Shaw itself drew on Gomillion; and, in 
this case, blacks are being brought into or 
kept in a district solely because of their race, 
and, in Gomillion, blacks were being 
excluded from a district solely because of 
their race. Nevertheless, in both cases, white 
members of the Alabama legislature, and the 
white ones alone, expressly and specifically 
targeted black people and treated them 
differently in the drawing of district lines 
solely because of the race. And despite the 
fact these black people object to, and are 
even offended by, this racial targeting and 
treatment, they are powerless to do anything 
about it politically. Or, to put it another way, 
a white majority has unwelcomely imposed 
its will on how a black minority is to be 
treated politically. 
The injustice of this was poignantly brought 
home in the testimony of Senator Vivian 
Figures, an African–American, at the trial of 
this case. Senator Figures acknowledged at 
trial that the Republican Party had won a 
supermajority in the 2010 elections “fair and 
square.” She therefore “expected to be 
outvoted” as a Democrat. But what she did 
not expect was for her “voice to be 
squashed.” This voicelessness, this complete 
powerlessness to do anything about the fact 
that white members of the 
Alabama legislature expressly and 
specifically targeted her and treated her 
differently in the drawing of her district 
lines solely because she is black, belies the 
idea that these plans could be considered 
“benign” under Justice Stevens's analysis. In 
this sense, Senator Figures's plight today is 
no different from that of Dr. Gomillion. Like 
Dr. Gomillion, she has no means to be heard 
and no avenue for relief—except through 
this court. In light of these considerations, it 
is clear that, under Justice Stevens' opinion 
in Vera, Alabama's plans are not saved from 
the court's “typically fatal skepticism.”  
Thus, under any of the analyses articulated 
in Vera, the racial quotas here, supposedly 
required by § 5, were the predominant factor 
motivating how the majority-black districts 
were drawn. Under any of those analyses, 
this plan is subject to strict scrutiny. For the 
plurality, strict scrutiny is required because 
the drafters adopted racial quotas, achieved 
those quotas, and there was no other factor 
to explain why they added so many black 
people to the majority-black districts. For 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the 
adoption of a racial quota is enough standing 
alone. And for Justice Stevens and the other 
dissenters, the factors which would allow for 
an exception to the rule of strict scrutiny for 
racial classifications are simply not present 
in this case. Under the analyses announced 
in each of the opinions in Vera, the use of 
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quotas in this case cannot stand unless they 
survive strict scrutiny. 
iii. 
This conclusion that the strictest scrutiny 
should apply in this case because of the use 
of racial quotas is reinforced by an 
examination of United Jewish Organizations 
of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey 
(“UJO ”).UJO was a predecessor to 
the Shaw line of cases. In UJO, a “highly 
fractured” majority upheld New York's 
reapportionment plan against a 
constitutional challenge. The Court, first 
in Shaw and later in Miller, read the UJO 
majority to have decided the case on a vote-
dilution theory, rather than a racial-
gerrymandering theory. The Court was clear 
in Miller: “To the extent any of the opinions 
in [UJO ] can be interpreted as suggesting 
that a State's assignment of voters on the 
basis of race would be subject to anything 
but our strictest scrutiny, those views ought 
not be deemed controlling.” Thus the 
fractured UJO majority's views are not 
relevant to this case, as the Court has since 
read them as either inapposite or overruled. 
iv. 
The majority states that the drafters' need to 
pursue certain racial percentages for the 
majority-black districts was not a “bright-
line rule” and that it gave way where 
“necessary to achieve other objectives.” 
I am not quite sure what the majority means 
by saying that there was no bright-line rule. 
If the majority means that significance 
should be drawn from the fact that the 
drafters did not succeed in securing the 
sought-after percentage of black residents in 
each and every majority-black district, I 
have no qualm in noting that significance. 
Perhaps, for those districts where the 
drafters fell short, factors other than race can 
explain resulting percentages, and I am 
willing to engage the majority in a 
determination of whether the plaintiffs 
should prevail as to those districts. With this 
dissent, I am not saying that the plaintiffs 
should prevail as to all the districts. What I 
am saying is two things: First, there must be 
an individual assessment for each district as 
whether race was a predominant factor. 
Second, the fact that the drafters failed to 
achieve their sought-after percentage in one 
district does not detract one iota from the 
fact that they did achieve it in another. The 
racial quota, and nothing else, explains why 
SD 26 is 75% black. And the same is true 
for the fact that SD 24 and SD 23 are 63% 
and 64% black, respectively, and that HD 55 
and HD 67 are 73% and 69% black, 
respectively, and so on. If the drafters relied 
on a racial quota in drawing even one 
district, that decision is subject to strict 
scrutiny. 
In any event, what is most striking is the 
extent to which the drafters did succeed in 
matching the black percentage of the 
majority-black districts: 
the black percentage of the population in 13 
House Districts and three Senate Districts is 
within one percentage point of the stated 
goal; in other words, the drafters effectively 
hit their quotas in those districts. Seven 
House Districts and three Senate 
Districts have an even higher percentage 
of black residents than under the old 
plan. Overall, the drafters either effectively 
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achieved or surpassed their quotas in 75% of 
the majority-black districts. 
Moreover, the majority points to no 
evidence that the drafters' quotas ever 
actually did give way to any “other 
objectives.” While the percentage was 
lowered in some districts, the record 
contains essentially no evidence to explain 
why. In fact, the only objective Hinaman 
ever cited to explain lowering 
the black percentage of a majority-
black district was the creation of another 
majority-black district near HD 19, namely 
the displaced HD 53. Maintaining the same 
number of majority-minority districts was 
part of the drafters' understanding of what § 
5 required; thus this explanation cannot 
support the conclusion that factors other 
than race trumped the drafters' quotas. 
Hinaman never testified that he lowered 
the black percentage in any district for any 
other reason. 
In fact, based on this record, the most likely 
explanation for the lower black percentage 
in some districts is that there were simply 
not enough black people nearby to maintain 
the already high black population 
percentages in some districts. It appears in 
some cases even extreme racial 
gerrymandering was not enough to find all 
the black people the drafters sought. But the 
fact that the drafters ultimately could not 
find enough black people to fill their quotas 
certainly does not mean that they did not try; 
and sorting people by race in the process 
of trying to achieve racial quotas is quite 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 
Looking to where the drafters fell short is a 
distraction from the important point, which 
is where they succeeded. In most of the 
districts, the drafters of these plans either 
surpassed their quotas or effectively 
achieved them (to within a percentage 
point). In some cases, the precision with 
which the drafters refilled districts with the 
exact number of black individuals they 
sought is breathtaking. The most extreme 
example is HD 52. There, the quota was an 
additional 1,145 black people; the drafters 
added 1,143. Out of a total population of 
45,083, this represents racial sifting down to 
the finest level, a racial exactitude that 
would be admirable in its skill if it were not 
illegal. 
In any event, if, with the observation that the 
drafters were not using a bright-line rule, the 
majority is suggesting that the drafters were 
pursuing ‘goals,’ or some synonym of that 
term, then “[t]his semantic distinction is 
beside the point.” “Whether this limitation is 
described as a quota or a goal, it is a line 
drawn on the basis of race.” In this case, the 
drafters have described setting a specific 
percentage of black population to achieve in 
each majority-black district. Thus, semantics 
aside, strict scrutiny applies. 
v. 
Even if the racial quotas, standing alone, 
were not enough to require strict scrutiny in 
this case, there is ample circumstantial 
evidence to establish that such scrutiny 
applies. That evidence shows that, time after 
time, the drafters subordinated various other 
districting factors to the goal of achieving 
their racial quotas. 
Filling those quotas posed an enormous 
challenge to the drafters. In order to 
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maintain the black percentage in the 
majority-black districts while repopulating 
the districts up to compliance with the 2% 
rule, the drafters needed to add over 120,000 
additional black people to the majority-
black House Districts. This amounted to 
19.7% of total black population in the State 
not already living in a majority-black House 
District. When one considers that many of 
the black people in Alabama but not already 
living in a majority-black district were likely 
dispersed around the rest of the State, the 
chance of finding those 120,000 in areas 
contiguous to the majority-black districts is 
even smaller. The same is true in the Senate: 
the drafters needed to find over 106,000 
additional black people in order to achieve 
their twin goals. That amounts to some 
15.8% of the black population not already 
living in a majority-black Senate District.  
The challenge of meeting those quotas 
explains why the drafters drew these plans 
in the way they did; indeed, seeking to 
achieve the racial quotas drove everything. 
An examination of the steps the drafters 
took in seeking to maintain the 
previous black population percentages offers 
compelling circumstantial evidence that race 
predominated, further supporting the direct 
evidence already discussed. 
The quotas also led Hinaman to “reach [ ] 
out” to find majority-black precincts to add 
to majority-black districts. And, when 
precincts with enough black people were not 
available at hand, it led him to split 
“massive” numbers of precincts, some 25% 
across the State, largely along racial lines. 
Hinaman's racial methodology in splitting 
precincts shows how far the drafters went to 
reach the target percentages of black people. 
Maptitude, the computer program he 
utilized, contained racial data at the census 
block level, but not political data. This 
means that when he split that “massive” 
number of precincts, he could not have done 
so based on how many Democrats or 
Republicans lived in each census block. 
Rather, it was racial data to which Hinaman 
looked in splitting precincts. And, indeed, 
Hinaman testified that he would split 
precincts in order to avoid what he 
considered retrogression. In addition, 
splitting a precinct by blocks required extra 
work, extra “clicking.” Each split was an 
affirmative choice, and the data on which 
Hinaman relied in making those choices 
were racial. 
The Supreme Court has found this kind of 
evidence of racial methodology particularly 
compelling. In Vera, the plurality described 
a strikingly similar computer system to the 
one used here: 
“REDAPPL permitted redistricters to 
manipulate district lines on computer 
maps, on which racial and other 
socioeconomic data were superimposed. 
At each change in configuration of the 
district lines being drafted, REDAPPL 
displayed updated racial composition 
statistics for the district as drawn. 
REDAPPL contained racial data at the 
block-by-block level, whereas other 
data, such as party registration and past 
voting statistics, were only available at 
the level of voter tabulation districts 
(which approximate election 
precincts).” 
The Vera plurality found that “the direct 
evidence of racial considerations, coupled 
with the fact that the computer program used 
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was significantly more sophisticated with 
respect to race than with respect to other 
demographic data, provides substantial 
evidence that it was race that led to the 
neglect of traditional districting criteria 
here.” In particular, since only racial data 
were available at the sub-precinct level, 
evidence of split precincts along racial lines 
suggested that “racial criteria 
predominated.” The same is true here. As 
in Vera, Hinaman's race-based methodology 
is powerful evidence that race 
predominanted, particularly in combination 
with the direct evidence of racial quotas. 
The majority in this case concludes that “at 
least some of the precinct splits” were 
attributable to the 2% rule. I agree this is 
probably true; Hinaman cited population 
deviation as the other reason to split 
precincts, along with compliance with the 
VRA. But the evidence shows that many if 
not most of the splits were made based on 
racial data. Cooper testified that, “If the only 
concerns were maintaining 27 
majority black districts and achieving a plus 
or minus 1 percent deviation, you wouldn't 
need to split anywhere near that many 
precincts.” And Arrington noted that, as in 
SD 26, the splits were mostly along racial 
lines statewide; if Hinaman were primarily 
splitting precincts to equalize population, 
there is no reason he would need to 
separate black residents from white ones in 
this way. The plaintiffs certainly do not need 
to show that every precinct split was racially 
motivated to establish that the drafters went 
to great lengths to achieve their racial 
quotas. The circumstantial evidence that 
Hinaman relied on the race of voters in 
deciding how to split many precincts, along 
with the other circumstantial evidence and 
the direct evidence of racial quotas, amply 
establishes that race was the predominant 
factor. 
vi. 
The majority finds that race cannot have 
been predominant because there is a factor, 
namely the 2% rule, that was not 
subordinated to race. The majority also 
points out that the drafters considered other 
factors as well. While I readily concede that 
the drafters abided by the 2% rule, and that 
they considered other factors, I must 
respectfully disagree that this allows their 
use of racial quotas to escape strict scrutiny. 
The fact that a Shaw claim is a “mixed 
motive suit” does not mean that no racial 
gerrymander exists. On the contrary, 
in Vera the plurality, after noting, as the 
majority does here, that “The record does 
not reflect a history of purely race-based 
districting revisions,” went on to strike 
down that plan under Shaw. The question 
there, as here, was whether race 
predominated over other factors as to any 
individual districting decision. 
But in considering that question, the 
majority misapprehends the appropriate 
analysis. It appears the majority believes 
that race cannot predominate as long as 
there is some factor which is not 
subordinated to race. But this is wrong. The 
fact that the drafters pursued “multiple 
objectives” does not preclude a finding of 
racial gerrymandering; again, that was the 
case in Vera, and the plan in that case was 
struck down. The existence of some 
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factor which is not subordinated to race 
cannot defeat a Shaw claim. 
For example, contiguity of a district is a 
traditional districting factor; 
the Miller Court cited it as a factor that, if 
subordinated to race, could establish that 
race predominated. Does that mean that 
contiguity must always be subordinated to 
race in order to prevail on a Shaw claim? On 
the majority's view, it would appear so: 
unless a district was non-contiguous, for 
example split into two unconnected sections 
on different sides of the State, then race 
would not predominate. But, of course, that 
is not the law; for example, in Miller the 
Court struck down a district despite the fact 
that every part of it was connected to every 
other part. 
The majority views the question of race 
predominating as a sort of ranking of factors 
as to the overall plan: since the 2% deviation 
rule is above the racial quotas in the drafters' 
hierarchy overall, no amount of sorting 
people by the color of their skin can trigger 
strict scrutiny. In other words, the majority 
believes that once some race-neutral factor 
is established as the highest priority for the 
plan as a whole, that means that 
no Shaw claim can succeed as to any part of 
that plan. But this is not the Supreme Court's 
analysis. 
Instead, the Supreme Court has established 
that the harm of racial gerrymandering is a 
local one: the court must scrutinize each and 
every individual district to see whether race 
was the predominant factor. In Vera, for 
example, the plaintiffs initially challenged 
24 of Texas' 30 congressional districts; the 
district court found Shaw violations in three 
of those districts, and the Supreme Court 
upheld that finding as to those districts. The 
analysis was not what factors were 
predominant as to the plan as a whole, or 
even as to all 24 challenged districts 
considered together, but whether race was 
the predominant factor as to any one district 
individually. 
Furthermore, a plaintiff need not even show 
that race was the predominant factor as to 
an entire district. In Miller, the Court stated 
that the plaintiff's burden in a Shaw case was 
to show “that race was the predominant 
factor motivating the legislature's decision to 
place a significant number of voters within 
or without a particular district.” The 
plaintiffs have made just this showing, 
establishing that racial quotas led the 
drafters to place very significant numbers of 
people in the majority-black districts 
because they were black. 
From this perspective, it is clear the 2% rule 
cannot explain why all these districts were 
drawn as they were. The drafters' quotas for 
SD 26 called for that district to have 72.75% 
black population after reapportionment; the 
district is over 75% black under the new 
plan. How does the 2% rule explain 
why black people ended up on one side of 
the district line and white people ended up 
on the other? How can it explain why just 36 
out of 15,785 new residents of SD 26 were 
white, despite the racially mixed 
demographics of the areas from which those 
people were drawn? The answer is clear: it 
does not. 
In fact, it is clear that one factor and one 
factor alone explains why SD 26 is 
75% black: race. The drafters had a quota 
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for that district, which they believed was 
required under § 5, and they reached and 
exceeded that quota. Nothing else explains 
that percentage. The same is true of SD 23, 
with a quota of 64.79% black and an 
eventual population of 64.81% black. And 
the same is true of HD 55, with a quota of 
73.54% black and an eventual population of 
73.6% black. And the same is true of HD 67, 
with a quota of 69.14% black and an 
eventual population of 69.2% black. The 2% 
deviation rule simply does not explain away 
this clear reliance on, and achievement of, 
racial quotas. 
But the Supreme Court's cases establish that, 
when confronted with compelling evidence 
of this sort that district lines were motivated 
by race, a State seeking to avoid strict 
scrutiny must show that another 
factor explains away the apparent reliance 
on race. That is, the Supreme Court's cases 
establish that a State may seek to show that 
“correlations between racial demographics 
and district lines may be explicable in terms 
of nonracial motivations.” 
In Vera, the alternative the State offered was 
incumbency protection. The State argued 
that the direct and circumstantial evidence 
that race predominated was rebutted because 
another factor, protection of incumbents, 
actually explained the apparently racial 
divisions of voters. The plurality rejected 
that argument on the facts, but 
acknowledged that such a showing would 
undermine the case for strict scrutiny.  
Similarly, in Easley v. Cromartie, the Court 
considered the argument that an apparent 
racial gerrymander was actually better 
explained as a partisan gerrymander. The 
Court reversed the district court and found 
the evidence in that case insufficient to 
establish that the apparently racial district 
boundaries were not in reality motivated by 
another factor. 
But the majority does not contend that the 
2% deviation rather than the drafters' goal 
of achieving racial quotas can explain the 
racialized boundaries of the majority-black 
districts. Nor could it, for there is no 
evidence to support that contention. Thus, 
the majority's observation that the 2% rule 
never gave way to race is beside the point. 
The plaintiffs have come forward with 
compelling direct and circumstantial 
evidence that the drafters of these plans 
relied on a system of racial quotas to 
determine who would be added to the 
majority-black districts and who would not. 
The State's adherence to the 2% rule simply 
does not rebut that evidence. 
Indeed, by and large the 2% rule served to 
increase the impact of the drafters' racial 
quotas. While most of the majority-
black districts were under-populated even 
using a more traditional 10% deviation rule, 
the 2% rule dramatically increased the 
number of additional black residents the 
drafters needed to find in order to achieve 
the quotas. This led to the sorting of 
individuals by race on a vast scale across the 
State in order to achieve racial quotas. Far 
from absolving the State of its liability 
under Shaw, it appears that in this case the 
2% rule further aggravated the constitutional 
harm. 
Thus, there is no legitimate basis for 
rejecting the conclusion that race 
predominated in this case. The State did 
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consider other factors, but the evidence is 
clear: race was the predominant factor in 
drawing the majority-black districts. 
Incumbency protection was a factor; but 
when Hinaman determined that he needed 
additional black residents for the under-
populated districts in Montgomery and 
Jefferson Counties, he abolished HD 53 and 
HD 73, leaving their incumbents in 
another legislator's district. Preserving the 
core of districts was a factor, but again one 
that gave way to race in the cases of HD 53 
and HD 73, which were abolished and 
redrawn elsewhere. Respecting political 
subdivisions was a factor; but, in order to 
sift the black people from the white, 
Hinaman split massive numbers of precincts, 
depositing their black residents in the 
already heavily-black districts and their 
white residents in the adjoining majority-
white districts. Compactness was a factor; 
but when Hinaman made up for SD 26's 
under-population with new residents that 
were overwhelmingly black (and 99.8% 
minority), he did so by creating a bizarre 
district that wraps around the white portions 
of Montgomery. Honoring the wishes of 
incumbents was a factor; but, as with 
Keahey's nearly ten proposed alternative 
maps, those wishes were ignored if they 
came into conflict with the drafters' rigid 
quotas. Preserving communities of interest 
was apparently a factor; but ultimately the 
boundaries of the majority-black districts 
were predominantly drawn in order to 
achieve the racial quotas for each district. 
These plans were a racial gerrymander. 
C. Narrow Tailoring 
Such a finding does not, of course, end the 
analysis. The State may save these plans by 
showing that they are narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling government interest. 
The majority concludes that compliance 
with the VRA is a compelling state interest, 
and I agree. 
The Supreme Court has made clear, though, 
that to qualify as narrowly tailored, the 
district as drawn must be “required by 
a correct reading of § 5.” And the legislature 
must have had a “strong basis in evidence” 
that its action was “needed in order not to 
violate” the VRA. As I will explain, these 
plans must fall because they are not required 
by any correct reading of § 5; because the 
drafters had no strong basis in evidence to 
believe they were required by § 5; and 
because in any event § 5 can no longer 
justify a racial gerrymander after Shelby 
County. 
i. 
The State has made a number of arguments 
about why its racial quotas were narrowly 
tailored to achieve the compelling purpose 
of compliance with § 5. Those arguments 
are all without merit. 
The drafters of the proposed plans have all 
described their understanding of what was 
necessary to obtain preclearance in the same 
terms: they needed to maintain the same 
overall number of majority-minority districts 
and, within those districts, they needed to 
get as close as possible to maintaining 
the black percentage of the population 
calculated with the 2010 census data 
imposed on the 2001 redistricting plan. As I 
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have explained, this amounted to imposing a 
racial quota on each such district. 
All of the drafters expressed concern that 
doing less might expose them to denial of 
preclearance by the Justice Department. The 
State has argued that this understanding was 
“not unreasonable.” The State argues that 
erring on the side of caution is appropriate, 
particularly because the Justice Department 
review process is so “opaque.” 
Whether the State's understanding was 
unreasonable is not the appropriate question 
under Miller and Shaw II. Nor is the 
question whether the Justice Department 
would approve or “look favorably” on the 
plans, or whether the drafters could 
accurately predict how the Justice 
Department would proceed. In Miller, the 
Court rejected the idea that narrow tailoring 
is satisfied by actions taken in order to 
obtain preclearance as a practical matter. In 
that case, the Justice Department had 
demanded that the State draw certain 
districts as part of its preclearance review; 
the Court found that this was not sufficient 
to establish that those districts were 
narrowly tailored. Rather, the only way to 
survive strict scrutiny is to show the plans 
were actually required by the statute.  
On this point, the State argues that, “Given 
the fact that the State's plans have been 
precleared, the State's reading of Section 5 
cannot be said to be incorrect.” This, again, 
is wrong. First, under strict scrutiny it is the 
State's burden to establish that its action was 
required under a correct reading of the 
statute, not the plaintiffs' burden to show the 
drafters' understanding was demonstrably 
incorrect.  
Second, the fact that the Justice Department 
precleared the plans does not determine one 
way or the other whether the State's actions 
were actually mandated by the substantive 
statute. This would be so even if the drafters 
had correctly interpreted the Justice 
Department's commands. “Where a State 
relies on the Department's determination that 
race-based districting is necessary to comply 
with the Act, the judiciary retains an 
independent obligation in adjudicating 
consequent equal protection challenges to 
ensure that the State's actions are narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling 
interest.” Here, however, the Justice 
Department never commanded the State to 
adopt its quotas; the drafters merely 
inferred, or believed, or guessed that such a 
step would smooth the preclearance 
process. That is insufficient to establish that 
the drafters' actions were narrowly tailored. 
In reality, the drafters' understanding of § 5 
was woefully incorrect, and as a result their 
solution is not narrowly tailored. Nothing in 
§ 5, or in the cases interpreting it, required 
the State to adopt and adhere to these 
quotas. In Beer v. United States, the 
Supreme Court noted that “the purpose of [§ 
] 5 has always been to insure that no voting-
procedure changes would be made that 
would lead to a retrogression in the position 
of racial minorities with respect to their 
effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 
Thus, § 5 as properly interpreted requires a 
State to determine whether an action would 
reduce minority voters' effective ability to 
elect candidates of choice; it does not 
command the State to match the pre-existing 
level of minority population. 
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The State relies on Texas v. United States, a 
recent three-judge-court § 5 case, as 
establishing that “ ‘A district with a minority 
voting majority of sixty-five percent (or 
more) essentially guarantees that, despite 
changes in voter turnout, registration, and 
other factors that affect participation at the 
polls, a cohesive minority group will be able 
to elect its candidate of choice.’ ” In the 
State's view, Texas establishes that the 
State's decision to add black people to 
majority-black districts as it did was 
required under § 5. The State is incorrect. 
In the relevant portion of its opinion on 
summary judgment, the Texas court 
established that a majority-minority 
population of 65% percent “essentially 
guarantee[d]” ability to elect in that case. 
Texas was a § 5 case, in which the issue was 
whether certain districts the State had 
drawn violated § 5 by retrogressing minority 
voting power. In establishing its per-se 65% 
rule, the court was making an evidentiary 
ruling: when it examined whether a given 
district the legislature had drawn was likely 
to elect a candidate of minority voters' 
choice, a 65% minority population was 
sufficient evidence standing alone. This 
amounts to a common-sense observation: at 
some point a State may put so many 
minorities in a district that ‘the numbers 
speak for themselves' when it comes to the 
ability of that minority group to win 
elections in the district. 
In this case, the question is not whether 
certain districts violated § 5 (for example by 
containing a minority population that is too 
low), but whether § 5 required the drafters 
to adopt the quotas as they did. Therefore, 
the court's observation in Texas that 65% 
minority populations are essentially 
guaranteed to be able to elect candidates of 
choice is not relevant here; the same is true, 
of course, of 75%, or 85%, or 100% 
minority districts. That tells one nothing 
about whether § 5 requires such high 
percentages. Thus, in sum, the State offers 
no reason to believe that its racial quotas 
were actually required by § 5. 
ii. 
The majority agrees with the State that these 
plans were justified by § 5. But, while the 
majority's interpretation of § 5 is different 
from the State's, it is no less mistaken. In the 
majority's view, the drafters' conduct was 
narrowly tailored because the 2006 
amendments to the VRA altered the standard 
for assessing retrogression. In those 
amendments, Congress expressly noted its 
intention to overturn the Supreme Court's 
decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft. The 
majority concludes that the amendments 
mean that “any diminishment in a minority's 
ability to elect its preferred candidates 
violates section 5.” The majority further 
concludes that this, in turn, required the 
State, “where feasible,” to “not substantially 
reduce the relative percentages 
of black voters” in majority-black districts. 
In other words, as the majority reads the 
amended statute, it required the drafters to 
do just what they did: adopt the 
previous black percentages as racial quotas 
for each district. 
In order to explain why the majority's 
reading is wrong, I must first explain how 
the majority arrives at its conclusion, and 
where we part ways. The majority first finds 
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that the 2006 amendments altered the 
retrogression analysis under § 5 to make it 
more stringent, and I agree. The majority 
also concludes that the amendment to the 
language of § 5 served, in relevant part, to 
overturn the Supreme Court's decision 
in Georgia, and to restore the standard 
articulated in Beer. Again I agree. 
The Georgia decision introduced a “totality 
of the circumstances” approach to 
determining whether a change would be 
retrogressive under § 5. The Court found 
that the ability of a minority group to elect a 
candidate of choice was important, but was 
not the only relevant factor. In addition, the 
Court held, retrogression analysis must take 
account of the minority group's ability to 
participate in the political process. In 
particular, the Court found that “influence” 
districts, in which the minority group cannot 
elect a candidate of choice but can “play a 
substantial ... role in the electoral process,” 
could compensate for a reduction in the 
number of districts in which minorities 
could elect candidates of choice. Also, the 
Court found that representatives of the 
minority group holding positions of 
“legislative leadership, influence, and 
power” was a factor suggesting that a new 
plan was not retrogressive. Because the 
Court determined that the district court had 
focused too narrowly on ability to elect, it 
remanded the case for analysis under the 
totality of the circumstances test.  
The majority finds that, in 
rejecting Georgia, Congress commanded 
that Alabama could not reduce “the 
percentages of black voters in the majority-
black districts because to do so would be to 
diminish black voters' ability to elect their 
preferred candidates.” That is, the majority 
believes that, after the 2006 amendments, 
any reduction in a minority group's 
percentage of the population in a given 
majority-minority district reduces the ability 
to elect, and is per-se retrogressive. I will 
explain why this is incorrect. 
First, though, I pause to observe just how 
implausible this reading of the statute is. On 
the majority's view, if a district is 
99% black, the legislature is prohibited by 
federal law from reducing 
the black population to a mere 98%. Read in 
this way, § 5 would become a one-way 
ratchet: the black population of a district 
could go up, either through demographic 
shifts or redistricting plans (like this one) 
that raise the percentage of black people in 
some majority-black districts. But the 
legislature could never lower 
the black percentage, at least so long as it 
was “feasible” to avoid it. Why? Because 
any reduction in the black population of a 
district would “by definition ... 
diminish black voters' ability to elect their 
preferred candidates.” With respect, this 
result cannot be. 
It is also not what Congress intended. As 
amended, § 5 provides in relevant part that a 
voting change is prohibited if it “will have 
the effect of diminishing the ability of any 
citizens of the United States on account of 
race or color ... to elect their preferred 
candidates of choice.” Congress specified 
that the purpose of the above-quoted 
language “is to protect the ability of such 
citizens to elect their preferred candidates of 
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choice.” It is clear from this language that “ 
‘ability to elect’ is the statutory watchword.” 
The congressional findings, and 
the legislative history, make it clear that the 
goal of this new language was to 
overturn Georgia. In the majority's view, 
this change means that now any reduction in 
a minority group's proportional share of the 
population in a district is retrogressive. The 
better reading of Congress' intent is that, in 
emphasizing “ability to elect,” Congress 
sought only to overturn the aspect 
of Georgia that so many found disturbing: 
namely the prospect that States would trade 
away districts where minority voters had 
actual ability to elect in exchange for 
amorphous influence districts or apparently 
politically powerful jobs for minority 
representatives. The House Committee 
Report described the problem in this way: 
“Under its ‘new’ analysis, the Supreme 
Court would allow the minority 
community's own choice of preferred 
candidates to be trumped by political 
deals struck by State legislators 
purporting to give ‘influence’ to the 
minority community while removing 
that community's ability to elect 
candidates. Permitting these trade-offs 
is inconsistent with the original and 
current purpose of Section 5.” 
Congress rejected this idea, endorsing 
instead the position of the dissent 
in Georgia. Rather than the extreme 
interpretation embraced by the majority in 
this case, it is clear that what Congress 
intended when it sought to 
overturn Georgia was to legislatively adopt 
the position of Justice Souter's dissent 
in Georgia. 
But Justice Souter's dissent did not interpret 
§ 5 in the way the majority does in this case. 
On the contrary, Justice Souter agreed with 
the majority in Georgia that reducing the 
percentage of black population in a 
majority-black district would not necessarily 
be retrogressive. “The District Court began 
with the acknowledgment (to which we 
would all assent) that the simple fact of a 
decrease in black voting age population 
(BVAP) in some districts is not alone 
dispositive about whether a proposed plan is 
retrogressive.” 
Justice Souter's view on this issue was 
hardly lost on Congress. Most of the debate 
surrounding the changes to the retrogression 
standard focused on whether or not 
“coalition” districts (in which a minority 
group does not constitute a majority but can 
routinely elect candidates of choice in 
coalition with other racial groups) could 
constitute “ability to elect” districts for § 5 
purposes. That question is not presented in 
this case. The question that is presented 
here—whether a minority percentage that is 
lower than the benchmark plan is always 
retrogressive—was not widely debated. But 
the two discussions of it in 
the legislative history firmly reject the 
majority's view. 
Representative Watt, a leading proponent of 
the bill in the House and chair of the 
Congressional Black Caucus at the time, 
specifically noted and endorsed the Georgia 
Court's unanimous position on this issue 
during a key hearing on the effect 
of Georgia on the retrogression standard: 
“Nine justices agreed, as do I, that section 5 
does not prohibit the reduction of super 
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majority minority voting age population 
percentages from that in a benchmark 
plan. Where the majority in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft strayed, however, losing four 
justices in the process, was in its failure to 
enunciate an articulable standard under 
which the opportunities to elect are 
preserved.” 
The principal sponsors of the amendments in 
the Senate agreed. During floor debate, 
some senators had suggested that coalition 
districts would not be protected by the 
retrogression standard. Senator Leahy 
responded by entering into the record a 
statement reflecting “my understanding of 
the purpose and scope of [the relevant] 
provisions as an original and lead sponsor.” 
That statement provided: 
“This change to Section 5 makes clear 
that Congress rejects the Supreme 
Court's Ashcroft decision and 
reestablishes that a covered state's 
redistricting plan cannot eliminate 
‘ability to elect’ districts and replace 
them with ‘influence districts' ... The 
amendment to Section 5 does not, 
however, freeze into place the current 
minority voter percentages in any given 
district. As stated by the dissenters 
in Georgia v. Ashcroft, as well as by 
Professor Arrington and Professor 
Persily at the Committee hearings, 
reducing the number of minorities in a 
district is perfectly consistent with the 
pre-Ashcroft understanding of Section 
5 as long as other factors demonstrate 
that minorities retain their ability to 
elect their preferred candidates.” 
Equally striking is the fact that no one 
contested this understanding. While there 
was a concerted effort by some in the Senate 
to establish that the retrogression standard 
would not lock in coalition districts, no one 
ever suggested that Congress was adopting 
the novel and implausible standard the 
majority posits in this case. Indeed, there is 
nothing in the text, nothing in 
the legislative history, and nothing in the 
dissent in Georgia which would support the 
majority's view. 
That view has also been rejected by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia, 
which is entrusted with the primary 
responsibility for enforcing § 5. The D.C. 
District Court's most extensive application 
of § 5 after the 2006 amendments came in 
the Texas case. In the opinion after trial in 
that case, the three-judge court rejected the 
idea that lowering the minority percentage 
of a supermajority district is per-se 
retrogressive. In considering the changes to 
Texas' House District 41, the court noted 
that the Hispanic citizen voting-age 
population had been reduced from 77.5% in 
the benchmark plan to 72.1% in the new 
plan. Under the test adopted by the majority 
in this case, that information by itself would 
establish retrogression. But the Texas court 
rejected a claim that this change was 
retrogressive, finding that even with a lower 
percentage of the population, Hispanic 
voters still had the ability to elect candidates 
of choice.  
Instead of the majority's test, which looks 
solely to whether a minority group's 
percentage of the population is lower than it 
had been under the benchmark plan, 
the Texas court adopted a “functional” 
approach. Rejecting the State's argument 
that the court should look only to population 
demographics, the court found that it was 
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necessary to examine a number of factors to 
determine whether a minority group has the 
ability to elect candidates of choice. “A 
single-factor inquiry, such as the test Texas 
proposed relying on racial and ethnic 
population statistics alone, is inconsistent 
with precedent and too limited to provide an 
accurate picture of the on-the-ground 
realities of voting power.” Rather, the court 
established at summary judgment that 
“Section 5 analysis must go beyond mere 
population data to include factors such as 
minority voter registration, minority voter 
turnout, election history, and 
minority/majority voting behaviors.”  
This is substantially the same interpretation 
of the amended § 5 as that adopted by the 
Justice Department, the other primary 
adjudicator of preclearance. In its updated 
guidance, released in 2011, the Justice 
Department, like the D.C. District Court, 
applies a functional, multi-factor test. As the 
Justice Department interprets § 5, the 
analysis of retrogressive effect “starts with a 
basic comparison of the benchmark and 
proposed plans at issue, using updated 
census data in each.” But it does not end 
there: 
“In determining whether the ability to 
elect exists in the benchmark plan and 
whether it continues in the proposed 
plan, the Attorney General does not rely 
on any predetermined or fixed 
demographic percentages at any point in 
the assessment. Rather, in the 
Department's view, this determination 
requires a functional analysis of the 
electoral behavior within the particular 
jurisdiction or election district. As noted 
above, census data alone may not 
provide sufficient indicia of electoral 
behavior to make the requisite 
determination.” 
In other words, both the D.C. District Court 
and the Justice Department have explicitly 
rejected the majority's interpretation. 
And with good cause. The majority's 
interpretation of the amended § 5 would 
raise serious, if not fatal, constitutional 
concerns. There is an inherent tension 
between the race consciousness of the VRA, 
and in particular § 5, and the protections of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Yet the majority urges an interpretation of § 
5 that would require States to engage in 
hugely racialized redistricting; indeed, an 
interpretation that would require States to 
redistrict in compliance with racial quotas. 
Under the majority's rule, a State faced with 
a 90% minority district has no choice: it 
must find nine minority individuals for 
every 10 needed to repopulate the district. 
Racial gerrymandering would become 
unavoidable, essentially required by a 
federal statute. “When [an] interpretation of 
the [VRA] compels race-based districting, it 
by definition raises a serious constitutional 
question.” 
UJO, discussed above, places these 
constitutional questions in stark contrast. 
Chief Justice Burger's dissent, which applied 
the Shaw reasoning later adopted by the 
Court, rejected the defendants' rigid 
adherence to a specific minority percentage, 
65%, in seeking to comply with § 5. He 
observed that there was “no indication 
whatever that use of this rigid figure was in 
any way related much less necessary to 
fulfilling the State's obligation under the 
Voting Rights Act as defined 
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in Beer.” Rather, he would have found this 
unjustified “rigid adherence to quotas” 
unconstitutional. The interpretation the 
majority adopts is no less rigid; it too 
equates ability to elect with a certain 
predetermined percentage of the population. 
It raises the same constitutional questions 
that Chief Justice Burger identified. 
But facing those constitutional questions is 
simply unnecessary. Congress did not seek 
to impose racial quotas on States, nor 
permanently to freeze in place minority 
supermajorities, long after minority groups' 
need for those supermajorities in order to 
elect candidates of choice has passed. The 
purpose of the VRA is to help minority 
groups achieve equality, not to lock them 
into legislative ghettos. Congress intended 
no such thing. The majority's interpretation 
of the amended § 5 is in error. 
iii. 
Applying instead the functional test 
articulated in Texas, I think it is clear that 
even substantial reductions in 
the black percentage of many of the 
majority-black districts would be 
permissible under § 5. As such, in seeking 
out so many black people to satisfy their 
unjustified racial quotas, the drafters “went 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to 
avoid retrogression.” 
The Texas court's functional analysis 
requires the court to look to a variety of 
factors, including the mobilization of the 
minority group in question. In Texas, the 
court was concerned that many of the 
relevant factors meant that the minority 
group at issue in that case, Latinos, would 
require substantially more than 50% of the 
population to effectively elect candidates of 
choice. Evidence and congressional findings 
of low Latino rates of registration and 
turnout “underscore[d] why Texas' reliance 
on a bare majority-minority district [could 
not] be used to determine an ability district 
under Section 5.” That is, Texas held that, 
considering the particular circumstances of 
Latinos in Texas, § 5 required substantially 
more than 50% minority population in 
majority-minority districts. 
In this case, there is significant evidence 
that, in light of much-improved black voter 
mobilization and near-universal citizenship, 
the black voting population in Alabama can 
elect candidates of their choice at 
significantly lower levels of population than 
the Texas court deemed necessary in that 
case. The evidence suggests that 
in Alabama black voters need to be only 
about 50% of a given district to be able to 
elect representatives of choice. If that is so, 
then even if the legislature substantially 
reduced the percentage of black residents of, 
for example, HD 55 
(73% black), black residents would still 
have the ability to elect candidates of choice 
there. The point is not that the State was 
required to lower the black percentage of 
HD 55. Rather, it is that § 5 did 
not prohibit the State from doing so. And, 
that being the case, the State here cannot 
claim that the VRA required it to maintain 
HD 55 with 73% black people. Therefore, 
the drafters' conduct was not narrowly 
tailored. 
The majority has found that much of the 
evidence that black voters can elect 
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candidates of choice with little more than a 
bare majority is not credible, and therefore 
concluded that the record can support no 
conclusion about the minimum level 
of black population necessary to 
allow black voters to elect candidates of 
choice. I disagree with those factual 
determinations; in particular, I can discern 
no legitimate basis in the record for the 
majority to find Arrington's testimony not 
credible. I would credit Arrington's 
testimony on this issue. 
But, more importantly, even if one accepts 
the majority's conclusion that the record 
supports no determination one way or the 
other regarding the level of black population 
necessary to elect candidates of choice, in 
the context of racial gerrymandering that 
conclusion can only harm the State's case. 
The burden is on it to establish that it had a 
“strong basis in evidence” for the need for 
their purported solution, namely striving to 
fill racial quotas. If it has not shown a strong 
basis in evidence, because the record can 
support no conclusion one way or the other, 
then the racial gerrymander is 
unconstitutional. 
The drafters' failure to take any steps to 
examine what § 5 actually required in this 
case underscores that these plans are not 
narrowly tailored. Hinaman testified that he 
did not review any studies of black voter 
participation in Alabama, did not look at 
variations among black communities, and 
did not use the political data he had 
available to examine effectiveness of 
majority-black districts. Dial testified that he 
did not inquire at all into what level 
of black population would be necessary to 
avoid retrogression in a given district: 
“Q. So your testimony is that you really 
didn't look into the behavior of 
individual districts. Instead, you simply 
went by the black—the number 
of black people, the black percentage in 
the district. And what you did was try 
and at least maintain that or increase it. 
Is that your—fair statement of your 
testimony? 
“A. That's fair, yes.” 
Had any of the drafters analyzed the 
available data, they might (or might not) 
have had a “strong basis in evidence” to 
conclude that § 5 required them to maintain 
the high percentages of black population; as 
they did nothing of the sort, they had 
nothing but guesses. And that is not enough 
to justify the use of racial quotas in 
drawing legislative districts. 
The question here is whether the State was 
required by the VRA to seek out black 
people to add to the already 
heavily black majority-minority districts in 
order to achieve their racial quotas. And the 
clear answer is no. There was an available 
alternative: not to sift individuals by race at 
all, or only to do so to the extent actually 
required by the VRA, and instead to use 
other districting principles to draw those 
lines. They could have been guided by 
protecting incumbents, following natural 
and political boundaries, keeping districts 
compact, etc. Instead, the drafters reached 
out and grabbed as many black people as 
possible to achieve their racial quotas even 
as the total population of those districts 
grew. The conclusion is as clear as day: the 
drafters' action was not required under any 
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correct reading of the statute, and so cannot 
survive as narrowly tailored. 
iv. 
Even if the drafters' racial quotas were 
somehow required by § 5, that would not be 
enough to save these plans, 
because Alabama is no longer subject to the 
preclearance requirements of § 5. 
The Alabama Legislative Black Caucus plai
ntiffs argue that the State cannot now rely on 
§ 5 to justify its racial gerrymander because 
of the Supreme Court's intervening decision 
in Shelby County, which was handed down 
after this case was filed but before trial. The 
majority responds that Shelby County struck 
down only § 4 of the VRA, the formula for 
determining whether a jurisdiction is 
covered by § 5, but left § 5 itself 
undisturbed. However, without § 4, and 
absent further action by 
Congress, Alabama is no longer a covered 
jurisdiction subject to § 5 and need not 
obtain preclearance.  
The majority then concludes that, even if 
compliance with § 5 is not now a compelling 
interest, the State's actions should be 
evaluated based on the circumstances when 
the plans were enacted, not those of the time 
of judgment. I disagree. These plans have 
not yet gone into effect, and “changed 
circumstances may ... transform a 
compelling interest into a less than 
compelling one.” Indeed, when it comes to 
racial classifications, the solution offered 
must last no longer than the compelling 
interest on which the State relies. Here, 
relying on the fact that § 5 was still 
applicable at the time the drafters designed 
the plans, the State asks us to approve a 
race-based solution that has not only already 
outlived its problem, but also one that will 
be in effect into the next decade, through the 
2020 census. But the question in strict-
scrutiny analysis is not whether the drafters 
acted in “good faith” when they enacted 
these plans, nor in strict scrutiny do we grant 
the kind of deference to which States are 
often entitled in other areas of law. In the 
absence of an actual compelling interest at 
the time of judgment, the court cannot 
approve a racial gerrymander. 
v. 
There is perhaps one last unarticulated 
premise to confront. One might think that 
the plaintiffs here, who are 
mostly black legislators and voters, should 
lose on their Shaw claims because the 
majority-black districts were drawn for their 
benefit. The plaintiffs in Shaw and its 
progeny were, after all, white voters who 
objected to the creation of majority-minority 
districts. It may be thought that there is 
some incongruity to black voters bringing 
the same charge against districts in which 
they are the majority. 
The Supreme Court's equal protection cases 
teach that it is sometimes difficult to discern 
when a race-conscious policy inures to the 
benefit of a minority group and when it 
covertly prejudices them. Indeed, as Justice 
Thomas recently observed, “The worst 
forms of racial discrimination in this Nation 
have always been accompanied by straight-
faced representations that discrimination 
helped minorities.” 
In this case, there is a deep dispute regarding 
the legislative purpose behind these plans. 
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According to the drafters, they sought 
nothing more than to comply with their legal 
duties and honor their colleagues' wishes as 
far as that was possible. According to the 
plaintiffs, these redistricting plans are part of 
a scheme to eliminate all white Democrats 
in the State and thereby establish the 
Republican Party as the natural home for all 
white Alabamians, leaving the Democratic 
Party comprised of only black voters and 
legislators. In furtherance of that scheme, 
the plaintiffs claim, the drafters packed as 
many black people as possible into the 
majority-black districts, thereby eliminating 
their influence anywhere else. All this, the 
plaintiffs claim, was done under the pretext 
of seeking to comply with § 5, while in 
reality the drafters were motivated by 
invidious racial discrimination. Apparently 
for this reason, no black legislator voted in 
favor of these plans. 
In my view, we need not resolve the 
question of the drafters' ultimate purpose, 
nor need we reach the plaintiffs' other 
claims. For, again, to me this case is simple. 
In drawing the majority-black districts, 
Hinaman and the others were driven by an 
overriding consideration: the race of those 
individuals who would be included in or 
excluded from those districts. They adopted 
racial quotas for each district, and they went 
to extraordinary lengths to achieve those 
quotas. Whether they did so in a good-faith 
belief that the quotas were required by § 5, 
or for some invidious purpose, is ultimately 
of no consequence for the Shaw claims. But 
that they did so is as clear as day. Because 
the State has offered no sufficient 
justification for the use of racial quotas, the 
plans are unconstitutional, and I would so 
hold. 
*** 
There is a cruel irony to these cases. Earlier 
this year, the State of Alabama passionately 
argued to the Supreme Court that it should 
be free from the VRA requirements of 
preclearance. The Court agreed, effectively 
removing the preclearance requirement for 
covered jurisdictions nationwide. Noting 
that “Our country has changed,” the Court 
found that Congress's remedy for racial 
discrimination in voting failed to “speak [ ] 
to current conditions.” 
The evidence here is overwhelming that the 
State has intentionally singled out 
individuals based on race and cabined them 
into district after district. The drafting of 
majority-black districts was driven by naked 
racial quotas; that alone is enough to 
condemn these plans. But Alabama argues 
that these percentages were justified by, of 
all things, § 5. Even as it was asking the 
Supreme Court to strike down the 
requirement of preclearance for failure to 
speak to current conditions, the State 
of Alabama was relying on racial quotas 
with absolutely no evidence that they had 
anything to do with current conditions, and 
seeking to justify those quotas with the very 
provision it was helping to render inert. 
To be sure, conditions 30 years ago or 20 
years ago or even a decade ago (in or around 
2001) may have justified requiring high 
percentages of black population in majority-
black districts. Indeed, as I now 
consider Alabama's and the majority's 
argument that the record justifies these high 
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racial percentages, I feel as if I were in a 
time warp carried back into the past, with 
the arguments being the same but with the 
parties having switched sides. But, again, 
the issue here is, What are the conditions 
today? Not, what they were back then. 
Therefore, just as the Supreme Court, in 
applying principles of federalism, found in 
Shelby County that Congress's remedy for 
racial discrimination in voting failed to 
“speak [ ] to current conditions,” this court, 
applying strict scrutiny, should likewise find 
that the Alabama Legislature's racially based 
redistricting plans fail to speak to current 
conditions. And just as the Supreme Court 
sent Congress back to the drawing board, 
this court should send 
the Alabama Legislature back as well. 
Moreover, because these plans have not 
gone into effect, there is ample time for the 
Alabama Legislature to come up with plans 
that accede to the request made by all of 
Alabama's black legislators, a request that is 
not only a legitimate and laudable one but is, 
in fact, the only legitimate request that can 
be made absent current conditions reflecting 
otherwise: to carry out its decennial 
reapportionment, as required by one-person-
one vote, based more on traditional 
districting factors (such as respect for 
political subdivisions and precincts, 
compactness, contiguity, and incumbency) 
and based far less on race. 
Therefore, because the plans before this 
court rely on quotas to cabin individuals into 
districts based on the race of those 
individuals in an intentional, unjustified, and 
thus illegal manner, I cannot give the plans 
my imprimatur. I respectfully dissent. 
  
212 
 
   1993 Plan  1993 Plan  
House 2001 Total Black Using 2000 Black Total Using 1990 Total Black 
District Plan Pop. (%) Census Data Pop. (%) Data Pop. (%) 
19 28,011 66.039 25,869 78.565 25,118 66.27 
32 24,975 59.598 22,704 63.490 24,626 63.93 
52 27,716 65.848 25,799 73.870 24,825 67.72 
53 26,247 64.445 21,312 65.298 24,136 66.01 
54 25,563 63.276 20,153 63.061 23,567 63.95 
55 27,344 67.772 27,217 76.270 22,534 61.57 
56 26,546 62.665 23,896 70.268 23,326 63.52 
57 25,373 62.967 28,593 82.615 23,453 63.90 
58 25,937 63.518 24,284 74,163 22,969 62.75 
59 25,449 63.241 20,459 66.255 23,367 63.86 
60 26,693 64.348 23,455 74.876 24,380 66.22 
67 25,663 63.447 23,358 71.032 23,247 63.50 
68 25,227 62.211 23,051 62.938 23,774 63.58 
69 26,417 65.308 25,198 64.855 23,149 63.29 
70 26,587 62.827 23,375 75.603 24,460 64.60 
71 25,872 64.191 24,041 67.736 24,390 66.16 
72 25,561 60.748 24,825 64.652 24,436 65.36 
76 30,117 73.309 29,655 76.527 24,427 66.69 
77 28,546 69.677 23,986 74.802 26,704 71.93 
78 29,390 72.697 23,911 68.874 26,468 72.37 
82 27,605 62.663 30,493 78.826 30,503 79.73 
83 24,651 61.214 26,144 60.782 25,957 64.52 
84 21,696 52.360 16,235 39.353 13,832 37.81 
85 19,964 47.863 16,934 53.312 18,696 51.13 
97 27,667 64.738 24,414 67.243 23,878 65.22 
98 27,393 64.448 22,935 69.401 24,062 65.72 
99 27,674 65.250 25,950 74.916 24,033 65.09 
103 26,570 63.049 25,832 75.299 24,003 65.58 
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   1993 Plan  1993 Plan  
Senate 2001 Total Black Using 2000 Total Black Using 1990 Total Black 
District Plan Pop. (%) Data Pop. (%) Data Pop. (%) 
18 82,769 66.865 67,264 67.588 72,528 65.89 
19 80,662 66.227 79,706 76.452 69,313 63.00 
20 80,075 65.697 68,198 71.829 70,716 64.28 
23 75,380 62.305 71,607 66.081 70,170 63.46 
24 75,520 62.409 72,245 68.964 73,286 65.36 
26 92,486 71.507 77,552 73.485 77,599 70.34 
28 71,653 56.458 72,872 59.269 70,292 61.09 
33 79,492 62.451 73,299 70.483 71,973 65.34 
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  Overpop. (+) or   
House Act 2012–602 Underpop. (-) of 2001 2001 House 1993 House 
District Total Black District Using 2010 Total Black Total Black 
Number Pop. (%) Census Data (%) Pop. (%) Pop. (%) 
19 61.5 –6.90 66.039 66.27 
32 60.3 –14.76 59.598 63.93 
52 60.1 –5.19 65.848 67.72 
53 56.2 –22.28 64.445 66.01 
54 56.9 –23.32 63.276 63.95 
55 73.6 –21.86 67.772 61.57 
56 62.3 –9.79 62.665 63.52 
57 68.5 –20.48 62.967 63.90 
58 73.0 –17.75 63.518 62.75 
59 76.8 –27.86 63.241 63.86 
60 67.9 –19.37 64.348 66.22 
67 69.2 –16.79 63.447 63.50 
68 64.6 –20.40 62.211 63.58 
69 64.2 –17.46 65.308 63.29 
70 62.2 –13.77 62.827 64.60 
71 66.9 –16.32 64.191 66.16 
72 64.5 –13.42 60.748 65.36 
76 73.9 –1.38 73.309 66.69 
77 67.0 –23.12 69.677 71.93 
78 70.2 –32.16 72.697 72.37 
82 62.2 –4.68 62.663 79.73 
83 57.7 –9.85 61.214 64.52 
84 52.4 –9.24 52.360 37.81 
85 50.5 –6.79 47.863 51.13 
97 60.8 –22.22 64.738 65.22 
98 60.0 –16.89 64.448 65.72 
99 65.7 –12.59 65.250 65.09 
103 65.3 –10.79 63.049 65.58 
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Senate Act 2012–603 Overpop. (+) or Underpop. 2001 Senate 1993 Senate 
District Total Black (-) of 2001 District Using Total Black Total Black 
Number Pop. (%) 2010 Census Data (%) Pop. (%) Pop. (%) 
18 59.12 –17.64 66.685 65.89 
19 65.39 –20.06 66.227 63.00 
20 63.38 –21.37 65.697 64.28 
23 64.81 –18.03 62.305 63.46 
24 63.30 –12.98 62.409 65.36 
26 75.22 –11.64 71.507 70.34 
28 59.96 –3.80 56.458 61.09 
33 71.71 –18.05 62.451 65.34 
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House District Act 2012–602 Total Act 2012–602 Voting– Deviation from Ideal 
Number Black Pop. (%) Age Black Pop. (%) Total Pop. (%) 
19 61.5 60.15 -.97 
32 60.3 57.68 -.04 
52 60.1 57.21 -.96 
53 56.2 52.98 -.91 
54 56.9 52.50 -.99 
55 73.6 70.60 -.99 
56 62.3 59.71 -.99 
57 68.5 65.96 -.99 
58 73.0 67.99 -.95 
59 76.8 74.28 -.67 
60 67.9 65.68 -.96 
67 69.2 65.73 -.97 
68 64.6 61.82 -.99 
69 64.2 61.83 -.10 
70 62.2 57.13 .99 
71 66.9 64.42 -.38 
72 64.5 61.88 -.38 
76 73.9 71.24 .99 
77 67.0 64.20 .95 
78 70.2 67.43 .96 
82 62.2 60.48 .74 
83 57.7 55.53 .99 
84 52.4 50.99 .98 
85 50.5 47.22 -.64 
97 60.8 56.73 -.99 
98 60.0 57.96 -.99 
20 63.38 59.03 -.99 
23 64.81 61.67 -.90 
24 63.30 59.74 .85 
26 75.22 72.70 -.08 
28 59.96 58.03 .98 
33 71.71 68.10 -.26 
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 Act 2012–602 Voting–Age 2001 house Plan Voting–Age 
 Black Pop. (%) Using Black Pop. (%) Using 
House District Number 2010 Census Data 2010 Census Data 
19 60.15 67.70 
32 57.68 56.62 
52 57.21 58.52 
53 52.98 52.49 
54 52.50 53.37 
55 70.60 71.22 
56 59.71 59.42 
57 65.96 66.52 
58 67.99 74.02 
59 74.28 64.25 
60 65.68 65.15 
67 65.73 65.59 
68 61.82 59.97 
69 61.83 61.99 
70 57.13 56.31 
71 64.42 62.04 
72 61.88 57.52 
76 71.24 67.48 
77 64.20 71.48 
78 67.43 72.57 
82 60.48 54.19 
83 55.53 55.51 
84 50.99 49.23 
85 47.22 45.64 
97 56.73 57.35 
98 57.96 62.23 
99 62.07 70.09 
103 60.18 64.83 
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 Act 2012–603 Voting–
Age 
Act 2001 Senate Plan Voting–
Age 
 Black Pop. (%) Using Black Pop. (%) Using 
Senate District 
Number 
2010 Census Data 2010 Census Data 
18 56.43 57.31 
19 62.68 69.31 
20 59.03 74.44 
23 61.67 61.79 
24 59.74 59.38 
26 72.70 70.87 
28 58.03 49.82 
33 68.10 61.55 
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       Black 
       People Moved 
       To Create 2001 
     Black Act 602 Plan Using 
 Total  Total Black People Deviation Act 602 
 Black  Black Pop. of Moved 
To 
from Deviations 
 Pop. Deviation Pop. 
(%) 
Plan Create Ideal (Redistribution 
 in 
2001 
in 2001 in 2001 Using 2001 Total / Total 
HD # Plan Plan (%) Plan Census Plan Pop. (%) Black Pop.) 
19 28,011 0.149 66.039 25,869 2,142 –0.97 1,947 / 27,816 
32 24,975 –1.055 59.598 22,704 2,271 –0.04 1,631 / 24,335 
52 27,716 –0.619 65.848 25,799 1,917 –0.96 1,088 / 26,887 
53 26,247 –3.837 64.445 21,312 4,935 –0.91 5,848 / 27,161 
54 25,563 –4.614 63.276 20,153 5,410 –0.99 6,494 / 26,647 
55 27,344 –4.736 67.772 27,217 127 –0.99 1,323 / 28,540 
56 26,546 0.021 62.665 23,896 2,650 –0.99 2,493 / 26,389 
57 25,373 –4.857 62.967 28,593 –3,220 –0.99 –2,076 / 26,517 
58 25,937 –3.587 63.518 24,284 1,653 –0.95 2,475 / 26,759 
59 25,449 –4.987 63.241 20,459 4,990 –0.67 6,259 / 26,718 
60 26,693 –2.057 64.348 23,455 3,238 –0.96 3,651 / 27,106 
67 25,663 –4.498 63.447 23,358 2,305 –0.97 3,366 / 26,724 
68 25,227 –4.255 62.211 23,051 2,176 –0.99 3,147 / 26,198 
69 26,417 –4.493 65.308 25,198 1,219 –0.10 2,552 / 27,750 
70 26,587 –0.083 62.827 23,375 3,212 0.99 3,612 / 26,987 
71 25,872 –4.836 64.191 24,041 1,831 –0.38 3,158 / 27,199 
72 25,561 –0.652 60.748 24,825 736 –0.38 914 / 25,740 
76 30,117 –3.001 73.309 29,655 462 0.99 1,834 / 31,489 
77 28,546 –3.268 69.677 23,986 4,560 0.95 5,931 / 29,917 
78 29,390 –4.545 72.697 23,911 5,479 0.96 7,306 / 31,217 
82 27,605 4.014 62.663 30,493 –2,888 0.74 –3,643 / 26,850 
83 24,651 –4.918 61.214 26,144 –1,493 0.99 161 / 26,305 
84 21,696 –2.165 52.360 16,235 5,461 0.98 6,254 / 22,489 
85 19,964 –1.516 47.863 16,934 3,030 –0.64 3,293 / 20,227 
97 27,667 .907 64.738 24,414 3,253 –0.99 2,848 / 27,262 
98 27,393 .357 64.448 22,935 4,458 –0.99 4,205 / 27,140 
99 27,674 .139 65.250 25,950 1,724 –0.99 1,528 / 27,478 
103 26,570 –.498 63.049 25,832 738 –0.98 722 / 26,554 
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       Black 
    Black   People Moved 
    Pop. of Black Act 603 To Create 2001 
 Total  Total 1993 People Deviation Plan USing Act 
 Black  Black Plan Moved 
To 
from 603 Deviations 
 Pop. Deviation Pop. 
(%) 
Using Create Ideal (Redistribution 
 in 
2001 
in 2001 In 2001 2000 2001 Total / Total 
SD # Plan Plan (%) Plan Census Plan Pop. (%) Black Pop.) 
18 82,769 –2.577 66.865 67,264 15,505 –0.96 16,879 / 84,143 
19 80,662 –4.142 66.227 79,706 956 –0.99 3,609 / 83,315 
20 80,075 –4.072 65.697 68,198 11,877 –0.99 14,450 / 82,648 
23 75,380 –4.781 62.305 71,607 3,773 –0.90 6,845 / 78,452 
24 75,520 –4.762 62.409 72,245 3,275 0.85 7,726 / 79,971 
26 92,486 1.794 71.507 77,552 14,934 –0.08 13,250 / 90,802 
28 71,653 –0.116 56.458 72,872 –1,219 0.98 –433 / 72,439 
33 79,492 .179 62.451 73,299 6,193 –0.26 5,845 / 79,144 
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“Court to Review Alabama’s ‘Race-Based’ Reapportionment” 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
June 2, 2014 
 
The Supreme Court said Monday that it will 
review Alabama’s legislative 
reapportionment plan, accepting a challenge 
from the state’s Democrats and African 
American legislators that the new plan was 
an attempt to limit minority effectiveness. 
The challengers said the state’s ruling 
Republicans packed too many minority 
voters into too few districts — ensuring 
minority representation in those districts but 
harming the chances for influence 
elsewhere. 
A three-judge federal panel had rejected the 
challenges filed by the Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus and the Alabama Democratic 
Conference. That court agreed with 
Alabama, ruling 2 to 1 that the legislature 
had successfully navigated a “political 
thicket” by obeying federal laws and the 
Constitution regarding redistricting while at 
the same time ensuring minority 
representation. 
Alabama has one of the nation’s highest 
percentages of African Americans serving in 
the state legislature. 
But the challengers said Republicans who 
control the state’s political leadership in 
effect supplied too much of a good thing. 
Districts with a minority population that 
would ensure the election of an African 
American were packed with even more 
black voters, raising the proportions to more 
than 70 percent. 
The new voters often came from districts 
where they might help elect a Democrat, the 
challenges say. In effect, it means virtually 
no districts are conducive to the election of a 
white Democrat, and the legislature’s blacks 
find themselves without partners to 
influence public policy, the challengers say. 
That has created an unusual situation in 
which it is minority groups that are saying 
the state paid too much attention to race 
when drawing districts. 
“When considering whether it is 
constitutional to take account of race in 
redistricting, the law is — and always has 
been — sensible enough to recognize a 
distinction between what is reasonably 
necessary to make voting fair, and what is 
not,” said the petition from the Alabama 
Democratic Caucus. 
Joe Reed, chairman of the conference, told 
the Associated Press that the Republican-
designed districts were drawn to reduce the 
number of black voters in majority-white 
districts. 
“They were doing their level best to wipe 
out white Democrats,” Reed said. “They 
were trying their best to have a legislature of 
white Republicans and black Democrats, 
and then they could ignore the black 
Democrats.” 
Such arguments have sometimes created 
tensions between minority groups and the 
Democrats they most often favor, said 
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Nathaniel Persily, a redistricting expert and 
Stanford University law professor. 
Black incumbents especially want to make 
sure that districts remain safe for reelection, 
while other Democrats want minority voters 
more dispersed to increase the party’s 
chances of winning more races, he said. In 
Alabama, the two sides seem to be in 
agreement. 
But the three-judge panel said Alabama 
proved that the changes it made to the 
redistricting map were to make sure the 
districts complied with another 
constitutional mandate — that they be equal 
in size. 
At the time the plan was finalized, Alabama 
was required by the Voting Rights Act to get 
the Justice Department’s approval before the 
new maps could be implemented, and the 
department complied. Last June, the 
Supreme Court tossed the part of the Voting 
Rights Act that required “preclearance” in 
some states with a history of discrimination, 
most of them in the South. 
Persily said the Alabama case will be the 
first time Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. 
and Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., both of 
whom are skeptical of racial classifications, 
have confronted the question of how race 
may be considered in redistricting decisions. 
Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange 
(R) said the state had complied with 
constitutional concerns and with the Voting 
Rights Act. The state’s plan has eight of the 
35 Senate districts and 28 of the 105 House 
districts with a majority of black residents, 
just as it was when Democrats controlled 
redistricting. 
“My office has been defending the 
constitutionality of these districts since they 
were enacted by the legislature and 
precleared by the Department of Justice, and 
we will continue to do so in the U.S. 
Supreme Court,” Strange said in a statement 
after the justices announced they would 
review the case in the term starting in 
October. 
Alabama voters go to the polls Tuesday for 
primaries in the redrawn districts. It seems 
likely the November elections also will take 
place under the new map. 
The combined cases are Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus v. 
Alabama and Alabama Democratic 
Conference v. Alabama.
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“Black Groups Tell Supreme Court Ala. Districts Biased” 
Montgomery Advertiser 
Mary Troyan 
August 17, 2014 
 
The Alabama Legislature will be further 
racially polarized by new district boundaries 
that pack more black voters into certain 
districts than the law requires, state black 
political groups told the Supreme Court last 
week. 
The justices agreed in June to hear the 
complaint from Alabama that the 
Republican majority went too far in using 
race to redistrict itself in 2012. The result, 
according to black Democratic legislators, is 
unusually high black majorities in districts 
surrounded by districts that are even more 
white. 
"The Constitution does not permit states to 
stumble into such excessively segregated 
election districts, whether through good faith 
or bad," wrote lawyers for the Alabama 
Democratic Conference, one of the groups 
involved in the case. 
The ADC and the Alabama Legislative 
Black Caucus filed their briefs with the 
justices on Wednesday. The Alabama 
Attorney General's office, which is 
defending the new map, is scheduled to 
respond in October. 
The case could be a significant test of how 
the Supreme Court, which recently struck 
down a piece of the Voting Rights Act, 
views the use of race in redistricting. 
The black Alabama lawmakers, all of whom 
voted against the new map, argue that the 
state's first GOP majority in 136 years 
wrongly focused solely on race in deciding 
where to draw new district lines. They also 
complain that the Republicans were 
unnecessarily strict in making sure each 
district had almost exactly equal population. 
The combination, they say, resulted in 
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. 
For example, the Montgomery County 
Senate District seat held by Sen. Quinton 
Ross would have been 72.75 percent 
African-American using the 2010 Census 
data. But the district, which lost population 
over the last decade, needed 16,000 people 
added to it. 
Republicans added 15,785 people to Ross' 
district: 14,806 were black, 36 were white 
and 943 were other minorities, according to 
their brief. The result was Ross' district grew 
to more than 75 percent black. 
The new district "creatively curls around to 
exclude a majority-white portion of 
Montgomery County," the lawyers wrote. 
Statewide, 16 to 20 percent of black 
residents were moved from white-majority 
districts into what the lawyers called "super-
concentrated" black districts. And districts 
that once had racially diverse voting age 
populations were eliminated, they argued. 
"The result is election districts 
extraordinarily segregated by race, but for 
which no level of government claims 
decision-making responsibility," wrote 
lawyers for the ADC. 
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Under the supervision of the U.S. Justice 
Department for the past half-century, it was 
standard for lawmakers to intentionally draw 
some districts in a way that increased the 
likelihood that black voters could elect the 
candidate of their choice. That policy is 
credited with helping elect black officials at 
every level of local, state and federal 
government after decades of racism and 
segregation. 
But now, under the new GOP majority, 
black Democrats in Alabama allege the 
policy is being twisted to diminish the 
power of black voters by packing them into 
a limited number of districts. 
Now, 27 of 105 House districts and eight of 
35 Senate districts have black majorities. 
Republican lawmakers have testified they 
intended to even out the population among 
the districts without lowering the percentage 
of blacks in the majority-black districts; to 
avoid putting incumbents into the same 
district; and to keep counties whole. 
Alabama Attorney General Luther Strange, a 
Republican, has argued in previous court 
filings that the lower court decision, a 
divided 2-1 ruling by a three-judge panel, 
rejected the argument that the new map was 
based solely on race and upheld the map as 
constitutional. 
"And black legislators themselves proposed 
some of the changes that the plaintiffs cite as 
evidence of packing," the attorney general's 
office wrote earlier this year. 
The justices are expected to hear the case 
during the court session that begins in 
October. 
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“Federal Judges Rule That State Legislative District Lines Don’t Violate 
Voting Rights Act” 
North Jefferson News 
Robert Carter 
December 20, 2013 
 
A special panel of three federal judges has 
ruled that Alabama's legislative district 
boundaries do not run afoul of the Voting 
Rights Act. 
The judges ruled 2-1 in favor of the 
boundaries, which were redrawn in 2011 to 
reflect population changes that resulted from 
the 2010 U.S. Census. The boundaries were 
pre-cleared by the U.S. Department of 
Justice at Attorney General Luther Strange's 
behest shortly after the legislature approved 
them. 
Lawsuits were filed by the Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus and the Alabama 
Democratic Conference, in which they 
claimed the new boundaries unfairly 
discriminated against minorities. The panel 
of judges held a seven-day trial in August, 
and handed down a voluminous opinion on 
Friday. 
Strange hailed the decision in a statement. "I 
have believed from the beginning of this 
process that Alabama complied with all 
legal and constitutional requirements in 
adopting the new district lines, and I am 
pleased that the court agreed with our 
position that the new legislative districts are 
consistent with federal law," he said. 
The latest redistricting process was the first 
since the Alabama State Legislature 
switched to a Republican majority. The 
process, which occurs after each census, has 
been subject to federal scrutiny under the 
Voting Rights Act since the law was enacted 
in 1965. The pre-clearance process that 
Strange requested has been largely done 
away with, after the U.S. Supreme Court 
declared it unconstitutional earlier this year 
in Shelby County v. Holder, in which the 
court said that the data used for pre-
clearance was useless because it was more 
than 40 years old.
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“The League of Dangerous Mapmakers” 
The Atlantic 
Robert Draper 
September 19, 2012 
 
Every 10 years, after U.S. census workers 
have fanned out across the nation, a snowy-
haired gentleman by the name of Tom 
Hofeller takes up anew his quest to destroy 
Democrats. He packs his bag and his laptop 
with its special Maptitude software, kisses 
his wife of 46 years, pats his West Highland 
white terrier, Kara, and departs his home in 
Alexandria, Virginia, for a United States that 
he will help carve into a jigsaw of disunity. 
Where Hofeller travels depends to some 
degree on the migratory patterns of his 
fellow Americans over the previous decade. 
As the census shows, some states will have 
swelled in population, while others will have 
dwindled. The states that gained the most 
people are entitled, under the Constitution, 
to additional representation in the form of 
new congressional districts, which (since the 
law allows only 435 such districts) are 
wrenched from the states that lost the most 
people. After the 2010 census, eight states 
(all in the South and the West) gained 
congressional districts, which were stripped 
from 10 others (in the Midwest and the East 
Coast, as well as Katrina-ravaged 
Louisiana). 
The creation of a new congressional district, 
or the loss of an old one, affects every 
district around it, necessitating new maps. 
Even states not adding or losing 
congressional representatives need new 
district maps that reflect the population 
shifts within their borders, so that residents 
are equally represented no matter where they 
live. This ritual carving and paring of the 
United States into 435 sovereign units, 
known as redistricting, was intended by the 
Framers solely to keep democracy’s 
electoral scales balanced. Instead, 
redistricting today has become the most 
insidious practice in American politics—a 
way, as the opportunistic machinations 
following the 2010 census make evident, for 
our elected leaders to entrench themselves in 
435 impregnable garrisons from which they 
can maintain political power while avoiding 
demographic realities. 
For the past four decades, it is what Tom 
Hofeller has done for a living. 
Hofeller maintains an office at the 
Republican National Committee on Capitol 
Hill, though he is now the RNC’s paid 
consultant rather than, as in years past, its 
official redistricting director. At 69, he is a 
professorial if somewhat impish fellow (in 
his early days, a California House speaker 
dubbed him “the kid with the shit-eating 
grin”) who is more than content not to be a 
household name. His after-hours life 
includes singing tenor in his church choir 
and reading multitudes of books that seldom 
have anything to do with politics. Hofeller’s 
earliest clients included Democrats, and 
today he describes himself as a moderate 
Republican. The adjective is irrelevant, 
however. His chosen field is, according to 
Georgia Congressman and House 
227 
 
Republican redistricting vice chair Lynn 
Westmoreland, “the nastiest form of politics 
that there is”: Tom Hofeller’s objective is to 
design wombs for his team and tombs for 
the other guys. 
And so his cyclical travels take him mainly 
to states where the Republicans are likely to 
be drawing the new maps. (In most states, an 
appointed committee consisting of 
legislators from the majority party produces 
the map, which is then brought to the 
legislative body for a vote. Other states 
relegate the duties to an appointed 
commission.) At meetings, Hofeller gives a 
PowerPoint presentation titled “What I’ve 
Learned About Redistricting—The Hard 
Way!” Like its author, the presentation is 
both learned and a bit hokey, with 
admonitions like “Expect the unexpected” 
and “Don’t get ‘cute.’ Remember, this IS 
legislation!” He warns legislators to resist 
the urge to overindulge, to snatch up every 
desirable precinct within reach, when 
drawing their own districts. 
But Hofeller’s helpful tips give way to the 
sinister warnings of a gimlet-eyed, semi--
clandestine political operative: “Make sure 
your security is real.” “Make sure your 
computer is in a PRIVATE location.” 
“ ‘Emails are the tool of the devil.’ Use 
personal contact or a safe phone!” “Don’t 
reveal more than necessary.” “BEWARE of 
non-partisan, or bi-partisan, staff bearing 
gifts. They probably are not your friends.” 
Be discreet. Plan ahead. Follow the law. 
Don’t overreach. Tom Hofeller relishes the 
blood sport of redistricting, but there is a 
responsible way—as Hofeller himself 
demonstrated this past cycle in the artful (if 
baldly partisan) redrawing of North 
Carolina’s maps—and also a reckless way. 
So that his message will penetrate, he tells 
audiences horror stories about states that 
ignored his warnings and went with maps 
that either were tossed out by the federal 
courts or created more political problems 
than they solved. 
Already Hofeller has picked out which 
cautionary tale he will relay during the next 
decennial tour. The new horror story, he’s 
decided, will be Texas, which stood, this 
past cycle, as a powerful example of how 
reckless a redistricting process can become. 
That mangled effort also provides a stark 
contrast to the maps Hofeller helped create 
in North Carolina—drawings that 
demonstrate how in the blood sport of 
redistricting, the most cravenly political 
results are won with calculating prudence. 
As the election returns rolled in on the 
evening of November 2, 2010, Hofeller had 
already started gearing up for the next round 
of redistricting. “I’m sitting and watching, 
less interested than many in the congres-
sional races,” he recalled. “I’m the one 
saying ‘Okay, so we won Congress. The 
question is, are we going to keep it?’ And 
then what I see is that we gained 700 state 
legislative seats. The night just kept getting 
better and better. Things happened in some 
states”—in terms of controlling whole 
legislative bodies—“that we never expected. 
Alabama! North Carolina!” 
It seemed like Reconstruction all over again 
for the GOP. Because the Republican 
tsunami coincided with the 2010 census, 
Tom Hofeller’s party was suddenly able to 
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redraw many of the 435 congressional maps 
to its own partisan advantage. 
Without asking for guidance from Hofeller 
or other veterans of the trade, delirious party 
officials predicted that after all the 
connivances were set in motion, the GOP 
would be able to reward itself with an 
additional 15 safe House seats before a 
single vote was cast in the 2012 elections. 
It hasn’t quite turned out that way. Partly 
this is because Democrats understood the 
stakes and went to extraordinary lengths to 
blunt the assault. In California, the 
Democrats (according to e-mails obtained 
by ProPublica) successfully swayed a newly 
formed independent citizens’ redistricting 
commission, through an intricately 
coordinated guerrilla operation that will 
likely accrue them six or seven new seats. In 
Republican-controlled Florida, Nancy 
Pelosi—in relentless pursuit of the House 
speakership she lost after the 2010 
midterms—helped fund the successful “Fair 
Districts” referendum to ban partisan 
redistricting. The measure seems to have 
persuaded Florida map-drawers to exhibit 
some self-restraint, and thus a number of 
surefire Republican seats were wiped from 
the boards. Of course, Pelosi has not 
suggested that the Fair Districts concept be 
applied to states where her party wields 
legislative control, such as Maryland and 
Illinois, where the Democrats further cut 
into the GOP’s gains by drawing nakedly 
partisan maps that simply vaporized 
Republican-held districts. 
Tom Hofeller certainly did his part to 
maximize the returns on the GOP’s 2010 
electoral bounty. Hired by North Carolina’s 
top GOP legislators just after the midterms 
to advise in the drawing of their state’s new 
maps, the political cartographer spent many 
hours on the phone with the state 
legislature’s redistricting chairmen. 
(Hofeller is careful to avoid leaving an e-
mail trail. As his PowerPoint presentation 
cautions, “A journey to legal HELL starts 
with but a single misstatement! … 
Remember recent e-mail disasters!!!”) 
While talking, Hofeller would expertly 
manipulate his computer’s Maptitude 
software, a lightning-fast graphics system 
that processes neighborhood population 
data, including racial composition, so that a 
user can draw and redraw hypothetical 
district lines. 
By July 2011, Hofeller had helped produce 
what a Democratic operative ruefully terms 
“exceptionally smart” maps—ones that, 
assuming they survive a lingering court 
challenge, may very well install a 10–3 GOP 
stronghold in place of the present 7–6 
Democratic congressional majority. 
Hofeller already knew North Carolina, the 
focal point of several landmark redistricting 
cases in which he’d testified, well. The Tar 
Heel State has a history of election 
discrimination and is therefore one of the 
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act, which requires that 
electoral maps be approved by either a 
federal court or the Justice Department. 
(Like all other states, North Carolina is also 
covered by Section 2, which forbids 
discriminatory practices more broadly.) 
Hofeller and the other Republican 
mapmakers therefore took particular care 
not to “retrogress” the racial makeup of the 
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districts represented by the African-
American Democrats G. K. Butterfield and 
Mel Watt—since doing so would have 
meant running afoul of the Voting Rights 
Act. 
Instead, he reserved his chief mischief for 
the remaining districts. Hofeller and his 
cohort hoarded several of Raleigh’s white 
precincts and moved them into the 2nd 
District, which had been held by Democrats 
for 108 of the previous 110 years, until a 
former intensive-care nurse named Renee 
Ellmers rode the Tea Party wave to an upset 
victory in 2010. The new drawings would 
give the neophyte Ellmers a safe Republican 
district to last at least at decade. 
Recognizing that North Carolina’s many 
Democratic voters had to be put somewhere, 
the mapmakers shoveled as many as 
possible into the Democratic districts of 
Watt and of David Price, a former Duke 
professor who represented the liberal bastion 
of Chapel Hill. Most of those Democrats, 
however, were stripped from the districts of 
the moderate Democratic incumbents Mike 
McIntyre, Larry Kissell, and Brad Miller. In 
the Democrat Heath Shuler’s 11th District, 
the mapmakers simply gouged out the 
progressive core, Asheville, and affixed it to 
the 10th, the state’s most Republican district 
over the previous 60 years. The new maps 
have made quite an impact. Shuler and 
Miller have announced that they will not 
seek another term. McIntyre (whose house 
has now been drawn out of his own district) 
and Kissell are widely viewed as among the 
most imperiled Democrats facing reelection 
in November. 
Progressive groups immediately filed suit 
challenging the North Carolina maps, 
contending that the state deliberately diluted 
minority voting power. Hofeller happens to 
be an old hand at redistricting litigation, and 
the maps will probably survive into the next 
decade. (Meanwhile, in a dazzling show of 
circular logic, Phil Berger, the top 
Republican state senator, recently refused to 
allow consideration of a redistricting-reform 
bill that he had supported back when his 
party was in the minority, citing the fact that 
North Carolina is “engaged in litigation on 
that issue.”) 
Still, legal battles have been the other major 
factor in diminishing the Republican Party’s 
success. Given that blacks and Latinos tend 
to vote overwhelmingly Democratic, 
Republicans have often taken pains to 
maximize their control of the districts in a 
way that does not violate the terms of the 
Voting Rights Act. But the new census 
results have presented the GOP with a 
particularly confounding puzzle—one that 
lies at the center of this cycle’s redistricting 
controversies. On the one hand, the biggest 
gains in U.S. population over the past 
decade have been in two Republican-
controlled states: Florida, which thereby 
received two new congressional districts, 
and Texas, which was granted a whopping 
four. 
But on the other hand, most of each state’s 
new residents are African Americans and 
(especially) Hispanics. In Texas, the 
population has swelled by 4.3 million over 
the past decade. Of those new residents, 
2.8 million are Hispanic and more than half 
a million are African American. While those 
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groups grew at a rate of 42 percent and 
22 percent, respectively, the growth in white 
Texans was a meager 4.2 percent. In other 
words: without the minority growth, 
Texas—now officially a majority-minority 
state—would not have received a single new 
district. The possibility that a GOP map-
drawer would use all those historically 
Democratic-leaning transplants as a means 
of gaining Republican seats might strike a 
redistricting naïf as undemocratic. 
And yet that’s exactly what the Texas 
redistricting bosses did last year. Shrugging 
off the warnings of Tom Hofeller and other 
Washington Republicans, the Texans 
produced lavishly brazen maps that resulted 
in a net gain of four districts for Republicans 
and none for minority populations. The 
entirely predictable consequence is that the 
Texas maps have spent more than a year 
bouncing between three federal courts, 
including the Supreme Court. The legal 
uncertainty has had national ramifications. It 
meant, for example, postponing the Texas 
primary from March 6 until May 29, which 
cost Texas its role as a prominent player in 
the Super Tuesday presidential 
sweepstakes—a very lucky break for the 
eventual nominee, Mitt Romney, who likely 
would have lost the state to Newt Gingrich 
or Rick Santorum. 
But the chaos produced by the overreach in 
Texas isn’t anomalous. Rather, it is very 
much in keeping with the new winner-take-
all culture of redistricting, an endeavor that 
has somehow managed to grow in both 
sophistication and crassness, like an ageless 
strain of cancer that inhabits a host body for 
so long that the two seem inseparable, even 
as the former quietly destroys the latter from 
the inside out. 
How ingrained is the practice of politically 
motivated redistricting in America? So 
ingrained that it existed even before 
Congress did. Late in 1788, just after 
Virginia voted to ratify the Constitution and 
thereby join the Union, Patrick Henry 
persuaded his state’s legislature to fashion 
the nascent 5th Congressional District in 
such a way as to force Henry’s political 
enemy James Madison, of Montpelier, to run 
against the formidable James Monroe, of 
Highland. Madison prevailed and later went 
on to become America’s principal author of 
the Bill of Rights as well as its fourth 
president. Serving as his second vice 
president was Elbridge Gerry, who as the 
governor of Massachusetts in 1812 had 
presided over a redrawing of the state map 
so blatant in its partisan manipulations that 
the curiously tailored shape of one Boston-
area district resembled a salamander. The 
term gerrymander has been used ever since 
to describe the contorting of districts beyond 
all reason save political gain. 
Though the constitutionally intended 
purpose of redistricting is to maintain proper 
apportionment of elected representatives, 
several states, for much of the 20th century, 
didn’t bother to adjust their district 
boundaries at all. The result, in Texas for 
instance, was that a powerful rural legislator 
like House Speaker Sam Rayburn could 
represent some 200,000 voters, while in the 
adjacent Dallas district, Bruce Alger 
represented roughly 900,000. In 1962, the 
Supreme Court ruled that such 
malapportionment violated the Fourteenth 
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Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection 
under the law. One of the dissenters, Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, warned against judges’ 
entering a “political thicket.” The high court 
subsequently ignored him. In the 1980s, the 
Court took umbrage at the redistricting 
orchestrated by Georgia Democrats and their 
leader, state Representative Joe Mack 
Wilson, who flatly declared, “I don’t want to 
draw nigger districts.” A decade later, the 
Court argued that efforts to boost minority 
representation could also go too far, citing 
Mel Watt’s North Carolina district, a wormy 
creature of such narrowness that, so it was 
said, a person driving down Interstate 85 
with doors open on both sides could kill 
people in two districts. Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor tsk-tsked that “appearances do 
matter,” and the Supreme Court decreed in 
1996 that even districts drawn so as to 
maximize minority representation should 
retain “compactness, contiguity and respect 
for political subdivisions." 
O’Connor’s admonition notwithstanding, as 
works of art, redistricting maps continue to 
evoke a crazed but symbolically rich 
dreamscape of yearnings, sentimentality, 
vendettas, and hyper-realism in American 
political life. Districts weave this way and 
that to include a Congress member’s 
childhood school, a mother-in-law’s 
residence, a wealthy donor’s office, or, out 
of spite, an adversary’s pet project. When 
touring Republican strongholds, Tom 
Hofeller enjoys showing audiences the 
contours of Georgia’s 13th District, as 
proposed after the 2010 census, which he 
likens to “flat-cat roadkill.” (The map that 
was ultimately approved is shaped more like 
a squirrel that hasn’t yet been hit by a car.) 
This redistricting cycle’s focus of 
wonderment, in Hofeller’s view, is 
Maryland’s splatter-art 3rd District, which 
reminds him of an “amoeba convention.” He 
tends not to mention the gimpy-legged 
facsimile that is his own rendition of North 
Carolina’s 4th District. 
The byzantine trade of redistricting was long 
dominated by brainy eccentrics like Hofeller 
and his Democratic counterparts Mark 
Gersh and Michael Berman. But that began 
to change in the 1990s, when the availability 
of mapping software (such as Maptitude, 
RedAppl, and autoBound) and block-by-
block census data for the whole country 
opened up the field to a waiting world of 
political geeks. The democratization of 
redistricting—made manifest last year in 
Virginia, which held a student competition, 
complete with cash prizes, to draw the best 
maps—is a lovely thing, perhaps. But as one 
redistricting veteran told me, “There’s an 
old saying: Give a child a hammer, and the 
world becomes a nail. Give the chairman of 
a state redistricting committee a powerful 
enough computer and block-level census 
data, so that he suddenly discovers he can 
draw really weird and aggressive districts—
and he will.” 
This amateur-hour dynamic presaged the 
Texas redistricting fiasco. My native state 
has a long heritage of bellicose 
gerrymandering, which began with 
pronouncedly racist maps drawn by 
Democrats more than half a century ago and 
continued with Tom DeLay’s knee-capping 
of Democratic incumbents in his notorious 
mid-census redistricting in 2003. But no one 
ever accused the DeLay machine of being 
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out of its depth. In 2011, by contrast, the 
individual principally responsible for 
drawing the state’s congressional district 
maps, Ryan Downton, was a lawyer and co-
owner of a medical-imaging firm. The 
seemingly random hiring of a relative novice 
like Downton (who was defeated in 
May 2012 as a Republican candidate for the 
state legislature) was in keeping with a 
willful ignorance embraced by the state 
legislature’s two appointed redistricting 
chiefs, neither of whom had the slightest 
experience in this arcane field. (Downton 
says he was hired because of his litigation 
expertise, since so many redistricting cases 
end up in court.) As the veteran Texas 
Democratic redistricting strategist Matt 
Angle told me, “People who actually have 
an understanding of the Voting Rights Act—
like Hofeller, who’s 10 times more 
competent than the people who drew these 
maps—they wouldn’t have been part of 
this.” 
According to one of the Texas Republicans 
intimately involved in the map-drawing 
project, “Tom [Hofeller] and [Republican 
National Committee counsel] Dale Oldham 
created an adversarial relationship with the 
leadership here in Texas. Incredibly brilliant 
people who tend to think they’re right, and if 
you don’t agree with them, they don’t put 
much effort towards convincing you. And 
that rubbed raw with the leadership here in 
Texas." 
Whether through personality conflicts or out 
of hubris, the Texas Republicans decided to 
do things their own way, with no guidance 
from Hofeller or other Washingtonians. 
When I asked Lynn Westmoreland, the 
House redistricting vice chair, to describe 
his role in the state’s redistricting process, 
he replied in a weary voice, “Well, the 
Texas legislature basically told me, ‘We’re 
Texas, and we’re gonna handle our maps.’ 
You know, I’m just saying that when you 
have a population increase of 4 million, and 
the majority of that is minority, you’d better 
take that into consideration." 
These statistical realities left the 
Republican-controlled state legislature and 
Governor Rick Perry with three choices 
when it came to redistricting. They could 
bow to the demographics, draw three or four 
new “minority-opportunity districts”—in 
which Latino and/or African American 
voters would have the opportunity to elect 
the candidate of their choice—and then set 
themselves to the task, as Governor George 
W. Bush once did, of appealing to the state’s 
fastest-growing population. Or they could 
opt for the middle ground and create one or 
two such districts. Or, says Gerry Hebert, a 
lawyer who has handled numerous election 
and redistricting cases for Democrats, “they 
could use the redistricting process to cling to 
what power they have and hang on for as 
long as they can." 
Earlier this year, I had a breakfast of waffles 
and fried chicken wings at the Poly Grill, a 
Fort Worth diner in the heart of a formerly 
Anglo east-side neighborhood named 
Polytechnic Heights, which, as a testament 
to the region’s fluid demographics, is now 
thoroughly black and Hispanic. With me 
was Marc Veasey, a 41-year-old African-
American Democrat and lifelong Fort Worth 
resident. Veasey is the community’s 
representative in the state legislature and 
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would like to be its U.S. congressman. 
Specifically, Veasey has been expecting one 
of Texas’ four new districts to be placed 
here, because of the explosive population 
growth of blacks and Latinos in the area. 
Many House Republicans, like the Texan 
and House Judiciary Committee Chairman 
Lamar Smith, reportedly agreed with Veasey 
that a new minority-opportunity district 
belonged here—though for different 
reasons. Failing to create such a district 
would mean that each of the half dozen–plus 
Republican members of Congress in the 
Metroplex would have to absorb increasing 
numbers of minority voters. Several once-
safe GOP districts might thereby become 
swing districts by the end of the decade. 
Better, as Smith and others saw it, to 
preserve the existing seats by funneling the 
minority population into a new district. 
But the Texas map-drawers refused to create 
such a district in the area. Over breakfast, 
Veasey explained to me what that lack of 
minority representation meant. Presently, 
Polytechnic Heights—one of many minority 
enclaves in the Metroplex that DeLay’s 
redistricters spread across five Republican 
districts, thereby “cracking” a potent voting 
bloc—falls in the district of Michael 
Burgess, a white Republican who last year 
told a local Tea Party group that he favors 
impeaching President Obama. “[Burgess] 
goes around saying ‘I represent more 
African Americans than any other 
Republican in the entire U.S. Congress. 
Look at me, look at my outreach,’ ” Veasey 
said. “There’s no way African Americans 
would ever have any influence in this 
district at all. His votes prove it. His rhetoric 
proves it.” 
In February, after court testimony in San 
Antonio and Washington, D.C., Veasey and 
his fellow Democrats prevailed in a suit 
charging the state of Texas with producing 
maps that discriminated against blacks and 
Hispanics. A three-judge panel ordered that 
the new 33rd District be drawn into 
Veasey’s stomping grounds—and Veasey 
promptly entered the race. He won the 
primary, and in November he’ll likely 
capture what will presumably be a safe 
Democratic seat. 
While the San Antonio court awarded the 
33rd District to the Democrats, it also left 
largely intact the state’s drastic redrawing of 
the 27th District, a territory that includes 
Corpus Christi, the home of Congressman 
Blake Farenthold. In the 2010 election, 
despite being an Anglo Republican who 
does not speak Spanish in a district that’s 
74 percent Hispanic, Farenthold upset the 
longtime Democratic incumbent, Solomon 
Ortiz, by a margin of about 800 votes. “I 
won, which disproves the fact that all 
Hispanics vote Democrat,” Farenthold told 
me. “I go back to my premise that most 
Hispanics, especially in south Texas, if 
given a test on the issues that would place 
you as Democrat or Republican, would fall 
into the Republican category.” 
In fact, Farenthold’s opponent, Ortiz, 
received 86.6 percent of the Latino votes 
cast. But Hispanic turnout in the 27th was 
abysmal that year. The Tea Party–backed 
Farenthold garnered more than 80 percent of 
the non-Latino vote, which put him over the 
top. 
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Over freshly shucked oysters at a Corpus 
Christi restaurant one afternoon, I relayed to 
Farenthold the testimony of the state GOP’s 
map-drawers: basically, they all 
acknowledged that Farenthold would have 
had a hard time being reelected in 2012 if 
they hadn’t drawn him a friendlier map. 
District 27, which they obligingly 
constructed for him last year, sheds the 
border city of Brownsville, climbs up the 
coast and swallows portions of Ron Paul’s 
existing district, then abruptly hooks 
westward into the deeply conservative 
Bastrop County. The new configuration 
resembles a Glock pistol held at a 45-degree 
angle. If Farenthold was so sure he had a 
Hispanic following, I asked him, then why 
hadn’t he insisted on keeping his district as 
it was? 
Farenthold, whom I find to be one of the 
more charmingly plainspoken members of 
Congress, laughed. “Listen,” he said of the 
new map, “I’ll take a 60-plus [percent] 
Republican district over a swing district any 
day. Duh!” 
Given Congress’s low standing, I wondered 
aloud to Farenthold whether allowing 
incumbents like him to escape the wrath of 
his constituents by installing him in a safer 
district wasn’t thwarting democracy. 
“I’m willing to run on my record in any 
district I live in,” the freshman maintained. 
He pointed out that “at least 50 percent” of 
his new district would be composed of his 
present constituents. He added, “On a 
metaphysical level, sure, there’s gonna be 
some politics in it. But elections have 
consequences. You elect a Republican 
legislature, you’ll get more Republican-
drawn districts. It works both ways.” 
I asked Farenthold if being in the new 
district would in any way change how he 
conducted himself. “The district I’m in now 
is a swing district,” he said. “This [new] 
district is a much stronger Republican 
district. You say the same thing, but you use 
different words. Immigration would be an 
issue—you’re probably not going to change 
your mind on your core immigration issues, 
but you’ll be a little softer about how you 
talk about it in a swing district than in a 
harder-core Republican district.” 
During his last few years in the House, John 
Tanner of Tennessee pursued a lonely quest 
to interest his colleagues in a redistricting-
reform bill. Tanner was a co-founder of the 
fiscally conservative Blue Dog Democrats, 
who were all but wiped out in 2010, the year 
Tanner himself decided to head for the 
sidelines. He had introduced his bill first in 
2005, when the Republicans controlled the 
House, then in 2007 and again in 2009, 
when Democrats were in charge and Nancy 
Pelosi was the speaker. “She and Steny 
[Hoyer, then the majority leader,] said, 
‘That’s a good idea, we’ll take a look at it,’ ” 
he recalled with a smirk. “But the hard left 
and the hard right don’t want it.” 
Tanner says that redistricting’s impact has 
evolved over time, from simply creating safe 
seats for incumbents to creating rigid 
conservative and liberal districts, wherein 
the primary contests are a race to the 
extremes and the general elections are 
preordained. “When the [final] election 
[outcome] is [determined] in the party 
primary—which now it is, in all but less 
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than 100 of the 435 seats—then a member 
comes [to Washington] politically crippled,” 
the retired congressman told me. “Look, 
everyone knows we have a structural deficit, 
and the only way out of it is to raise 
revenues and cut entitlements. No one who’s 
reasonable thinks otherwise. But what 
happens? The Democrats look over their left 
shoulder, and if someone suggests cutting a 
single clerk out of the Department of 
Agriculture, they go crazy. Republicans look 
over their right shoulder, and if someone 
proposes raising taxes on Donald Trump’s 
income by $10, they say it’ll be the end of 
the world. So these poor members come to 
Washington paralyzed, unable to do what 
they all know must be done to keep the 
country from going adrift, for fear that 
they’ll get primaried. 
“It’s imposed a parliamentary model on a 
representative system,” Tanner went on. “It 
makes sense for Democrats to vote one way 
and Republicans to vote another in a 
parliamentary system. It’s irrational in a 
representative form of government. So what 
that’s done is two things. First, it’s made it 
virtually impossible to compromise. And 
second, as we’ve seen in this past decade, 
it’s damn near abolished the ability and 
responsibility of Congress to hold the 
executive branch of the same party 
accountable. The Bush years, we were 
appropriating $100 billion at a time for the 
Iraq War with no hearings, for fear that 
[those would] embarrass the administration. 
Hell yeah, that’s due to redistricting! The 
Republicans in Congress and the Bush 
administration became part of the same 
team. We’re totally abdicating our 
responsibility of checks and balances. 
”Tanner’s bill (which fellow Blue Dogs 
Heath Shuler and Jim Cooper reintroduced 
last year, to similar non-effect) would have 
established national standards for 
redistricting and shifted the map-drawing 
duties from state legislatures to bipartisan 
commissions. Such commissions already 
exist in a handful of states, while Iowa relies 
on nonpartisan map-drawers whose end 
product is then voted on by the state 
legislature. Tom Hofeller points to the 
California citizens’ commission as evidence 
that politics will inevitably find its way back 
into the process. “There’s no such thing as 
nonpartisan,” he told me. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hofeller insists that 
the dire consequences of his vocation are 
overblown. “We’ve had gerrymandering all 
along, so there’s no proof that that’s the 
cause of all the polarization,” he told me. 
“I’m here to tell you that there are two other 
major factors that are much, much more 
prevalent than redistricting. One is the 24-
hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week news media, 
where you only get noticed if you’re 
extreme. And the other is McCain-Feingold, 
which pushed a great deal of money to the 
extremes.” In limiting the size of financial 
contributions to national parties, the 
campaign finance–reform law encouraged 
donors to funnel their cash to opaque outside 
groups. 
“That’s part of the problem,” Tanner 
conceded when I asked him about the super-
PAC ads flooding the airwaves. “But you 
can trace how the members got here back to 
gerrymandering. I don’t give a damn how 
much money you spend. These guys are 
gonna be responsive to the people that 
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elected them, to avoid a party primary. And 
so they come here to represent their political 
party, not their district or their country. That 
attitude has infected the Senate, too. Look at 
Orrin Hatch,” he said, referring to the 
veteran Utah senator who fought off a 
primary challenge from an ultra-
conservative. “Now you’d think he was an 
original member of the Tea Party. It makes 
you sick to see him grovel.” 
Some redistricting experts argue that 
Americans have polarized themselves, by 
gravitating toward homogenous 
communities, a demographic trend observed 
in Bill Bishop and Robert Cushing’s 2008 
book, The Big Sort. But, says one Texas 
Republican map-drawer, “redistricting has 
amplified the Big Sort by creating safe 
Republican and safe Democratic districts. 
Look at Texas. If you count [Blake Farent-
hold’s] 27th as the result of a fluke election, 
the [racially polarized West Texas] 23rd is 
the only swing district in the state.” In this 
sense, the only difference that the new maps 
will make is that instead of one swing 
district out of 32, there will now be one out 
of 36. As to what this portends, former 
Texas Congressman Martin Frost, a 
Democrat, told me, “I won’t mention anyone 
by name, but I know certain Republicans in 
the Texas delegation who would be inclined 
to be more moderate, if they didn’t have to 
fear a primary challenge.” 
One Texas Republican who dipped his toe in 
the moderate waters, by voting for last 
summer’s debt-ceiling deal, was 
Congressman Michael Burgess. Tea Partiers 
lambasted him to his face, saying, “You 
caved.” An analysis by National Journal 
found that politicians like Burgess were the 
exception—that most House members who 
voted to raise the debt ceiling were from 
swing districts, while “the further a 
member’s district is from the political 
center, the more likely it is that he or she 
opposed the compromise.” 
We know what happened after that whole 
debacle: the Dow Jones plummeted, 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded America’s 
credit rating, and Congress’s approval rating 
sank to an unprecedented low of 9 percent. 
That intensity of public disgust has hardly 
abated, and it is felt across the political 
spectrum: according to an NBC/Wall Street 
Journal poll released this past January, at 
least 56 percent of all liberals, moderates, 
and conservatives would like to see 
everyone in the legislative branch fired this 
November. 
If this is so, then perhaps Tom Hofeller is 
right. Perhaps redistricting reform is 
unnecessary. Perhaps instead the system is 
self-correcting: the extremists whom the 
map-drawers have helped to create will be 
judged as obstructionists unworthy of their 
safe seats and, by means of electoral 
laxative, flushed out of the body politic. 
Thus cleansed, America can then slowly 
return to what James Madison called “this 
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual 
animosities.” When that happens, we know 
who will be there to draw the battle lines. 
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NEW TOPIC: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER FISHER V. TEXAS 
“Fisher vs. Texas Dismissed Again; is it Headed Back to Supreme Court?” 
Forbes 
Daniel Fisher 
July 15, 2014 
 
An appeals court dismissed the affirmative-
action lawsuit of frustrated University of 
Texas applicant Abigail Fisher after 
reconsidering it in light of last year’s U.S. 
Supreme Court decision tightening the 
standards for race-conscious college 
admissions. The appeals-court ruling drew a 
strong dissent that suggested the majority 
got it wrong, however, and if Fisher follows 
up on her vow to appeal the question may 
wind up in front of the Supreme Court 
again. 
In a decision released today, two of the three 
judges on a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in New Orleans held that Fisher 
failed to make her case that UT had engaged 
in unconstitutional discrimination by using 
race as a factor in some of its admissions 
decisions. 
“We find force in the argument that race 
here is a necessary part, albeit one of many 
parts, of the decisional matrix,” Judge 
Patrick Higgenbotham wrote, in an opinion 
joined by Judge Carolyn Dineen King. 
Fisher, who is white, was rejected by UT in 
2004 and subsequently graduated from 
another university, but her case has lived on 
as a key challenge to the constitutionality of 
affirmative action. In a strong dissent, Judge 
Emilio M. Garza said the majority allowed 
the school to escape the strict scrutiny 
required under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Fisher vs. University of Texas. 
“Simply put, the Constitution does not treat 
race -conscious admissions programs 
differently because their stated aim is to 
help, not to harm,” Garza wrote. By 
allowing UT to set a vague goal of “critical 
mass” for certain minorities — primarily 
black and Latino students — Garza said, the 
majority failed to give Fisher the 
opportunity to prove that the UT program 
wasn’t narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state goal. “Critical mass” was 
never defined in the pleadings and the 
majority also failed to address the question 
of how anybody could determine when it 
has been achieved, he said. 
“Accordingly, it is impossible to determine 
whether the University’s use of racial 
classifications in its admissions process is 
narrowly tailored to its stated goal — 
essentially, its ends remain unknown,” he 
said. 
Fisher’s lawyer Edward Blum told the Los 
Angeles Times his client would appeal this 
latest decision. 
“We are disappointed,” Blum said. “But this 
court was proven wrong by the Supreme 
Court in 2013 and we believe they will be 
proven wrong again.” 
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The Fifth Circuit majority opinion examined 
the recent history of UT admissions and 
concluded that the university had achieved 
substantial diversity by admitting the 
majority of students under the so-called Top 
Ten Percent plan, which requires UT to 
accept any students in the top 10% of their 
high school classes. That plan, required by 
state law, is designed to make a virtue out of 
the severe racial and ethnic segregation in 
Texas public schools by forcing the 
university to accept applicants from diverse 
backgrounds. 
This race-neutral policy, which supplies 
more than 80% of students, works against 
black and Latino students who find 
themselves in majority-white schools and 
other well-rounded applicants outside the 
top 10% of their classes. 
“With its blindness to all but the single 
dimension of class rank, the Top Ten 
Percent Plan came with significant costs to 
diversity and academic integrity, passing 
over large numbers of highly qualified 
minority and non -minority applicants,” 
Higgenbotham wrote. 
To address the “nearly intractable problem” 
of racial and ethnic diversity, the school 
adopted a “holistic review” process that the 
Supreme Court approved in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, a 2003 decision upholding a 
University of Michigan Law School 
affirmative action program. That program 
considered race as one of a number of 
qualifications for admission; in UT’s case, 
race was among a bundle of factors that had 
a slightly higher weighting than essays. 
Only a minority of students are accepted 
through the holistic review process and the 
majority of those are white. In the year 
Fisher applied, 17,000 applicants who 
applied outside the Top Ten Percent 
program competed for 1,200 remaining seats 
at the 38,000-student school. 
Fisher argued the minimal impact of the 
holistic review process argued against it 
being an essential tool for achieving a policy 
goal, and Garza agreed. The university 
failed to explain, and the majority failed to 
require to it to explain, how the program 
advanced the goal of diversity, he said. 
Garza also criticized the “alarming 
conclusion” of the majority that the Top Ten 
Percent plan didn’t accept enough minority 
students, or not the right type of candidates. 
The court assumes, he said, “that minority 
students from majority-minority Texas high 
schools are inherently limited in their ability 
to contribute to the University’s vision of a 
diverse student body.” 
The proper analysis would allow the 
university to determine that racial and ethnic 
diversity are important goals, he said, but 
leave to courts the decision of whether the 
tools the university uses are narrowly 
tailored to achieve them. 
“Because the role played by race in the 
admissions decision is essentially 
unknowable, I cannot find that these racial 
classifications are necessary or narrowly 
tailored to achieving the University’s 
interest in diversity,” said Garza, a George 
H.W. Bush appointee. 
The decision and dissent illustrate the almost 
intractable conflict between opponents and 
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supporters of affirmative action as the 
Supreme Court continues to chip away at the 
allowable uses of race in government 
decisions. The majority, relying on earlier 
Supreme Court decisions, says UT can 
continue to pursue the goal of diversity, 
which it defines as some unspecified, higher 
number of black and Latino students. Garza 
hews to the absolutist line of Chief 
Justice John Roberts, who once famously 
declared: “The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race.” 
 
Garza, citing the landmark 1967 decision 
in Loving v. Virginia, striking down that 
state’s law against interracial marriages, 
said: “Any official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic 
origin is inherently suspect.” 
It remains to be seen if the Supreme Court 
will find enough material in the majority’s 
decision to accept yet another appeal of this 
long-running case.
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“Finally! The Fisher Decision in Plain English” 
SCOTUSblog 
Amy Howe 
June 24, 2013 
 
Today the Court finally issued its decision 
in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 
the challenge to that school’s use of race in 
its undergraduate admissions process.  Since 
the Court announced last year that it would 
review the case, the university and 
supporters of affirmative action had feared 
the worst:  that the Court would strike down 
not only the university’s policy, but 
affirmative action more generally.  This 
morning the university learned that its 
admissions policy will at least live to fight 
another day, but it will face a tough test 
when the case goes back to the lower courts 
for further proceedings.  Let’s take a look in 
Plain English. 
As I explained in an earlier post, the case 
was filed by Abigail Fisher, a young woman 
from Texas who applied to the university 
but was rejected.  Fisher, who is white, then 
filed a lawsuit, arguing that she had been a 
victim of racial discrimination because 
minority students with less impressive 
credentials than hers had been 
admitted.  The university prevailed in the 
lower courts, but found a skeptical audience 
among the conservative Justices at oral 
argument at the Supreme Court.  Although 
Fisher and her lawyers made clear that they 
were not asking the Court to overrule its 
2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, ruling 
that the University of Michigan Law School 
could consider race in its admissions process 
as part of its efforts to achieve a diverse 
student body, the Court nonetheless seemed 
ready to put real restrictions on when and 
how universities can consider race. 
Today a broad majority of the Court 
reinforced that affirmative action must be 
strictly reviewed, but it did not outlaw those 
programs.  In an opinion that required only 
thirteen pages, the Court explained that a 
university’s use of race must meet a test 
known as “strict scrutiny.”  Under this test, a 
university’s use of affirmative action will be 
constitutional only if it is “narrowly 
tailored.”  The Court in Fisher took pains to 
make clear exactly what this means:  courts 
can no longer simply rubber-stamp a 
university’s determination that it needs to 
use affirmative action to have a diverse 
student body.  Instead, courts themselves 
will need to confirm that the use of race is 
“necessary” – that is, that there is no other 
realistic alternative that does not use race 
that would also create a diverse student 
body.  Because the lower court had not done 
so, the Court sent the case back for it to 
determine whether the university could 
make this showing. 
Justice Antonin Scalia joined the Court’s 
opinion, but he also wrote a separate, one-
paragraph concurring opinion in which he 
made clear that, if Fisher and her lawyers 
had asked the Court to do so, he would have 
voted to overrule the 2003 decision 
in Grutter and eliminate the use of 
affirmative action altogether.  Justice 
Clarence Thomas – who in his 
241 
 
autobiography blamed affirmative action for 
his problems finding a job after he graduated 
from Yale Law School in the 1970s – shared 
that view, but he opted to discuss his 
reasoning at length, in a twenty-page 
concurring opinion in which he suggested 
(among other things) that “the arguments 
advanced by the University in defense of 
discrimination are the same as those 
advanced by the segregationists.” 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the lone 
dissenter, but she still managed to produce a 
few zingers of her own in her sparse four-
page opinion.  Most notably, she pooh-
poohed the idea that the two alternatives to 
affirmative action suggested by Fisher and 
her lawyers – the school’s Top Ten Percent 
Plan, which offers automatic admission to 
any Texas high school student in the top ten 
percent of her class, and the review of 
applications without regard to race – are in 
fact “race-blind.”  Because race was actually 
at the heart of the Top Ten Percent Plan, she 
suggests, and because universities will still 
consider race even if they need to do so 
covertly, “only an ostrich could regard the 
supposedly race neutral alternatives as race 
unconscious.” 
How will the university’s policy fare in the 
lower courts?  Given the Top Ten Percent 
Plan’s success in achieving a diverse student 
body, the school could face an uphill battle 
in convincing the lower court that it needs to 
be able to consider race to fill the remaining 
slots.   And it may soon have lots of 
company in court, if today’s ruling leads to 
new lawsuits by spurned applicants at other 
schools. 
Given how long it took the Court to decide 
this case (nearly nine months), the seven-to-
one vote came as somewhat of a 
surprise.  Although it may be many years 
before we know for sure, it seems very 
possible that the end result was a 
compromise brokered to break a 
stalemate:  affirmative action survives at 
least in theory (which would gain the 
support of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor), 
but will be far more difficult to implement in 
practice (which would gain the support of 
the Court’s more conservative 
Justices).   But for now, and probably much 
to their relief, affirmative action is off the 
Justices’ plate – at least until fall, when they 
will hear oral arguments in a case 
challenging an amendment to the Michigan 
constitution that prohibits the use of 
affirmative action by public 
universities.  Stay tuned . . . we’ll be back to 
cover that one in Plain English too. 
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“Affirmative Action Fading From College Scene” 
USA Today 
Greg Toppo  
February 12, 2014 
 
After more than 60 years, is the end of the 
road near for affirmative action in college 
admissions? 
The idea of using race to help determine 
who gets a seat in public colleges has been 
under fire for decades. Eight states have 
essentially banned the practice, and a 
Michigan case pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court could prompt others to do 
the same. 
College officials nationwide got a wake-up 
call last June from the high court, which set 
a high bar for using race as part of a 
complex admissions program in Texas. 
Many observers say the combined weight of 
the two cases could finally push state 
universities to find another way to promote 
diversity. 
"All the trends are pointing against the 
continued use of race in admissions," says 
Richard Kahlenberg of the Washington, 
D.C.-based Century Foundation, a liberal 
think tank. Kahlenberg has for years 
advocated using family income,not race, as a 
way to ensure that public K-12 schools and 
colleges have a diverse student body. 
While the Supreme Court majority stopped 
short of outlawing race-based preferences in 
its landmark ruling in Fisher v. University of 
Texas in June, they said that colleges' use of 
preferences must be "narrowly tailored" and 
that colleges must prove that considering 
race is absolutely necessary to maintaining 
diversity. They sent the case back to a lower 
court, which recently heard new arguments. 
Observers say Fisher probably will end up 
back at the high court, bringing with it what 
could be the most definitive ruling so far on 
race in higher education. 
"Colleges are going to have to think about 
what to do to comply with Fisher 
standards," says Gary Orfield, co-founder of 
the Civil Rights Project at UCLA. 
Fisher is the latest in a string of affirmative 
action cases dating as far back as 1950, 
when the Supreme Court backed an effort by 
Heman Sweatt, an African-American 
student, to enroll at the University of Texas 
School of Law. The current originated in 
2008 when Abigail Fisher, a white high 
school student, sued Texas' flagship 
university in Austin after she was denied 
admission. She said the university's practice 
of using race as a factor violated the U.S. 
Constitution's 14th Amendment, as well as 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, two measures 
long used to protect the rights of minorities. 
For years, Texas' public university system 
has automatically admitted all students in 
the top 10% of their high school graduating 
class, but Fisher just missed the cutoff. She 
demanded that the university admit her 
anyway and asked a judge to stop the state 
from using race as a factor in admissions 
when considering those who don't earn 
automatic admission. The court heard 
arguments in October 2012 and sent the case 
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back to the lower court last June. In the 
meantime, Fisher attended and graduated 
from Louisiana State University. The 
University of Texas says its "holistic" 
admissions process considers students' race 
as well as test scores, community service, 
work experience and leadership skills, 
adding that the 10% rule drives most of its 
admissions. In 2010, the university reported 
that for the first time, white students 
represented a minority of incoming first-
time  freshmen. 
A year after hearing Fisher, the justices last 
October heard arguments in a case from 
Michigan, where a 2006 state constitutional 
amendment banned racial preferences in 
public university admissions. Seven other 
states — California, Florida, Washington, 
Arizona, Nebraska, Oklahoma and New 
Hampshire — do the same, and about 29% 
of students live in states where affirmative 
action is banned, Kahlenberg estimates. 
Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette 
says the state's position was summed up well 
by Chief Justice John Roberts, who said the 
best way to stop racial discrimination "is to 
stop discriminating on the basis of race." 
"Our constitution requires equal treatment in 
college admissions, which is an expression 
by 58% of Michigan voters in 2006 that says 
it is fundamentally wrong to treat people 
differently based on race or the color of their 
skin," Schuette says. "It's just wrong." 
A July 2013 study by Georgetown 
University scholars Anthony Carnevale and 
Jeff Strohl found that in 2009, white 
students were more "over-represented" 
among the USA's 468 most selective 
colleges than they had been in 1995. From 
1995 to 2009, the nationwide share of young 
people ages 18-24 who were white dropped 
6 percentage points, from 68% to 62%. But 
whites' share of freshman slots at the USA's 
most elite colleges dropped just 2 points 
during that same period, from 77% to 75%. 
Another study, by Orfield's Civil Rights 
Project, found that 15 years after California's 
ban on racial preferences went into effect, 
increased competition has dropped the share 
of black in-state high school graduates 
admitted to UCLA from 47.6% of applicants 
to 13.7%; the percentage of Latino students 
admitted dropped from 54.9% of applicants 
to 14.8%. The percentage of white students 
admitted also dropped, but not as sharply. 
Kahlenberg says the string of affirmative 
action cases has pushed universities to find 
alternative ways to create diverse freshman 
classes. He notes that Texas' 10% rule has 
resulted in higher levels of black and Latino 
representation. Other state systems have 
gotten similar results by eliminating 
preferences for children of alumni and 
bolstering financial aid, among other 
measures. These strategies have led to more 
racially and economically diverse classes "in 
a way the Supreme Court can't touch," he 
says. "I think that's the future of affirmative 
action." 
Recent surveys have found that Americans 
don't like using race in admissions, 
Kahlenberg says, "but on the other hand, 
Americans don't want to see universities and 
American higher education re-segregated." 
A decision in the Michigan case, Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, is 
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expected this spring. If a majority of eight 
justices rule in Michigan's favor (Elena 
Kagan, a former solicitor general, recused 
herself), it could prompt opponents of 
affirmative action in other states to push for 
similar bans. 
But if the ban is overturned, states such as 
California again could weigh race in college 
admissions — and not a moment too soon, 
Orfield says. Admissions pressures there 
have become "very intense." He notes that 
UCLA alone last year received nearly 
100,000 applications. "It's a big state, it's 
growing … and we haven't been growing the 
higher education system." 
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NEW TOPIC: ADMITTING PRIVILEGES AND THE FUTURE OF 
ABORTION REGULATION 
“Admitting-Privileges Laws have Created High Hurdle for Abortion 
Providers to Clear” 
The Washington Post 
Sandhya Somashekhar 
August 10, 2014 
Among the raft of abortion restrictions 
passed by states in the past few years, one 
did not initially gain much notice — a 
requirement that doctors performing 
abortions obtain admitting privileges at a 
local hospital. 
But the measure, which 11 states have 
passed in some form, has proved an 
especially high hurdle for abortion providers 
to clear and a potent tool for antiabortion 
activists seeking to shut down abortion 
clinics. 
Already, more than a dozen clinics have 
been shuttered in Texas as a result of that 
state’s admitting-privileges law, and at least 
one closed in Tennessee. Groups say clinics 
in Oklahoma, Louisiana and Wisconsin face 
the same fate if new laws there are permitted 
to take effect. Three of Alabama’s five 
clinics, and the last remaining clinic in 
Mississippi, would have shuttered if not for 
court decisions this month that stopped an 
admitting-privileges law from going into 
effect. 
The state laws, on the surface, seem like a 
paperwork matter. They require physicians 
who perform abortions to forge relationships 
with hospitals so that they may treat patients 
there — a common-sense measure that will 
protect women’s health in case of a botched 
abortion, foes of the procedure say. 
In practice, many clinics have found getting 
these privileges very difficult. Their doctors 
often live too far away from the hospitals or 
cannot commit to admitting the minimum 
number of patients required for such a 
relationship. In other cases, hospitals have 
religious objections or have been reluctant to 
become embroiled in such a politically 
charged issue. 
A doctor at the sole clinic in Mississippi, for 
instance, said his staff reached out to 
13 hospitals to try to comply with the law. 
Six did not respond to their inquiries, and 
the rest informed them he would not qualify, 
he said. 
Courts have differed in their opinions of 
such laws, and the matter may be taken up 
by the Supreme Court. If they are ultimately 
upheld, the impact could be “huge” 
compared with other abortion restrictions 
that have been passed recently, said 
Elizabeth Nash, state-issues manager for the 
Guttmacher Institute, a research 
organization that supports abortion rights. 
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“It has just really taken over, in a sense, 
because it has such the potential for shutting 
down clinics,” she said. 
Tough rules to meet 
Antiabortion groups contend that if clinics 
are shutting down, that is only because they 
cannot meet basic safety standards. 
Requiring admitting privileges ensures that 
abortion doctors are vetted by their peers 
and prevents abortion doctors from simply 
abandoning their patients in trouble at the 
emergency room. “The need for admitting 
privileges requirements is clear,” Denise 
Burke, vice president of legal affairs at 
Americans United for Life, said in an e-
mail. 
Abortion rights proponents, however, argue 
that admitting privileges are medically 
unnecessary because anyone can be 
admitted to an emergency room. They 
regard the bills as a back-door attempt to 
shut down clinics in the wake of the 
antiabortion movement’s inability to 
overturn Roe v. Wade, the 1973 decision 
legalizing abortion nationwide. 
The admitting-privileges rule has proved so 
hard to meet in part because abortion 
doctors often live out of state, flying in to 
places such as Mobile and Birmingham to 
practice. One doctor in Alabama 
periodically travels to Montgomery from 
Nigeria, according to court papers. And 
large numbers of abortion clinic patients 
typically do not end up needing 
hospitalization, the providers and abortion 
advocates say. 
Hospitals wary of debate 
Federal law prohibits hospitals from 
discriminating against doctors who provide 
abortions. But doctors say the hospitals have 
nevertheless been hesitant to extend 
privileges because of a reluctance to involve 
themselves in the abortion debate, the 
advocates argue. 
For example, one Dallas hospital revoked 
the admitting privileges of two abortion 
doctors after it became a target of 
antiabortion protests. The hospital reinstated 
their privileges after the doctors filed suit. 
In his opinion last week striking down the 
Alabama law, District Judge Myron H. 
Thompson related testimony from one 
Birmingham abortion doctor who had 
privileges at two teaching hospitals in 
Atlanta, where she lived. Her residency in 
Georgia barred her from getting privileges at 
five Alabama hospitals, Thompson wrote. 
Three others were affiliated with the 
Catholic Church, which strictly opposes 
abortion. 
The doctor finally approached the 
University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
where she had previously been on the 
faculty. But the chairman of the obstetrics 
and gynecology department “explained to 
her that he would not hire her because of her 
work providing abortions and serving as 
medical director for Planned Parenthood,” 
Thompson wrote. “Because the university 
hospital is a state-funded institution, the 
chair did not want to involve his department 
with what he considered to be a politically 
contentious organization and procedure, that 
is, abortions.” 
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Willie J. Parker, the doctor at the Jackson 
Women’s Health Organization, 
Mississippi’s only abortion clinic, said in an 
interview that he was not surprised that so 
many hospitals did not respond to his staff’s 
requests or rejected him outright. He has 
admitting privileges at an out-of-state 
hospital and previously had privileges at 
Northwestern Memorial Hospital in 
Chicago, where he lived until recently. 
“In fairness to the hospitals, they were thrust 
in the middle of a very political situation,” 
Parker said. “For a hospital to do that, it 
would be making a conscious decision to 
take on the state legislature.” 
Abortion foes’ tactical shift 
The laws are part of a wave of state bills 
passed by state legislatures in recent years, 
driven by a conservative shift in those 
bodies as well as a change in strategy on the 
part of antiabortion activists, who have 
turned their focus away from Roe v. Wade in 
favor of laws that reduce access to the 
procedure. 
Clinic regulations have been part of that 
push, and the efforts gained momentum last 
year when a Philadelphia abortion doctor 
who operated in filthy conditions was 
convicted of murder for killing babies born 
alive during abortion procedures. A suit 
being litigated in Texas is challenging a law 
there scheduled to go into effect in 
September that would require abortion 
clinics to have the amenities of an 
emergency room rather than a doctor’s 
office. Abortion rights advocates say it 
would lead to the closure of more Texas 
clinics if enacted. 
That law, similar versions of which are in 
place in other states, may require clinics to 
buy or renovate property. 
Some antiabortion activists acknowledge 
they are not sorry to see clinics close shop. 
But they say they also want to see more 
safeguards to protect women who make the 
decision to end a pregnancy. 
“Many of us have realized Roe v. Wade is 
here. Now what can we do in light of it?” 
said Bob Foust, a longtime antiabortion 
activist in Birmingham. “To be honest, we’d 
like to see clinics close, but if they’re going 
to be open, they need to provide the best of 
care and have a physician with admitting 
privileges.” 
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“MS Admitting Privilege Law Struck Down by 5th Circuit” 
Harvard Law Blog 
Jonathan F. Will 
July 30, 2014 
On July 29, 2014 a panel of the 5th Circuit 
struck down a Mississippi statute that would 
have effectively closed the only remaining 
abortion clinic in the state. Just four months 
ago a different panel of the 5th Circuit 
upheld a nearly identical statute enacted in 
Texas. Both statutes require physicians 
performing abortions to have admitting 
privileges in local hospitals. 
The differing results are unremarkable 
because both the purpose and effects prongs 
of Casey’s undue burden analysis are 
necessarily fact driven. But there are some 
open questions worth highlighting from the 
decisions. The Mississippi law raises a 
matter of first impression. Namely, of what 
relevance is it, if any, that Mississippi 
women would have to cross state lines to 
obtain an abortion if the law was upheld? 
After all, even if the last abortion clinic 
closed, Mississippi women would have a 
shorter distance to travel to obtain such 
services than some Texas women now have 
because of the other 5th Circuit decision. 
In striking down the Mississippi law, the 5th 
Circuit cited an Equal Protection case from 
the 1930s involving racial discrimination, 
and suggested (at least in part) that 
Mississippi cannot “lean on its sovereign 
neighbors to provide protection of its 
citizens’ federal constitutional rights.” The 
idea being that if a state cannot rely on a 
sister state to provide education for 
minorities, a state likewise should not be 
permitted to rely on a sister state to provide 
abortion services. Regardless of my feelings 
about the outcome of the case, I have to 
agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Garza that this analogy doesn’t work very 
well. 
As the 5th Circuit majority itself points out, 
states have an affirmative obligation under 
the Equal Protection Clause to distribute 
services equally. But they do not have an 
affirmative obligation to provide abortion 
services; rather, they are prohibited 
(pursuant to a different clause in the 
Constitution) from enacting laws that have 
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice to 
have an abortion. The difference is not 
merely semantic.   Imagine a State X where 
no abortion clinic exists only because no 
physicians are willing to perform them. 
State X would not be obligated to open a 
clinic for its citizens, and any woman 
desiring an abortion would have to cross 
state lines to obtain it. Now imagine that 
State X decided to join the trend and enact a 
statute requiring any physician who might 
want to perform abortions to have admitting 
privileges. If a doctor wanted to open a 
clinic in State X, but then couldn’t get 
admitting privileges, it would be hard to 
claim that the statute imposed any burden at 
all on women, since their ability to obtain 
abortions would remain exactly the same. So 
crossing state lines alone does not seem to 
answer the question. 
Judge Garza also points out that the 
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majority’s rationale seems to suggest that 
any law that would close the last abortion 
clinic in a state would per se impose an 
undue burden (though the majority 
attempted to sidestep this by limiting its 
decision to the facts before it). For instance, 
what if the only existing clinic was terribly 
unsterile and had unacceptably high 
mortality rates. Certainly the state would 
have an interest in closing it regardless of 
the fact that women would then have to 
cross state lines to obtain an abortion. 
But there does seem to be something 
intuitively problematic (regardless of travel 
time) about a state intentionally forcing its 
citizens to navigate a foreign state’s body of 
often complex abortion laws; laws that such 
citizens would have no ability to change 
through the democratic process. And that 
brings me to perhaps the more troubling 
aspect of these 5th Circuit decisions. 
Priscilla Smith, Caitlin Borgmann, and 
others have written recently about courts de-
emphasizing the purpose prong of Casey’s 
undue burden analysis. Put simply, even if a 
given statute fails to impose an undue 
burden on a woman’s ability to choose to 
have an abortion, the law should fail if its 
purpose was to do so. This suggests that 
some level of inquiry should be performed 
into the intent behind the law. 
But here the 5th Circuit utilized an 
interesting move when evaluating the Texas 
statute. Rather than begin with Casey’s 
undue burden analysis (as the Supreme 
Court did in Gonzales v. Carhart), the court 
started with rational basis review. It 
reasoned that because all laws must survive 
rational basis review, it makes sense to start 
there. If the law fails, you never have to get 
into the more cumbersome undue burden 
analysis. 
This trick allowed the 5th Circuit to perform 
a very deferential rational basis review, 
which simply asked whether the statute was 
rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest. There is no requirement that the law 
actually succeed in serving that interest. And 
on their face, admitting privilege laws are 
related to women’s health – continuity of 
care and all that – which is a legitimate 
interest. A very deferential rational basis 
review would end there. 
At this point the 5th Circuit proclaimed that 
because the Texas law survived rational 
basis, it necessarily had a proper 
purpose.   Hence the sleight of hand; by 
starting with rational basis, the court 
avoided the more rigorous purpose inquiry 
that Casey would seem to demand. The 
majority of the panel deciding the 
Mississippi case avoided the inquiry 
altogether because no arguments were made 
regarding Casey’s purpose prong, and it felt 
bound by precedent on the rational basis 
inquiry. The dissent went a step further and 
suggested that Carhart served to eliminate 
the purpose prong of Casey altogether! 
That really is a shame. Recent cases in the 
7th Circuit and out of the Middle District of 
Alabama suggest (without having the 
opportunity to perform the analysis) that 
courts ought to take the purpose prong of 
Casey more seriously. A more searching 
analysis might smoke out statutes that really 
are intended to infringe on women’s rights 
(regardless of whether they are successful). 
That would go a long way to justify laws 
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that might shut down the sole, unsterile 
clinic operating in a state. 
Then again, as Judge Posner notes, 
determining the purpose behind these types 
of statutes will not be an easy task. Even if 
some public officials openly discuss their 
desire to outlaw abortion within a given 
state, members of the legislature may vote to 
approve the law out of true concern for 
women’s health. How many votes based on 
an illicit purpose would be necessary to 
strike down the law? 
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“Fifth Circuit Upholds Controversial Texas Abortion Law” 
The Washington Post 
Jonathan H. Adler 
March 28, 2014 
Yesterday, a three-judge panel of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
Texas’ controversial abortion law, known as 
H.B. 2. The challenged provisions of the law 
required doctors performing abortions to 
have admitting privileges at a local hospital 
and mandated that abortion-inducing drugs 
be prescribed only in accordance with those 
protocols approved by the U.S. Food & 
Drug Administration. In Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical 
Health Services v. Abbott, the Court found 
that neither requirement imposed an undue 
burden on exercise of the abortion right. The 
opinion was written by Judge Edith Jones, 
and joined by Judges Jennifer Elrod and 
Catharina Haynes. 
Could this case bring abortion back to the 
High Court? Perhaps. Although HB2 was 
quite controversial — and prompted a noted 
filibuster by State Sen. Wendy Davis — 
equivalent laws have been enacted in other 
states and upheld against constitutional 
challenge. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, for instance, 
both upheld similar admitting privilege 
requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit also upheld a similar 
restriction on the use of abortion-inducing 
drugs. On the other hand, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld a 
preliminary injunction against an admitting-
privilege requirement passed in Wisconsin. 
Although the procedural posture was 
different, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected 
some of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, 
creating an opening to argue there’s a circuit 
split.  In addition, the Court recently 
expressed interest in considering the 
permissibility of restrictions on the use of 
abortion-inducing drugs. 
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“The Fight to Criminalize Early-Term Abortions:  
New Rulings in Texas and Oklahoma Could Challenge the Last Remnant of 
Roe v. Wade” 
Slate 
Dahlia Lithwick 
November 1, 2013
In 2011, Oklahoma passed a law making it 
harder for doctors to prescribe abortion-
inducing drugs. Oklahoma’s Supreme Court 
struck down the law as unconstitutional. 
Then the Supreme Court agreed to review 
the case, but asked the Oklahoma court 
(which had written only a few paragraphs) 
to clarify why they struck down the law in 
the first place. This week, the Oklahoma 
Court explained itself: The state’s effort to 
regulate abortion-inducing drugs amounted 
to a total ban on medication abortions. And 
so it was unconstitutional. 
One day earlier, a lower court in Texas, 
looking at a substantially similar (but not 
identical) effort to regulate medication 
abortions, upheld the provision, albeit with 
an exception. If a woman need a nonsurgical 
abortion to protect her health or life, she can 
still get it. The raft of new efforts to regulate 
medication abortions are confusing, and the 
legal questions surrounding them are even 
more so. How can we square what happened 
in Texas with what happened in Oklahoma, 
and what does it all mean for the future of 
this type of abortion at the Supreme Court, 
where the Oklahoma case may be heard in 
the near future? 
The constitutional questions around 
medication abortions are new and 
complicated and different from the usual 
fights we’ve witnessed over surgical 
abortion and TRAP laws (Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Providers). 
Medication abortions mainly involve the 
drug mifepristone, or RU-486. They take 
place in the first trimester—and that means 
the state-erected limits are often thinly 
disguised state efforts to challenge what 
remains of Roe v Wade. Oklahoma Gov. 
Mary Fallin, signing her state’s bill in May 
2011, called it “a critical part of our effort to 
promote the cause of life.” Gov. Rick Perry 
has expressly stated that his goal is to make 
abortion at any stage “a thing of the past.” In 
effect, these challenges force questions that 
have been unanswered for years at the court: 
Is Roe still on safe ground? Are state efforts 
to force the question back before the high 
court going to pay off? And what does it 
mean when courts seem to find it easier to 
write about the rights of doctors to practice 
good medicine than the rights of women to 
receive it? 
Twelve states, including Oklahoma, have 
some form of medication-abortion 
regulations on the books. The Oklahoma ban 
was incredibly poorly drafted, essentially 
sweeping in any “abortion inducing 
medication,” which made it easy for the 
state Supreme Court to see it as a total ban. 
The other states have been sneakier. 
As Linda Greenhouse explained in 
September, the issue here is not the 
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abortions themselves. The statues revolve 
around how doctors may prescribe the series 
of pills that induce them. Only one drug—
mifepristone—has been approved by the 
FDA for inducing abortions, and only for the 
first nine weeks of pregnancy. But the way 
doctors use this drug and others related to it 
has changed in the intervening years. At this 
point, the most common medication-
abortion protocol requires that women take 
two pills: mifepristone, which terminates the 
pregnancy, and misoprostol, two days later, 
which causes the uterus to expel the 
pregnancy. In most states, women can take 
the first pill at her doctor’s office and the 
second pill at home, which helps improve 
access for poor or rural women who live far 
from abortion clinics, can’t take off several 
days from work, and want to terminate as 
early as possible. 
Under the 2011 Oklahoma law, the state 
required physicians to follow the dosage and 
procedures only as written on the F.D.A. 
label. The prohibition on allowing doctors to 
prescribe the pill in a manner considered 
"off-label" effectively means that although 
research and best practices have evolved (as 
they have for medications approved for 
cancer and migraines and most other things), 
physicians must continue to prescribe 
dosages that are medically outdated. As 
Amanda Marcotte explained in Slate, since 
the FDA label was approved, further 
research has shown that the second pill in 
the series can safely be taken at home, and 
that the 600 milligrams of Mifeprex required 
by the label is too high. Most doctors agree 
that only 200 milligrams are needed. Finally, 
as Greenhouse clarified, “While the original 
F.D.A. label specified that the drugs should 
be used only up to 49 days of pregnancy, 
doctors have found the regimen safe and 
effective for up to 63 days—nine weeks of 
pregnancy.” 
To sum up, the FDA label mandates a 
protocol that is more cumbersome, 
expensive, and dangerous for most women. 
Emily Bazelon explained why FDA 
reauthorization has not been sought, even 
though, at this point “96 percent of all 
medication abortions now involve an 
evidence-based regimen that departs from 
the FDA protocol that’s on the label.” That’s 
why a district court judge in Oklahoma, 
looking at the restriction, found that limiting 
physicians to the label requirements was “so 
completely at odds with the standard that 
governs the practice of medicine that it can 
serve no purpose other than to prevent 
women from obtaining abortions and to 
punish and discriminate against those 
women who do.” In other words, he got it. 
And then he stopped Oklahoma’s law from 
going into effect. 
The issue in Oklahoma, though, was that the 
law as drafted was ambiguous. It either had 
the effect of banning all medication 
abortions, or—as the state contended—
merely provided that medication abortions 
induced with Mifeprex had to follow the 
FDA protocol. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court decision from 2012, which struck 
down the law, merely found that the law as 
written was unconstitutional under Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case that 
reaffirmed Roe but permitted abortion 
regulations that are "reasonable" and do not 
impose an "undue burden" on women. 
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So what happened this week in Oklahoma? 
Having been told by the Supreme Court to 
unpack its earlier decision striking down the 
medication abortion law, the state Supreme 
Court took 22 pages to explain that yes, in 
its view, the Oklahoma statute barred 
physicians from using misoprostol (the 
second drug in the protocol) and 
methotrexate (a third drug sometimes used 
in the abortion-inducing protocol). By 
focusing on outdated FDA regulations, the 
state’s intention was to outlaw medication 
abortion. 
Last April, a district court judge in North 
Dakota struck down a similar ban on off-
label uses of abortion inducing drugs. But 
last year a federal appeals court upheld a 
related Ohio law, largely on the theory that 
the restriction was not unconstitutional if a 
majority of women could still access 
abortion in some other manner. The split 
increases the chance that the Supreme Court 
will have to decide the issue. 
Meanwhile, in Texas this week, U.S. District 
Judge Lee Yeakel upheld a provision of the 
Texas law that limited doctors to FDA 
labeling requirements for medication 
abortions. The Texas law differs from the 
Oklahoma statute HOW? Judge Yeakel 
didn’t seem to buy the state’s proffered 
safety reason for forcing doctors to stick to 
the labelling requirements: “This court finds 
that, when performed in accordance with the 
off-label protocol, medication abortion is a 
safe and effective procedure, as is 
medication abortion with the FDA 
protocol.” He also found that “taken as a 
whole, the FDA protocol is clearly more 
burdensome to a woman than the off-label 
protocol.” But then he deemed the burden 
insufficient to strike the law down. The 
restriction wasn’t an unconstitutional ban, he 
reasoned, since women have other options. 
And to make sure that women’s health isn’t 
compromised, he wrote a do-it-yourself 
health exception into his opinion: “The 
medication abortion provision may not be 
enforced against any physician who 
determines, in appropriate medical 
judgment, to perform the medication-
abortion using off-label protocol for the 
preservation of the life or health of the 
mother.” 
As a result of this ruling, in Texas, some 
doctors must prescribe heavier doses of 
abortion-inducing drugs (unless they see a 
threat to the health or life of the woman) and 
can only offer medication abortions up to 
seven weeks into a pregnancy, as opposed to 
nine. 
How to reconcile the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court’s decision to strike down the law with 
the Texas court’s determination that it could 
stand? Partly the bad drafting in Oklahoma. 
But it feels like something else is going on. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down 
the statute by focusing a great deal of 
attention on the professional imperative 
requiring that licensed physicians adhere to 
best practices. Indeed the whole concluding 
section revolves around the professional 
obligations of doctors and the Hippocratic 
oath. The court’s path here is very different 
path than the one taken by Yeakel, who 
focused on a woman’s right to medical care 
(and then said that a woman’s right was not 
compromised as long as alternative 
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procedures exist). This semi-solicitude for a 
woman’s health is the result of a years-long 
campaign by opponents of choice, to suggest 
that protecting women’s health is so 
critically important, that every other concern 
falls away. 
If the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruling had 
been a full-throated discussion of women’s 
rights, and all the ways regulating 
medication abortions drastically restrict 
them, it would have been close to perfect. 
But the court was thinking about physicians. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s attention to 
the rights (and statutory responsibilities) of 
physicians is reminiscent of Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s original reasoning in Roe, 
which as Jeffrey Toobin recently reminded 
us, had a lot less to do with a woman’s 
rights than those of her physician. As 
Toobin wryly observed, the word 
“physician” appears in Roe 48 times, the 
word “woman” 44 times. Later cases made 
clear that the rights of the physician and 
woman were in fact aligned; that this is the 
relationship on which the state must not 
intrude. 
It just shouldn’t be the case, 40 years after 
Roe, that courts still don’t see the rights of 
women and those of their doctors as equally 
compelling; that such opinions still just 
don’t seem to “write” (as the lawyers say). 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court decision was 
correct, but it still pinches that the outcome 
is rooted in the harms to doctors who can't 
practice medicine as they see fit, as opposed 
to the needs of women to get the care they 
are due. Efforts to legislate first-trimester, 
constitutionally permissible abortion right 
out of existence, are subversive and 
paternalistic. And the cure for legislative 
paternalism shouldn’t be judicial 
paternalism. 
 
 
